Abstract
In this paper, I explore the possibilities for arriving at a useful conception of methodological reductionism. Some participants in the debate talk about methodological reductionism as a research program. I argue that the concept of a research program, at least in Lakatos’ sense, cannot account for the diverse nature of methodological reductionism. I then present my own concept of a research directive as a useful alternative and elaborate on this by drawing on Hasok Chang’s theory of ontological principles and epistemic activities. According to my view, the reductionist research directive can be characterized as consisting of the principles fundamental ontological homogeneity, part-whole asymmetry, and orderliness, together with the corresponding activities construction of identities, decomposition, and unification. I suggest that looking at reductionism in this way enables us to understand it as a gradual concept and thus go beyond the simplistic yes-or-no-questions that dominate many current debates on this topic.
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Notes
It is surely a misrepresentation to directly associate Popper with naive falsificationism and Kuhn with radical incommensurability. Lakatos himself thought about his conception of sophisticated (non-naive!) falsificationism as following “Popper’s way” (Lakatos 1970, 116). For Kuhn’s conception of incommensurability, cf. Hoyningen-Huene (1989, 212ff).
At this point it should be noted that the concept of an RD does not commit us to subscribing to Lakatos’ theory of research programs. One might just as easily think about RDs as showing up inside, e.g., the framework of a (Kuhnian) paradigm or the construction process of a mechanistic model.
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Lausen, F. Reductionism as a Research Directive. J Gen Philos Sci 45, 263–279 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-014-9255-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-014-9255-7