Abstract
In this paper, I show that there are important but hitherto unnoticed similarities between key figures of the Vienna Circle and early defenders of sociology of knowledge. The similarities regard their stance on potential implications of the study of science for political and societal issues. I argue that notably Otto Neurath and Karl Mannheim are concerned with proposing a genuine political philosophy of science that is remarkably different from today’s emerging interest in the relation between science and society in philosophy of science.
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Notes
Of course, the regained reflection on the relation between science and society/politics is mainly due to the pioneer work of Paul Feyerabend and also to discussions in the sociology of science in the 1970s; feminist philosophy of science needs to be mentioned in this context, too (Harding 1991; Longino 1990).
These developments led to much debatte and polemics from philosophy of science in the analytical tradition that focused on the questions of relativism and constructivism. Importantly, the more recent developments in analytical philosophy—and Philip Kitcher can serve as witness here—see a reevaluation of the issue from authors from a distinguished realist and anti-relativist point of view.
See especially Reisch (2005) for the historical background.
A notable exemption is Howard (2009).
See e.g. Carnap et al. (1973, 301f.): “[...] endeavors toward a new organization of economic and social relations, toward the unification of mankind, toward a reform of school and education, all show an inner link with the scientific world-conception [...].” and “The vitality that shows itself in the efforts for a rational transformation of the social and economic order, permeates the movement for a scientific world-conception too.” See also the remarks on 304f.
I am quoting here from the reprinted, translated version from 1973. A very helpful edition is also the edition by Friedrich Stadler and Thomas Uebel that includes translations in four languages (see Stadler and Uebel 2012).
See Carnap et al. (1973, 317).
Unfortunately, this paper is not yet translated into English. I will provide my translation and refer to the German version.
See Neurath (1981, 351). In effect, Neurath applies an argument already stated by Max Weber in his seminal essay ‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy: “It can, to be sure, be just as obligatory subjectively for the practical politician, in the individual case, to mediate between antagonistic points of view as to take sides with one of them. But this has nothing whatsoever to do with scientific “objectivity.” Scientifically the “middle course” is not truer even by a hair’s breadth, than the most extreme party ideals of the right or left. Nowhere are the interests of science more poorly served in the long run than in those situations where one refuses to see uncomfortable facts and the realities of life in all their starkness” (Weber 1949, 57f.). See on Weber and Mannheim: Scott (1998).
It should be noted that Neurath’s example is quite unfortunate since Mannheim more than once emphasizes that the contents of the natural sciences and mathematics must be exempted from his thesis of existential determination [he even mentions the equation 2 times 2 equals 4 (see Mannheim 1946, 244)]. Therefore, Mannheim could easily protest that in the case of mathematical truths his idea of a synthesis of viewpoints does not apply.
Note, however, that this move would rescue Mannheim’s idea only if there is a distinction between the contents of the humanities and the contents of the natural sciences and mathematics in principle. Mannheim, however, denies that there is such a difference in principle (see Seidel 2011a).
See also Neurath (1973b, 297): “It is precisely the proletariat that is the bearer of science without metaphysics”.
See Neurath (1981, 353).
See Neurath (1981, 356).
As Reisch has argued, Carnap’s claim to neutrality of philosophy and science does not imply that the insights of the latter have no political consequences: “Though logic and philosophy of science may remain independent of politics in Carnap’s project, politics is not independent of logic and philosophy of science” (Reisch 2005, 50f.). To my mind the same can be said with respect to Mannheim.
See Endress (2011, 161).
For obvious reasons Neurath’s criticism of Ideology and Utopia from 1930 does not refer to this article. Nevertheless, I focus on this article because the purpose of my paper is not to assess the adequacy and cogency of Neurath’s criticism but to show via the example of Mannheim that around 1930 the idea that a scientific investigation of worldviews and a scientific conception of the world can have political and social consequences was prevalent among many intellectuals in German speaking Europe.
Some notes on the translation of Mannheim’s German works into English: I consider them as mostly inadequate. Just to give one of the most obvious examples: the translation of Mannheim’s essay Historismus (Mannheim 1952a) completely omits five pages of the original (on page 176)!
However, it has to be noticed that Mannheim himself changed the English translation of Ideologie und Utopie remarkably, because he wanted to adjust the text to the ‘way of thought of the American-English reader’ and was afraid that a more literal translation will not be understood properly by the English reader (see his letters to Louis Wirth from June 18th, 1935, December 24th, 1935, February 15th, 1936, March 23rd, 1936 and June 12th, 1936; all reprinted in Gabor 2003). Notwithstanding this fact, I deliberately also changed the translation of Ideologie und Utopie, since I take it to be very misleading. Just take Mannheim’s discussion on page 271, where Mannheim distinguishes between Seinsverbundenheit and Seinsgebundenheit in the German original by claiming that by discovering Seinsverbundenheit we make a first step to solve Seinsgebundenheit. In the English translation Seinverbundenheit and Seinsgebundenheit are both translated as ‘situational determination’ such that the claim sounds like bootstrapping.
The translation of ‘Seinsverbundenheit’ as ‘existential relatedness’ follows the use of Simonds (1978, 27).
See Mannheim (1946, 271): “the neutralization of existential determination by attempting to rise above it”.
See Neurath (1981, 353).
See Mannheim (1946, 271).
See Mannheim (1971, 266).
See on Mannheim’s supposed elitism Loader (1985, 173).
See Mannheim (1946, 140, 142).
See for the background of this metaphor Kettler et al. (1984, 54).
Mannheim explicitly claims that it is not so much their social middle position but their “experimental outlook” and their attitude (Haltung) that defines the free-floating intellectuals (see Mannheim 1946, 134).
Note that also in the manifesto of the Vienna Circle reference to intuitions as a superior way of knowing is denied. Carnap, Hahn and Neurath do not reject intuition as such but demand that intuitive knowledge must be tested scientifically (see Carnap et al. 1973, 308f.).
See also Scott (1998, 112).
Nemeth (2007, 279) interprets Neurath’s opposition to Mannheim from this perspective: Neurath, she maintains, critizes Mannheim’s ‘humanist’ social theory and aims to defend a modern scientific social theory.
This is not to suggest that this is the decisive reason—surely the different topics dealed with by these authors are of major importance in explaining the difference.
See most obviously Fleck (1990b).
See Seidel (2011b) for discussion.
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I would like to thank Reinold Schmücker and the members of his colloquium at the University of Muenster in summer term 2013 for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
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Seidel, M. Changing Society by Scientific Investigations? The Unexpected Shared Ground Between Early Sociology of Knowledge and the Vienna Circle. Found Sci 21, 117–128 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-014-9368-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-014-9368-9