Abstract
This paper defends a deontological egalitarianism in the ethics of future generations. Concerns about the non-identity problem have been taken as a reason to develop sufficientarian approaches to intergenerational justice. This paper argues for a solution to the non-identity problem that refers to the claims of future persons. In principle, the content of these claims could be spelled out with a sufficientarian and an egalitarian approach. What speaks against sufficientarianism, however, is that the sufficiency threshold, unless it is set very low, would have to be set arbitrarily. The hidden justification behind a higher threshold would be egalitarian. It draws its plausibility from the justified belief that future persons have a claim on us that we leave equally valuable shares of natural resources to them.
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Notes
A partly similar reconstruction of the general problem can be found in Boonin (2008, pp. 131–133).
Note that in On what matters, Parfit subscribes to what he calls the “Triple Theory” and points to strong similarities between Kantian contractualism, Scanlonian contractualism and rule consequentialism. Thus he clearly does not subscribe to classical utilitarianism.
In his postscript to an edited volume on the Repugnant Conclusion, Parfit summarizes the various contributions as follows: “The reasoning in this anthology shows how hard it is to form acceptable theories in cases that involve different numbers of people” (Parfit 2004, p. 257).
See also Shiffrin (2012, p. 366f).
This example can also be found in Harman (2004, p. 89).
She also identifies a unifying connection between various conditions that represent harm: in her view, “harm involves conditions that generate a significant chasm or conflict between one’s will and one’s experience, one’s life more broadly understood, or one’s circumstances”. Shiffrin (1999, p. 123).
This is, for example, the position Woodward advocates: “On a nonconsequentialist approach we think of a person as harmed (or as having an interest which is infringed) whenever an action is performed which violates some right possessed by or obligation owed to that person” (Woodward 1986, p. 818).
See also Meyer (2004): 308.
At one point in On what matters, Parfit himself shows some sympathy for rights-based solutions to the non-identity problem: “Some of our acts might be truly claimed to wrong certain people even if we know both that these people‘s lives would be worth living, and that, if we had acted otherwise, these people would never have existed. For example, we might wrong some future people by choosing policies that risk causing some catastrophe, such as using nuclear energy and failing to ensure that radio-active wastes are stored safely. […] Such acts might be wrong because they violate people’s rights, or they cause people to exist with rights that cannot be fulfilled (Parfit 2011, p. 242). However, just like in Reasons and Persons, he judges their scope to be very limited.
This is also Broome's terminological suggestion. See Broome (1999, p. 114).
Kumar (2003, p. 112). Kumar takes the talk of types “to be a convenient way of making singular reference without reference to particulars”. (Kumar 2003, p. 112, Fn. 12.) A similar version of this proposal has been defended by Hare (2007). Hare distinguishes between “De Re Betterness” and “De Dicto Betterness” and claims that sometimes we should be concerned with “De Dicto Betterness“. Since Hare speaks about “betterness” and for other reasons that are found in the text, his proposal, however, is not as pronouncedly anti-consequentialist as Kumar’s is.
See also Kumar (2009) for an extension of his earlier considerations (with a focus on reproductive choices) to the more general topic of our duties towards future generations.
In particular, he thinks that Scanlon cannot count on this strategy because “Scanlon claims to be giving an account of the particular forms of concern that we owe to other individuals” (Parfit 2011, p. 235).
The idea of “waiving” these rights can also be found in Parfit's work (Parfit 1984, p. 365).
Parfit also makes this distinction: “Our view may instead be Deontological or, for short, Deontic. We may believe we should aim for equality, not to make the outcome better, but for some other moral reason. We may believe, for example, that people have rights to equal shares” (Parfit 2000, p. 84).
For numerous criticisms, see Casal (2007).
This principle has been advocated by Brian Barry (1977, p. 284): “Those alive at any time […] ought to pass it [the planet, K.M.] in at least no worse shape than they found it in.”
I should add two further remarks: (1) The notion of well-being is not meant to suggest a specific conception of the good human life. Further reflections on the human good are needed. If, for example, autonomy is of central value, we should also ensure the ability to choose how to use various kinds of natural resources. (2) One might think that nature also has an “intrinsic value”, regardless of its contribution to human or animal well-being but since I am here concerned with our duties towards future generations, I will bypass the question of whether we also have moral duties to preserve nature that go back to this intrinsic value.
For example, by Meyer and Roser (2009).
The formulation “equally valuable” shall be open to different accounts on what makes life good. It merely implies that the natural resources contribute to the human good, and that there is some way of comparing our good (our well-being, for example, or the degree of our autonomy) to the good of future persons.
One may wonder whether b) is correctly characterized as a form of deontic egalitarianism. One might suggest that telic egalitarians are those who think outcomes can be in themselves bad if they do not involve agency, while deontic egalitarians are those who affirm this necessary condition for badness. (Lippert-Rasmussen 2007, p. 105). Parfit (2000), however, writes that the kind of case that most clearly separates deontic from telic egalitarians is that in which some inequality cannot be avoided. And b) implies that something can be done by the present generation.
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Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Maike Albertzart, Roland Hesse, Johanna Privitera, Lukas Tank, Gabriel Wollner and the two reviewers for their critical remarks and helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
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Meyer, K. The Claims of Future Persons. Erkenn 83, 43–59 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-016-9871-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-016-9871-1