Abstract
This discussion paper is a reply to Stathis Psillos’ paper “Induction and Natural Necessities” (J Gen Philos Sci 48(3):327–340, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-017-9366-z), published in this journal. In that paper, he attempts to refute David Armstrong’s solution to the problem of induction. To accomplish this desideratum, he proposes that the best explanation for our observed regularities is a sort of “best before date” necessity. That is, necessary connections may break down and are not by default timeless. He develops arguments against my (Castro, Teorema 33(3):67–82, 2014) defence of the necessitarian solution regarding a previous paper by Beebee (Noûs 45(3):504–527, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00821.x). He alleges that (a) best before date necessity is no worse than timeless necessity; (b) his proposal does not imply any further inductive generalisation to timeless necessity; and (c) inductive inferences are justified. In this discussion paper, I provide arguments against these three claims.
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Notes
Hildebrand (2018) develops a different strategy against Beebee’s challenge. The timeless necessitarian does not need to show that NC is better that NCsf. Instead, the timeless necessitarian needs only to reject some (three) non-induction-justifying necessitarian hypotheses that fill out the ground for time-limited laws. I think that this strategy may be replicated against Psillos. However, in this paper, I endorse the strategy that I followed against Beebee. I assume that the time-limited necessitarians believe in time-limited laws despite the fact that, in light of our best metaphysics, these time-limited laws are simply unfounded, as Hildebrand carefully demonstrates.
If the bb-necessitarian claims that the conclusion is inferred only by induction from premise (1), then bb’s argument collapses into the “old” enumerative induction before Harman, where IBE simply evaporates. That is, bb-necessities are a red herring.
See Devitt (1984, 4).
This idea was adapted from Hildebrand (2018, sect. 6.5).
See also my (Castro 2014).
References
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Acknowledgements
I am very grateful to Carl Hoefer and an anonymous reviewer of this journal whose detailed comments have substantially improved previous versions of this paper. I am also grateful to LOGOS, University of Barcelona, for providing a friendly atmosphere to my sabbatical visit.
Funding
This work was supported by grant SFRH/BSAB/128040/2016, Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, Programa Operacional Capital Humano.
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Castro, E. Best Before Date Necessity: A Reply to Psillos. J Gen Philos Sci 50, 163–169 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-018-9425-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-018-9425-0