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Haecceitism for Modal Realists

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Abstract

In this paper, I examine the putative incompatibility of three theses: (1) Haecceitism, according to which some maximal possibilities differ solely in terms of the non-qualitative or de re possibilities they include; (2) Modal correspondence, according to which each maximal possibility is identical with a unique possible world; (3) Counterpart theory, according to which de re modality is analyzed in terms of counterpart relations between individuals. After showing how the modal defended by David Lewis resolves this incompatibility by rejecting modal correspondence, I defend modal correspondence and develop an alternative strategy for reconciling these theses. Specifically, I examine Lewis’s arguments against non-qualitative counterpart theory and undermine them by developing a novel version of non-qualitative counterpart theory that appeals to a metaphysics of bare particulars. I then indicate how this version of non-qualitative counterpart theory accommodates both haecceitism and modal correspondence.

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Notes

  1. For discussion, see Skow (2008) and Lewis (1986).

  2. This case is drawn from Melia (2003). Haecceitism can also accommodate more controversial modal commitments. For example, if there is a maximal possibility according to which Bush and Obama “swap” their actual qualitative profiles (i.e., the set of all their actual qualitative properties), haecceitism follows. Similarly, if there is a possible world where an individual has every qualitative property you actually do, but you nevertheless fail to exist, haecceitism would also follow.

  3. See Lewis (1968, 1971, 1986) for the development of counterpart theory.

  4. For present purposes, I set aside an alternative account of de re representation: the modal analogue of four-dimensionalism, which holds that individuals are partly located at distinct possible worlds and have their de re modal properties by virtue of the properties instantiated by their modal rather than temporal parts. See Lewis (1986: 210–220) for discussion.

  5. For example, Hawthorne (2003: 8) says “[H]aecceitistic properties—such as being identical to John or being the daughter of Jim—are those which, in some intuitive way, make direct reference to a particular individual(s).”

  6. See Bricker (2006).

  7. Lewis (1986: 231).

  8. Here and throughout, I follow Black (1952) in rejecting the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles for individuals. Since I will be primarily concerned with those views according to which worlds are maximal individuals, I also reject the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles as it concerns worlds.

  9. Lewis is agnostic on the existence of qualitative indiscernible worlds. See Lewis (1986: 224, 2003: 26). Since my present defense of modal correspondence secures theoretical benefits for the modal realist, I take Lewis to be mistaken.

  10. Stalnaker (2007: 69–71). Note that a commitment to uncentered propositions of this sort does not preclude the employment of centered propositions for other theoretical purposes.

  11. Lewis (1986: 235).

  12. Graff Fara (2009: 296).

  13. Lewis (1986: 230).

  14. It is worth noting that the acceptance of non-qualitative counterpart theory does not preclude a reduction of modality, since the distinction between the categorical and the modal cross-cuts the distinction between the qualitative and the non-qualitative. For example, facts about the identity of individuals are plausibly viewed as categorical albeit non-qualitative. That said, one might object that, if necessary, identity facts are therefore modal. Against this objection, I take it that many facts hold of necessity even while they are paradigmatically categorical (e.g., the fact that there are no round squares).

  15. Lewis (1986: 230).

  16. Lewis (1986: 230).

  17. Lewis (1986: 229)

  18. Lewis (1986: 232).

  19. See Lewis (1986) for discussion of these distinctions.

  20. On substratum theory and bare particulars, see Bailey (2012), Denkel (2000), Giberman (2012), Moreland (1998, 2001), and Sider (2006).

  21. See Bailey (2012) and Moreland and Pickavance (2003) on this distinction.

  22. Denkel (2000: 432) argues that this version of substratum theory is either inadequate or collapses into the former version. Here, I assume, pace Denkel, that sameness of bare particulars is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the identity of thick particulars.

  23. For more on overlap within modal realism, see McDaniel (2004).

  24. The claim that MRBP is a form of counterpart theory need not entail that the de re modal properties of entities of all ontological categories are given via counterpart theory. After all, were Lewis to accept an ontology of universals, they would likely admit of identity across possible worlds, but this would do nothing to undermine the thesis that his view of the de re modal properties of objects is a form of counterpart theory. See Lewis (2008) for discussion.

  25. Notice, for example, that, while Lewis holds the problem of accidental intrinsics to preclude identity across worlds, the existence of this general problem does not, on its own, rule out the identity of some specific intrinsic duplicates across worlds. Instead, Lewis infers the impossibility of identity across worlds from the existence of the relevant problem and, if one is content with this inference, MRBP is on all fours with LMR.

  26. Defenses of alternative modal realisms in Bricker (2006) and McDaniel (2004).

  27. In particular, the prospects for reconciling substratum theory with classical mereology require more careful scrutiny.

  28. See Bricker (2006) for discussion of island universes.

  29. See Lewis (1986: 71).

  30. At least not as its basic ontological constituent. We might allow that composite material objects have many bare particulars as constituents, but its basic constituent is the fusion of all these bare particulars. The bare particular that instantiates the universals we attribute to the object.

  31. See Kripke (1980).

  32. Among other things, this requires endorsing the temporal and spatial analogue of MRBP and the corresponding responses to problems regarding temporary and spatial intrinsics. Since the temporal analogue of counterpart theory is stage theory, defended in Sider (2001), the temporal analogue of MRBP is non-qualitative stage theory. I hope to say more about the prospects for non-qualitative stage theory elsewhere.

  33. This instantiation relation now proves suspiciously similar to the primitive multigrade compresence relation of bundle theory.

  34. For helpful discussion and comments, my thanks to Phil Bricker, Ben Caplan, and two very helpful anonymous referees.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Western Michigan University, 1903 West Michigan Avenue, Kalamazoo, MI, 49008-5328, USA

    Sam Cowling

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Cowling, S. Haecceitism for Modal Realists. Erkenn 77, 399–417 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-012-9394-3

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