Abstract
The patent system appears to make three ontological assumptions often associated with scientific realism: there is a natural world that is independent of human knowledge and technology; invented products can be unobservable things; and invented products have causal powers. Although a straightforward reading of patent laws implies these ontological commitments, it is not at all clear that what the patent system has to say about the world has any bearing on issues of scientific realism. While realists might embrace the patent system’s apparent ontology as providing additional support for their view, anti-realists could propose an alternative interpretation of patent law that does not involve realist ontological commitments. Thus, questions about the patent system’s ontology depend on whether one takes patent laws at face value or defends an interpretation of patent law motivated by philosophical theory. Philosophers of science should pay attention to the practice of patenting, even if they ultimately reject the patent system’s apparent ontology and offer an alternative interpretation.
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Notes
By ‘unobservable entity’ I mean something that we cannot observe with our unaided senses. See van Fraassen (1980).
Other countries have similar laws.
By “laws of nature” the courts generally include any type of empirical generalization.
My aim in this paper is not to critique specific philosophical positions on scientific ontology but to explore how different approaches (such as social constructivism, realism, etc.) might respond to the patent system's apparent ontology. For further discussion of these positions see Salmon (1984), Kitcher (1995), and Chakravartty (2007).
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Resnik, D.B. Scientific Realism and the Patent System. J Gen Philos Sci 47, 69–77 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-016-9326-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-016-9326-z