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Function Ascription and Explanation: Elaborating an Explanatory Utility Desideratum for Ascriptions of Technical Functions

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Abstract

Current philosophical theorizing about technical functions is mainly focused on specifying conditions under which agents are justified in ascribing functions to technical artifacts. Yet, assessing the precise explanatory relevance of such function ascriptions is, by and large, a neglected topic in the philosophy of technical artifacts and technical functions. We assess the explanatory utility of ascriptions of technical functions in the following three explanation-seeking contexts: (i) why was artifact x produced?, (ii) why does artifact x not have the expected capacity to ϕ?, (iii) how does artifact x realize its capacity to ϕ? We argue that while function ascriptions serve a mere heuristic role in the first context, they have substantial explanatory leverage in the second and third context. In addition, we assess the relevance of function ascriptions in the context of engineering redesign. Here, function ascriptions also play a relevant role: (iv) they enable normative statements of the sort that component b functions better than component a. We unpack these claims by considering philosophical theories of technical functions, in particular the ICE theory, and engineering work on function ascription and explanation. We close the paper by relating our analysis to current debates on the explanatory power of mechanistic vis-à-vis functional explanations.

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Notes

  1. Cf. (Preston 1998; Kroes 2003; Vermaas and Houkes 2003; Krohs 2009; Houkes and Vermaas 2010).

  2. Neander’s (1991) theory counts as an evolutionist one in the context of biology. Applied to technology, it becomes an intentionalist one (Houkes and Vermaas 2010).

  3. Since these weaknesses have no bearing on the argumentation presented in this paper, we do not elaborate them here.

  4. Note that this desideratum is different from the theory or model constraint of ‘simplicity’. When endorsing ‘simplicity’ a theorist or modeler may intentionally exclude reference to factors that make a difference to whether or not a phenomenon occurs. The constraint which we endorse here, requires that an agent should strive for describing all the factors that make a difference to whether or not a phenomenon occurs. Whether an agent succeeds in doing so is, of course, a different matter. Weisberg (2007) labels this constraint an “1-causal” representational ideal, and distinguishes it from the representational ideals of “simplicity” and “completeness”. The latter requires that an explanation should specify both difference making properties with respect to whether or not a phenomenon occurs, as well as the “higher order causal factors” that affect the precise manner in which the phenomenon occurs (cf. Weisberg 2007, p. 651).

  5. An anonymous referee pointed out that (justified) function ascription could have played no role in answering the first explanation-seeking question since there was no physical artifact yet to which a designer could have ascribed a function to. Agreed, yet our answer is in keeping with the ICE theory: “The historical perspective required to ascribe ICE functions may be limited to the design process; it need not extend to earlier generations of artefacts. An artefact can therefore straightaway be ascribed the capacity for which designers selected it, even if the artefact is a completely novel one (the case of the first nuclear plant)” (Houkes and Vermaas 2010, p. 93) (our italics). In other words, the answer accords with the ICE theory. To be sure, we here take function ascriptions as answers to the explanation-seeking question under consideration to be ‘proper’ function ascriptions. Proper function ascriptions are discussed by Houkes and Vermaas (2010) against the backdrop of what they call ‘proper use plans’.

  6. An anonymous referee pointed out that regarding production, belief initially is sufficient and justified belief only becomes relevant in continuation of the production process. Again, agreed. However, justified belief is central to the ICE theory, both in the ascriptions of functions to technical artifacts, and in accommodating central desiderata put forward in the function literature, such as the proper-accidental function distinction, function ascription in innovative contexts, and the handling of malfunction statements. The underlying reason is that the ICE theory is a “normative rather than a descriptive perspective” on “justifiable function ascriptions” (Houkes and Vermaas 2010, p. 4). Given this perspective, the requirement of justified belief for explaining the production of an artifact is either a bullet one has to bite when adopting the ICE theory, or the ICE theory should be extended to also encompass a descriptive perspective in which ‘mere belief’ suffices for explaining the production of an artifact. Hence, our use of the term ‘justified’.

