Abstract
Probabilistic realism and syntactical positivism were two among outdated theories that Feigl criticised on account of their semantical poverty. In this paper, I argue that a refined version of probabilistic realism, which relies on what Feigl specified as the pragmatic description of the symbolic behaviour of scientists’ estimations and foresight, is defendable. This version of statistical realism does not need to make the plausibility of realist thesis dependent on the conventional acceptance of a constructed semantic metalanguage. I shall rely on the Prediction Error Minimisation theory (PEM) to support my probabilistic version of realism with a scientifically-informed and naturalistically plausible statistical account of the theories-world relationship which has a pragmatic ring to it.
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Notes
In a nutshell, the argument is that realism is the only stance that does not represent the empirical success of science as miraculous (Laudan 1981). The same argument could be formulated in terms of Inference to the Best Explanation, by saying that the realist thesis provides the best explanation for the empirical success of theories.
I owe this remark to one of the reviewers of this journal.
Interestingly enough, NMA has been mostly assimilated by the Structural Realist extension of semantic view of theories. Structural Realism (SR) seeks to reconcile NMA with the antirealist pessimism about the continuity (and intactness of the references of the theoretical terms) of the theories through shifting historical scenes (Worrall 1989). To realize the reconciliatory goal and bring about the best of both Worrall suggested that it would be best to make ontological commitments not with regard to the content of scientific theories but their mathematical form. Worrall’s proposal lines up fairly neatly with the probabilistic realists’ attempt at replacing “discontinuous and historical character (action at a spatial and/or temporal distance) of the phenomenalistically restricted account with spatio-temporally continuous (contiguous) and nomologically coherent formulation on the level of hypothetical construction” (Feigl 1950, 40). Despite the fact that Worrall himself left the question of the logical framework of the regimentation of the structure of scientific theories open—and interestingly enough called his view structural or “syntactical realism” (Worrall 1989, 112)—later SR-theorists insisted that it is best to use model theory and lean towards semantic view (French and Ladyman 1999; French 2015).
Reichenbach (2006, chapter 2) struggled to substantiate a probabilistic account of inference of the existence of the external world. He proposed the following thought experiment:
We imagine a world in which the whole of mankind is imprisoned in a huge cube, the walls of which are made of sheets of white cloth, translucent as the screen of a cinema but not permeable by direct light rays. Outside this cube there live birds, the shadows of which are projected on the ceiling of the cube by the sun rays; on account of the translucent character of this screen, the shadow-figures of the birds can be seen by the men within the cube. The birds themselves cannot be seen, and their singing cannot be heard. To introduce the second set of shadow-figures on the vertical plane, we imagine a system of mirrors outside the cube which a friendly ghost has constructed in such a way that a second system of light rays running horizontally projects shadow-figures of the birds on one of the vertical walls of the cube […]. As a genuine ghost this invisible friend of mankind does not betray anything of his construction, or of the world outside the cube, to the people within; he leaves them entirely to their own observations and waits to see whether they will discover the birds outside. He even constructs a system of repulsive forces so that any near approach toward the walls of the cube is impossible for men; any penetration through the walls, therefore, is excluded, and men are dependent on the observation of the shadows for all statements they make about the "external" world, the world outside the cube. (Reichenbach 2006, 115–116).
According to Reichenbach, the cubical world finally allows for the emergence of a genius who infers, from observation of the ceiling, that the dark spots are birds. He also discovers that generally the images of the birds on the ceiling correspond (pairwise) to the images of the birds on the walls. Accordingly, this observer would conclude that each two matching shades “are nothing but effects caused by one individual thing situated outside the cube within free space” (ibid, 117). In this vein, Riechenbach defended a probability-based account of causal relation according to which the interference of chance in correlating the matching shades is not impossible but only improbable or unlikely (ibid, 121).
I owe this formulation of Sober’s view to one of the reviewers of this paper.
In a nutshell, counterfactual account holds that: “C causes E if and only if it is true both that (a) if C were to occur, then E would occur, and (b) if C were not to occur, then E would not occur” (Woodward 2007b, 19).
I owe this remark to one of the reviewers of this journal.
As the example indicates, PEM could contribute to a 'naturalised' understanding of prior probabilities. As my examination of the probabilistic realism in the previous sections indicates, the absence of a viable basis for assigning priors in an objective manner amounts to a serious hindrance to the development of probabilistic realism. By dissolving this issue, PEM could strengthen the roots of the probabilistic version of realism. Of course, an antirealist, such as van Fraassen, could accept this sort of naturalization and still remain a constructive empiricist. However, a version of moderate realism that builds upon enactivism (and ecological- environmental psychology) and draws on pragmatic considerations, does more justice to the scientific facts about the biological mechanisms of the formation of objective knowledge (in comparison to a headstrong version of empiricism). In entertaining this assumption, I am leaning towards Roy Wood Sellars’ (and Wilfrid Sellars’) version of realism rather than outright empiricism. I owe this discussion to the comment of one of the reviewers of this journal. Sellars’ approach (based on the contribution of the enactivist and pragmatist elements to a moderate form of realism) is at least as viable and down-to-earth as empiricism, but it can also satisfy the realist taste.
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I am greatly indebted to the reviewers and guest editors of this journal for their constructive comments. The debt is gratefully acknowledged.
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Beni, M.D. Reconstructing Probabilistic Realism: Re-enacting Syntactical Structures. J Gen Philos Sci 51, 293–313 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-018-9426-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-018-9426-z