Abstract
In previous work, I have sought to show that the basic argument for epistemic relativism derives from the problem of the criterion that stems from ancient Pyrrhonian scepticism. Because epistemic relativism depends upon a sceptical strategy, it is possible to respond to relativism on the basis of an anti-sceptical strategy. I argue that the particularist response to scepticism proposed by Roderick Chisholm may be combined with a naturalistic and reliabilist conception of epistemic warrant as the basis for a satisfactory response to epistemic relativism. In this paper, I outline this particularist response to relativism, and provide further commentary on the relationship between naturalism and particularism. In addition, I set the approach in contrast with reflective equilibrium approaches in epistemology. I also briefly explore the connection between the particularist response to relativism and G. E. Moore’s defense of an external world.
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Notes
My claim that relativism and scepticism stem from a common source relates specifically to the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. The connection with other forms of scepticism, such as Cartesian scepticism, is indirect. But, as we will see in the final section, a connection may be made via G. E. Moore’s commonsense particularist response to scepticism about the external world.
I employ the term ‘norm’ as a general term for epistemic standards or rules to which appeal is made to justify a belief or to warrant acceptance of a theory. Hence, I regard the paradigm-specific rules of Kuhnian normal science as well as Kuhn’s non-algorithmic values of theory-choice as examples of epistemic norms. Equally, I take the poison-oracle which Azande tribesmen employ as a basis for beliefs about witchcraft and everyday misfortunes as an epistemic norm as well. In the present context, I also take criteria in the sense relevant to Pyrrhonian scepticism to constitute epistemic norms.
Though I have independently developed this line of thought, the idea is not without precedent. For example, Williams (2007, 94) takes it to be the “fundamental argument for epistemic relativism”.
I find it natural to describe such local settings as contexts, and in general I will do so. However, it is important to note that contexts in the sense at issue here are different from the kinds of contexts at issue in contextualist epistemology. We are not here speaking of alternative contexts of discourse in which variable conversational presuppositions affecting knowledge attribution are in place. Rather, we are speaking of different cultures or intellectual contexts in which different epistemic norms may be employed. I devote a section to further exploration of the relationship between relativism and contextualism in ‘Scepticism, Relativism and a Naturalistic Particularism’ (2014).
For example, in Sankey (2012) I consider an argument from the diversity of values which may be employed due to the underdetermination of theories by data. I also consider two arguments described by Harvey Siegel, the argument from non-neutrality and the argument from perspective (Siegel 2011). However, I argue that these arguments are all less fundamental than the argument based on the problem of the criterion. I have developed my approach in detail in the context of a form of epistemic relativism which depends upon methodological incommensurability in Sankey (2013b).
I frame the argument in terms of norms rather than criteria because this is my preferred terminology. The argument may of course be framed in terms of criteria.
Note that I have formulated the problem of the criterion in the form of a trilemma. As I will mention later, Chisholm formulates the problem in a form that is known as the diallelus or wheel.
In his comment on my approach to relativism, Markus Seidel objects that the sceptical basis for relativism prevents justification by operative norms from being genuine justification (Seidel 2013, 136–137). In response, I distinguish between weak justification where a belief is justified by appeal to some norm and strong justification where the norm itself is also justified. The relativist allows weak justification, but denies that there may be strong justification. See Sankey (2013a, 142).
More specifically, in Sankey (2011) I show that an argumentative strategy that draws significantly on the problem of the criterion features in the treatment of relativism by such figures as Barnes and Bloor, Feyerabend, Kuhn, Laudan, Popper and Worrall, among others. I do not, of course, claim that all of these writers are relativists. My point is simply that the problem of the criterion plays an important role in thinking about relativism amongst key figures in the history and philosophy of science.
The question of how it is possible to answer one of the questions without answering the other constitutes the form of the problem of the criterion that is known as the diallelus or the wheel. See Sankey (2011, section 2.1) for different formulations of the problem by Sextus Empiricus.
Of course, while the naturalist may allow that particular items of knowledge are indeed items of knowledge, this does not entail that the naturalist is necessarily a particularist. I take there to be a close affinity between naturalism and particularism. However, a naturalist might be tempted to adopt a methodist stance. Such a methodist naturalist might take particular items of knowledge to constitute knowledge in virtue of their satisfaction of the criteria. But, while this may be a possible position, such a methodist naturalist must confront Chisholm’s point that the choice of epistemic criteria prior to identification of particular instances of knowledge must surely be arbitrary. Suffice to say that I regard particularism and naturalism to be a more natural fit than methodism and naturalism.
It may be objected that mathematics and logic are not empirical, so that the epistemology of such areas must be a priori. I do not wish to enter this dispute here. Suffice to say that the naturalist may respond in various ways, for example by insisting that even such seemingly a priori disciplines are in fact empirical or perhaps by allowing that even an empirical discipline must involve non-empirical elements.
Here a comment is in order in relation to the possibility of epistemic goals other than truth and empirical confirmation. Epistemologists may tend to assume that truth is the only epistemic goal. But in the philosophy of science, there has been significant dispute about the aims of science. While scientific realists hold that the aim of science is truth, aims such as empirical adequacy, predictive accuracy, overall simplicity and practical control over the environment have been advocated by anti-realist philosophers of science. Laudan’s account of the appraisal of epistemic norms is not committed to any particular aim of science.
My principal source for the idea that epistemic norms may be subject to empirical appraisal as reliable means to epistemic goals is the normative naturalism of Laudan (1996, chapters 7 and 9), as well as the methodological pragmatism of Nicholas Rescher (1977). Where my version of this approach differs particularly from Laudan’s normative naturalism is that I place the approach within a realist framework which takes truth to be an attainable cognitive aim (see Sankey 2000).
This response to the relativist takes relativism to be mistaken because some norms are objectively better than others. Of course, one might seek a stronger response to the effect that there is one uniquely correct set of epistemic norms. As opposed to such a “monistic” or “absolutist” approach, I favour a pluralist view which allows that there may be multiple norms (or sets of norms) capable of providing genuine epistemic warrant. (See Sankey (2000) for a development of this view with respect to the methodology of science.)
In treating particularism as a methodology, Greco follows Michael DePaul. For the idea that particularism is a methodology see, for example, DePaul (1988).
In taking particularism as a meta-epistemology, Lemos follows Ernest Sosa, who writes that “particularism and methodism are meta-epistemological positions, for they tell us which justifies which of two sorts of epistemic knowledge” (Sosa 1980, 558).
Though I here focus on the relationship between epistemological particularism and commonsense realism, I hold that scientific realism is an outgrowth of common sense. This ensures that the present approach to epistemic relativism may be integrated with scientific realism. Thus, the generally realist outlook to which I refer in the text is a position which regards commonsense realism and scientific realism as combining to form a single, unified stance.
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I am grateful to anonymous referees for comments which have enabled me to introduce a number of improvements into this paper.
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Sankey, H. Relativism, Particularism and Reflective Equilibrium. J Gen Philos Sci 45, 281–292 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-014-9253-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-014-9253-9