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Evaluating Formal Models of Science

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Abstract

This paper presents an account of how to evaluate formal models of science: models and simulations in social epistemology designed to draw normative conclusions about the social structure of scientific research. I argue that such models should be evaluated according to their representational and predictive accuracy. Using these criteria and comparisons with familiar models from science, I argue that most formal models of science are incapable of supporting normative conclusions.

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Notes

  1. Unlike the other papers discussed here, Hong and Page (2004) do not discuss science specifically, but rather problem solving generally. However, due to the similarity of their approach to that employed by philosophers of science, I treat this paper as part of the formal models of science literature.

  2. Philosophers often distinguish between Aristoltean idealization, which ignores irrelevant features of a system, and Galilean idealization, which deliberately distorts the system. According to this taxonomy, Cartwright’s “Non-Galilean” idealizations would actually be a subset of Galilean idealization. For simplicity I maintain Cartwright’s terminology.

  3. This is not to say that Schelling’s model involves no non-Galilean idealizations. For instance, it assumes that moving is costless and that individuals of either colour are equally free to move to any vacant location.

  4. As a reviewer observed, this is a weak, qualitative prediction. Schelling’s model, like some formal models of science, relies on the robustness of this behaviour for its explanatory appeal. As discussed below, what distinguishes Schelling’s model from most formal models of science is not its predictive accuracy, but that this behaviour is generated by Galilean (stripping away) idealizations.

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  1. Bard Prison Initiative, Bard College, PO Box 193, Tivoli, NY, 12583, USA

    Michael Thicke

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Thicke, M. Evaluating Formal Models of Science. J Gen Philos Sci 51, 315–335 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-018-9440-1

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