Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Ad Hoc Philosophy of Science

  • Discussion
  • Published:
Journal for General Philosophy of Science Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

It has been shown that the concept of ad hocness is ambiguous when applied to natural science. Here, it is established that a similar ambiguity is present also when the concept is applied in a philosophical debate. Neil Tennant’s proposal for solving Fitch’s paradox has been accused for being ad hoc several times, and he has presented several defenses. In this paper, it is established that ad hocness is never defined, although each author uses different notions of the concept. And we see that no reason to adopt a certain notion is offered.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. Hunt (2012).

  2. From now on, I will use ad hoc and unprincipled as synonymous.

  3. Fitch (1963).

  4. Williamson (1982), Percival (1990).

  5. Edgington (1985).

  6. Tennant (1997).

  7. Williamson (2000, 2009), Tennant (2001a, 2010).

  8. Hand and Kvanvig (1999, 2).

  9. Hand and Kvanvig (1999, 4).

  10. Tennant (1997, 272).

  11. Tennant (1997, 272–273).

  12. Tennant (1997, 247–259).

  13. Tennant (1997, 246–247).

  14. Tennant (2001b).

  15. DeVidi and Kenyon (2003, 485).

  16. Hand and Kvanvig (1999, 2).

  17. Douven (2005, 49–50).

  18. Douven (2005, 50).

  19. Tennant (2001b, 110).

  20. Douven (2005, 51).

  21. Philosophers worth mentioning are, among others, Comte, Feyerabend, Kuhn and Lakatos.

  22. Popper (1963, 37).

  23. Popper (1963, 241).

  24. Popper (1963, 241–242).

  25. Brush (1989, 1994, 1999).

  26. Brush (1999, 208).

  27. Leplin (1975).

  28. Leplin (1975, 336–337).

  29. Leplin (1975, 318).

  30. Hunt (2012).

  31. Hunt (2012, 10).

References

  • Brush, S. G. (1989). Prediction and theory evaluation: The case of light bending. Science, 246(4934), 1124–1129.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brush, S. G. (1994). Dynamics of theory change: The role of predictions. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 2, 133–145.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brush, S. G. (1999). Why was relativity accepted? Physics in Perspective, 1(2), 184–214.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • DeVidi, D., & Kenyon, T. (2003). Analogues of knowability. Australasian Journal of Philosopohy, 81(4), 481–495.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Douven, I. (2005). A principled solution to Fitch’s paradox. Erkenntnis, 62(1), 47–69.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Edgington, D. (1985). The paradox of knowability. Mind, 94(376), 557–568.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fitch, F. B. (1963). A logical analysis of some value concepts. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 28(2), 135–142.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hand, M., & Kvanvig, J. (1999). Tennant on knowability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77(4), 422–428.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hunt, C. (2012). On ad hoc hypotheses. Philosophy of Science, 79(1), 1–14.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Leplin, J. (1975). The concept of an ad hoc hypothesis. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 5(4), 309–345.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Percival, P. (1990). Fitch and intuitionistic knowability. Analysis, 50(3), 182–187.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Popper, K. (1963). Conjectures and refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tennant, N. (1997). The taming of the true. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tennant, N. (2001a). Is every truth knowable? Reply to Williamson. Ratio, 14(3), 263–280.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tennant, N. (2001b). Is every truth knowable? Reply to Hand and Kvanvig. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79(1), 107–113.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tennant, N. (2010). Williamson’s woes. Synthese, 173(1), 9–23.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Williamson, T. (1982). Intuitionism disproved? Analysis, 42(4), 203–207.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Williamson, T. (2000). Tennant on knowable truth. Ratio, 13(2), 99–114.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Williamson, T. (2009). Tennant’s troubles. In: J. Salerno (Ed.), New essays on the knowability paradox (pp. 183–205). New York: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Lund University, Lund, Sweden

    Thomas Johansson

  2. Viken, Sweden

    Thomas Johansson

Authors
  1. Thomas Johansson
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Thomas Johansson.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Johansson, T. Ad Hoc Philosophy of Science. J Gen Philos Sci 50, 297–306 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-018-9438-8

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-018-9438-8

Keywords

Search

Navigation