Who’s Afraid of Scientific Fictions?
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Notes
Schlick (1932), 85 and 107. For an excellent discussion of the role of Vaihinger’s fictionalism in early Carnap up to the Aufbau, where knowledge is deemed possible in the form of a system of scientific concepts and statements Carnap referred to as ‘fictional constructions’, see Carus (2008, ch. 4).
Reichenbach (1922, 5–12).
Scheffler (1963, ch. 13).
Fine (1993).
Frigg (2010).
In Niven (1890, vol. 2, 775).
Cat (2001) and forthcoming.
Ibid.
Kant drew a distinction for scientific representation, Callender and Cohen have done so more recently for representation in a non-metaphysical, Gricean way (Callender and Cohen 2006; for the case of reduction see Spector 1978). In fact, they distinguish between the constitution, regulation and recognition (some important conditions taken as constituents by some authors play a heuristic role in helping recognize the action of other, key constituents). They argue that many specific proposals such as the ones by Teller, Giere, Suárez, etc., are either vacuous or too demanding. Indeed, Suárez’s account of representation claims a minimalism that skirts the requirement of necessary and sufficient conditions and yet he criticizes alternative views and motivates his own against that requirement.
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Cat, J. Mauricio Suárez (ed.): Fictions in Science. Philosophical Essays on Modeling and Idealization. J Gen Philos Sci 43, 187–194 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-012-9186-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-012-9186-0