  7. We focus on those difference making factors that are part of the conceptual framework of the ICE theory, and do not consider other potential difference making factors, such as, say, the choice of materials for the computer mouse. Therefore, our labelling of the notion that explanations should specify difference-making factors as a desideratum (cf. note 4). That there are, in the explanatory context under consideration, other difference making factors does not affect the outcome of our comparison of the explanatory superiority of functional vis-à-vis teleological explanations.

  8. Note that the argumentation presented here is not to be confused with conceptual explication of the term ‘technical function’. On the ICE account, ‘technical function’ refers to a physical–chemical capacity. We here invoke the ICE function ascription machinery to construct two parallel explanations.

  9. Another example illustrating the distinction, given by Vermaas (2009), are the functions of a sound barrier: its behavior function can be described as ‘converting acoustic energy to thermal energy’ and its effect function as ‘absorbing sound’.

  10. In methodologies that advance effect and/or purpose functions the concept of behavior is typically introduced as well, and through descriptions of the behavior of technical artifacts the physical conservation laws are taken into account.

  11. In van Eck (2011a, b) the relevance of ascriptions of functions is analyzed in the context of routine designing, and the conversion of functional descriptions across routine design frameworks. In this paper we analyze the explanatory utility of function ascriptions in other and more varied contexts of engineering design, i.e., artifact production, failure analysis, reverse engineering, and redesign.

  12. Some of these factors that normally functioning and malfunctioning artifacts have in common might affect the precise manner in which a malfunction occurs, yet do not affect the occurrence itself. Weisberg labels factors that affect the precise manner in which a phenomenon occurs, “higher order causal factors” (cf. Weisberg 2007, p. 651).

  13. The FIL is one of the most visible methodologies in engineering fault analysis; work on the FIL dates back to the late ‘90 s (cf. Price 1998), and continues to be further elaborated to this day. The approach is well-entrenched in the broader literature on ‘function’ in engineering, building upon classics in the field (like Chandrasekaran and Josephson 2000) and, in addition, is not only successful in the academic engineering literature, but also successfully employed in industry (Bell et al. 2007). The FIL is developed both for automated failure analyses as well as intended as a method for fault analysis done by human engineers.

  14. To support more detailed malfunction analyses, functions are often decomposed into sub functions in FIL. We here focus on the simple case. It suffices to illustrate our case without introducing unnecessary complexity.

  15. This redesign step involves a lot of mathematical modeling, use of physical and technological principles, and/or prototype building (Otto and Wood 1998, 2001). These details need not concern us here.

  16. The precise lingo for describing mechanisms differs. Some, for instance, prefer activity and entity talk (e.g., Machamer et al. 2000), others operation and working part terminology (e.g., Bechtel and Abrahamson 2005), or behavior and part parlance (Glennan 2005). These differences have no bearing on the argumentation presented in this paper.

  17. Functional contribution is understood in terms of the notion of “mechanistic role function” (Craver 2001), being an offshoot of Cummins’ (1975) notion of function. On the mechanistic account of role functions, function ascription is intimately tied to the manner in which the behavior of a component is organized within a mechanism. In Cummins’ account, organization is treated more loosely and not restricted to mechanisms (cf. Craver 2001).

  18. In Otto and Wood’s (1998, 2001) reverse engineering method, the terms ‘function’ and ‘functional decomposition’, referring to (sets of organized) behavior(s), are used to describe and explain the workings of artifacts. In the mechanist literature, the term ‘function’ is reserved for individuating mechanisms, whereas descriptions of mechanisms are given in term of organized behaviors and components.

  19. We adapt this example from (Nervi 2010).

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Acknowledgments

We thank two anonymous referees, Conor Dolan, Raoul Gervais, and Merel Lefevere for very useful comments.

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  1. Department of Philosophy and Moral Science, Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Ghent University, Blandijnberg 2, 9000, Ghent, Belgium

    Dingmar van Eck & Erik Weber

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van Eck, D., Weber, E. Function Ascription and Explanation: Elaborating an Explanatory Utility Desideratum for Ascriptions of Technical Functions. Erkenn 79, 1367–1389 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9605-1

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