Abstract
Neurolaw is a new, rapidly developing area of interdisciplinary research on the meaning and implications of neuroscience for the law and legal practices. In this article three recently published volumes in this field will be reviewed.
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Notes
I adapt Morse and Roskies’ (2013) view. They state that neuroscience “is poised to have a significant effect on law in three ways” (2013, p. 240–1). The first way concerns brain-based assessment, which may be used for, e.g., prediction of recidivism. The second way is treatments and other interventions, for instance aimed at prevention of crime. Thirdly, neuroscience may have impact on the law by changing “commonsense views about human nature and the causes of human action” (2013, p. 241).
Libet and co-workers reported that specific neural activity can be detected (recording the so-called readiness potential) before subjects are aware that they are about to perform an action (Libet 2002).
In part following Vincent (2013, p. 326) who distinguishes between denying, assessing, restoring and enhancing responsibility.
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Books
Morse SJ, Roskies AL (eds) (2013) A primer on criminal law and neuroscience. A contribution of the law and neuroscience project, supported by the MacArthur Foundation. Oxford University Press, New York. 320 pages. ISBN 978-0-19-985917-7. Price: £48.99
Pardo MS, Patterson D (2013) Minds, brains, and law. The conceptual foundations of law and neuroscience. Oxford University Press, New York. 240 pages ISBN 978-0-19-981213-4. Price: £55.00
Vincent NA (ed) (2013) Neuroscience and legal responsibility. Oxford University Press, New York. 368 pages. ISBN 978-0-19-992560-5. Price: £38.99
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Meynen, G. Neurolaw: Neuroscience, Ethics, and Law. Review Essay. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 17, 819–829 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-014-9501-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-014-9501-4