Abstract
There have been different interpretations of satisficing rationality. A common view is that it is sometimes rationally permitted to choose an option one judges is good enough even when one does not know that it is the best option. But there is available a more radical view of satisficing. On this view, it is rationally permitted to choose an option one judges is good enough even when a better option is known to be available. In this paper I distinguish between two possible interpretations of ‘genuine’ satisficing, a de re and a de dicto interpretation. I then argue that while de re genuine satisficing is always irrational, de dicto genuine satisficing might be rationally permissible. In fact, de dicto genuine satisficing does not appear to be covered by existing accounts of satisficing behaviour.
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Notes
If not indicated otherwise, I shall by ‘option’ in what follows mean ‘action’ or ‘act-option’.
See Slote (1989, p. 23).
See Byron (1998, p. 78).
Thus, Swanton claims that in genuine satisficing ‘a good enough option may be preferred to a better. It is assumed that a better option is included in a set of options that have been enumerated and evaluated. I shall follow Slote in calling this satisficing’. Swanton (1997, p. 83).
See e.g., Weber (2004, p. 78).
See e.g., Pettit (1984, p. 173).
Pettit may seem to interpret Slote this way. See Pettit (1985, pp. 402–403).
Mulgan’s criticism of Slote might be vulnerable to this objection. See Mulgan (1993).
See Slote (1989, pp. 32–47). In fact, Slote also has another argument for genuine satisficing, which is that the maximizing view leaves no conceptual space for supererogation. See Slote (1989, p. 3). I will not discuss this argument as the notion of supererogation raises various other complex issues, e.g., the role of duties in moral theory which is beyond the scope of this paper to address.
See Byron (1998, p. 88).
See Schmidtz (1995, p. 38) for this formulation.
I borrow this term from Byron (1998, p. 85). The Better Reasons condition is widely held to be a general condition of rationality. See e.g., Pettit (1984), Schmidtz (1995), Byron (1998), Swanton (1997). Note that the Better Reasons condition does not rule out that there may also be a ‘Good Enough Reasons’ condition, i.e., that one’s choice is rational even if one recognizes that one’s reasons might not be the best of reasons, as long as they seem good enough. Dynamic satisficing would be an example. However, dynamic satisficing does not entail that one recognizes clearly better reasons for choosing any of one’s forgone alternatives.
Slote (1989, pp. 21–22).
Ibid., pp. 23–25.
For this definition of incomparability, see Chang (1997, p. 4).
Note that it is assumed here that there are only two options in this case. A common view is that if an agent is indifferent between two options, i.e., one is as good as the other, there is no room left for rational choice. Still, the agent might ‘pick’ one of the options. For a useful discussion of cases of ‘picking’, see Ullmann-Margalit and Morgenbesser (1977).
Weber (2004, p. 78).
Ibid., p. 87.
Ibid., p. 80.
Swanton (1997).
Ibid., p. 84.
Ibid., pp. 85–86.
Ibid., p. 87.
This notion of ‘silencing’ goes back to McDowell (1998).
In general, there is something odd in picturing the virtuous person as someone who actually thinks that she has forgone something better when she chose to do what she knew was right. If this is really what she thinks, it would seem she also has reason to regret her choice. But it seems wrong to picture the virtuous person as someone who is subject to regret. If she regrets her choice, her reasons for doing what she knew was right simply cannot have succeeded in silencing the reasons against. Dancy rules for similar reasons out that a virtuous person can be subject to regret. See Dancy (1997, p. 50).
A similar point has been made by Byron (1998, p. 90).
Van Roojen (2004).
Bernard Williams discusses a case of a man who can save only one of several people and who chooses to save his wife, and remarks: ‘It might have been hoped by some (for instance, his wife) that his motivating thought, fully spelled out, would be the thought that it was his wife, not that it was his wife and that in situations of this kind it is permissible to save one’s wife.’ See Williams (1981, p. 18).
See also Byron (1998, p. 90) for a similar point.
I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this journal for pointing this out to me.
For a discussion of some of these difficulties, see e.g., Salmon (1997).
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Acknowledgements
An earlier version of this paper has been presented to the Department Colloquia at the University of Oslo. I thank the audience on that occasion for helpful comments. Thanks also to two anonymous referees for Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
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Henden, E. Is Genuine Satisficing Rational?. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 10, 339–352 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-006-9056-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-006-9056-0