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Collective action, institutional design and evolutionary “blindness”

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Notes

  1. As Hayek (1967: 32) summarizes it, the basic proposition of Darwinian evolutionary theory is “that a mechanism of reduplication with transmittable variations and competitive selection ... will in the course of time produce a great variety of structures adapted ... to the environment and to each other.”—See also Campbell (1974b: 143): “There are three major components to the model: (1) Variations, a heterogeneity of alteration on existing form. (2) Systematic selection from among the variations. Systematic elimination. (3) Retention, preservation (and, in many systems, multiplicative duplication) of selected variations.”

  2. Popper (1972: 261): “All this may be expressed by saying that the growth of our knowledge is the result of a process closely resembling what Darwin called ‘natural selection’; that is, the natural selection of hypotheses: ... a competitive struggle which eliminates those hypotheses which are unfit. This interpretation may be applied to animal knowledge, pre-scientific knowledge, and to scientific knowledge.”

  3. Campbell (1974a: 422): “In going beyond what is already known, one cannot but go blindly. If one can go wisely, this indicates already achieved wisdom of some general sort.”

  4. See also p. 29 of Ostrom’s paper: “For rule configurations to evolve, there must be processes that (1) generate variety, (2) select rules based on relatively accurate information about comparative performance in a particular environment, and (3) retain rules that perform better in regard to criteria such as efficiency, equity, accountability, and sustainability.”

  5. Campbell (1974b: 42): “If one is expanding knowledge beyond what one knows, one has no choice but to explain without benefit of wisdom (gropingly, blindly, stupidly, haphazardly.”

References

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  • Vanberg, V. J. (2013). Darwinian paradigm, cultural evolution and human purposes: On F. A. Hayek’s evolutionary view of the market. Journal of Evolutionary Economics. doi:10.1007/s00191-013-0305-9.

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  1. Walter Eucken Institut, Freiburg, Germany

    Viktor J. Vanberg

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  1. Viktor J. Vanberg
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Correspondence to Viktor J. Vanberg.

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Vanberg, V.J. Collective action, institutional design and evolutionary “blindness”. J Bioecon 16, 99–104 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10818-013-9162-8

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