Abstract
In this paper I present and defend a highly demanding principle of justice in education that has not been seriously discussed thus far. According to the suggested approach, “all the way equality”, justice in education requires nothing short of equal educational outcome between all individual students. This means not merely between equally able children, or between children from different groups and classes, but rather between all children, regardless of social background, race, sex and ability. This approach may seem implausible at first, due to the far-reaching implications it entails, primarily its requirement to deny better-off children their advantage for the sake of equality. However the paper argues that all-the-way-equality, in fact, does a better job realizing the goals of justice in education than alternative conceptions of justice. It is further argued that at least some of the principle’s most radical consequences, those that make it seem counterintuitive, can be mitigated by balancing all-the-way-equality with competing interests.
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Notes
See for example Michalos (2008), reviewing research that shows that education affects health, life expectancy, the likelihood of obtaining a well-paid and secure job and diminishes the likelihood of being involved in criminal activity. For research regarding health, see Meara et al. (2008); and Rogot et al. (1992), suggesting a gap of 5–6 years in life expectancy between the most and least educated. See also Lochner and Moretti (2001), showing that completing high school reduces the probability of incarceration, especially for minority children.
Different articulations of this principle are possible that may vary between absolute priority for the worst off, to softer versions of priority. For a critique of absolute priority, and discussion whether Rawls’s Difference Principle is an absolute prioritarian principle, see: Glannon (1995).
Brighouse and Swift (2014), for example, comment that this is the main strength of this principle of justice in education.
Although for two unequal situations, the one in which the worst-off is better-off, could indeed be better than the alternative. For example, between two unequal distributions A (2,4) and B (4,6), B would be better than A.
This applies to a principle of priority in education that aims at promoting the worst-off’s educational outcome. Although this seems to me the most natural way to construe a principle of priority in education, it is not the only possible understanding of it. Schouten’s account (2012) of a prioritarian principle of educational justice involves distributing educational resources to the worst-off with the aim of promoting flourishing over the course of their lifetime. As a result, inequality in educational outcome can, in theory at least, promote the wellbeing of the worst-off. This account seems to me quite indistinct from the requirements of a general theory of priority that involves promoting the worst-off’s wellbeing in many different ways, including, but not limited to, education. It also entails endorsing priority for the worse-off as the preferred general theory of distributive justice, as opposed to the account that requires priority with regard to educational outcome, that can fit in with any theory of distributive justice applied to other spheres. Schouten’s account may also bring about problematic results. Schouten argues that a teacher may be justified to invest time “imparting life skills that will enable [a cognitively disabled student] to attain a higher level of independence … or impart skills for navigating personal relationships.” this would be an appropriate use [of the students’ time], even if it might otherwise have been spent marginally improving their test scores” (p. 478). While some students will no doubt benefit more from learning life skills than from gaining a small improvement in educational outcome, allowing teachers to decide this routinely is objectionable. Teachers may exclude students from certain academically oriented educational programs, limiting their options in life and leaving them with a set of options that is, from the outset, inferior in comparison to other children’s education. Tracking students to separate educational programs that limit their future options should always be looked upon with suspicion, and is especially troubling when Schouten’s approach is generalized and taken as a comprehensive theory of justice in education that applies to inequalities caused by race, class, or gender. Numerous past injustices have ensued as a result of finding categories of individuals “unsuitable” for certain kinds of education and occupation, and directing them, “for their own good”, to other tracks. Instead of risking this result, cases in which students truly cannot benefit from academically oriented instruction, or urgently require different kinds of instruction, should be dealt with by balancing equality (or any other principle of justice) with other values, such as preventing waste, or promoting overall flourishing.
Talent, in the context of a principle of meritocracy refers to the abilities required to perform a certain role. In education talent would primarily refer to the cognitive abilities that help children succeed in school. Throughout the paper I refer to these as “talent”, “ability”, “intelligence”, and “being smart” interchangeably. By doing so I don’t aim to say anything meaningful about these abilities and am merely following popular usage.
Brighouse initially adopted an approach that requires equality in ‘effective’ resources, meaning that resources should be invested in children differentially to create equality in the educational service they receive (Brighouse 2000). However, in his more recent publication (Brighouse 2011), Brighouse admits that his previous approach is flawed and presents two approaches - the more popular meritocratic approach, detailed above, and what he calls “the radical conception” approach (addressed in part 3.b bellow). Interestingly, Brighouse is vague as to which approach he finally endorses, as has been noted in the book by his commentators (Haydon 2011; Howe 2011; Tooley 2011). See also Brighouse and Swift (2014) in which they state that they are pluralists with regard to the appropriate principle of justice in education (p. 27).
For example, although almost any policy for equalizing educational opportunity for the poor would require diverting significant resources from well-off students to poor ones, the funding gap between the rich and the poor in the United States remains extremely wide (Biddle and Berliner 2002; The Education Trust 2006).
That ability is influenced by nurture (especially in childhood) is relatively uncontested. However, there is also evidence that ability is continuously affected by social and psychological circumstances. An interesting example is that of ‘stereotype threat’, which occurs when members of minority groups are aware that poor performance on their part will reinforce a negative group stereotype. The anxiety they experience as a result ultimately undermines their performance (Walton 2013).
This example leans on one given by Chris Jencks (1988).
Later, however, Brighouse and Swift admit they are “uneasy with yet another source of inequality”, because it entails holding children responsible for the effort they invest. As a result they concede that an even more extreme principle of justice could be considered (Brighouse and Swift 2014).
This raises a bigger issue, which I won’t discuss here, concerning the notion of responsibility in general in light of the possibility that such organic tendencies exist. It would seem, however, that this issue is especially significant in the context of education.
Segall (2013, p. 142), admits that, all things considered, it would not be desirable for educational systems to hold children responsible for their educational achievements. He insists, however, that this is precisely what justice requires, prima facie.
For example, it might denote that people with disabilities are inferior, causing them disgrace and disadvantage, or diminish human diversity. I do not deny that there may be certain cases in which these, as well as other, competing interests could override all-the-way-equality. These cases will be discussed in part c.
Note that Schouten’s account of priority (Schouten 2012) requires distributing resources to the worst-off, with the aim of promoting their wellbeing in life, and not improving their educational outcome. Therefore her specific view does not reach the same conclusion as all-the-way-equality. An account of priority that would be similar to all-the-way-equality would have to require that priority for the worst-off be expressed in educational outcome.
Schouten’s account of priority is motivated by the need to contend with the presumed injustice caused by the fact that meritocracy doesn’t attend to inequality caused by differential ability (Schouten 2012). As a result, Schouten’s motivation, it seems, is an extension of the egalitarian motivation to yet another group and not a distinct prioritarian one. Tooley’s support for priority is motivated by his aversion from promoting equality by taking from the advantaged (Tooley 2011). Yet, as was argued, given education’s positional nature, taking from the advantaged would be required also according to a prioritarian principle of justice.
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Harel Ben-Shahar, T. Equality in Education – Why We Must Go All the Way. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 19, 83–100 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9587-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9587-3