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A note on burdens of proof in civil litigation

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Abstract

It has been widely believed that who bears the burden of proof significantly affects the incentives of the legal parties. In particular, Hay and Spier (J Legal Stud 26:413–431, 1997) argues that if legal parties have a commonly accessible body of evidence (perfectly correlated pieces of evidence), the party who bears the burden of proof will present the evidence if and only if the evidence supports his position, while the other party (without the burden) will refrain from presenting it regardless of whether the evidence supports his position. In this paper, I claim that the result will be dramatically changed if the pieces of evidence that each party possesses are not perfectly correlated. I show that each party will present the evidence that supports his position whenever available, regardless of the burden of proof assignment. This implies that allocating the burden of proof does not matter in terms of information elicitation.

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Notes

  1. Burden of proof is a term encompassing two separate notions: the burden of producing evidence (production) and the burden of persuasion. The burden of production is the obligation to present evidence to the judge or jury, while the burden of persuasion is the duty to convince the judge or jury to a certain standard on the premise that evidence is presented. Hay and Spier (1997) mainly discussed the effect of the burden of production, whereas Shin (1998) and Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) dealt with the issue of the burden of persuasion to some extent.

  2. They assume that “both parties have access to a body of evidence that indicates whether the defendant acted negligently, and both parties know what the evidence contains.”

  3. Hay and Spier assume that a party who has the burden loses with certainty if he does not present evidence. This assumption more or less corresponds with the adversarial system. Under the system, the judge does not have the responsibility of investigating cases, leaving it to the parties. The burden of production is just as the risk of not producing evidence, i.e., if the party bearing it fails to present it, normally he loses. If he meets the burden, the burden shifts to the other party, and if he rebuts, the burden as to rebuttal evidence then shifts back to the original party and so on. On the other hand, the burden of persuasion is regarded as a tie-breaker, i.e., it is invoked on one party only when the evidence provided is inconclusive (equally likely to support each party), whereas there is no occasion to invoke the burden of persuasion if the judge has a definite conclusion.

  4. Hay and Spier do not directly assume the default judgment rule, but it is derived from some underlying assumption in their model.

  5. This should be also true even under the adversarial system if burden of proof is invoked when the case is neither clearly conclusive (almost 100 %) nor completely inconclusive (50 %).

  6. Burden of proof in this paper could also be interpreted as burden of persuasion if the cost of presenting evidence is negligible. As long as a positive cost of presenting evidence is considered, the interpretation as burden of production is more plausible.

  7. This is contrasted with the result of Sobel (1985).

  8. See, for example, Milgrom (1981), Grossman (1981), Farrell (1986) and Shavell (1994).

  9. There exists a slight difference between mandatory information disclosure and the burden of proof. Not complying with the former usually entails a penalty in monetary terms, while failing to meet the burden of proof does not.

  10. This is not a matter of partial presentation that Hay and Spier already recognized in footnote 8 of their paper.

  11. Independent evidence gathering does not necessarily imply that the defendant’s evidence and the plaintiff’s evidence are independent. Although it is very likely that the pieces of evidence are mutually exclusive (negatively correlated) as a result of selective evidence gathering, it is also possible that the parties end up with common evidence (perfectly correlated evidence).

  12. This is a consequence of selective evidence gathering. Each party searches only for evidence that supports his position.

  13. This is a crucial difference from the model of Hay and Spier. In their model, if the conditional probability that \(x<\overline{x}\) given the evidence presented exceeds 1/2, i.e., higher than the conditional probability that \(x\ge \overline{x}\), J rules for P with probability one. In this sense, their model is deterministic. The stochastic model can be justified as follows. As one can see in the “Appendix”, computing conditional probabilities requires the knowledge of q. However, it is hard for P and D to know J’s prior belief in reality. In a deterministic model, knowing the prior belief is essential to the decisions of P and D, while their decisions do not rely on the knowledge in the stochastic model where each party only needs to see whether conditioning his winning probability on the evidence increases or decreases the probability.

  14. See Farrell (1986) for this possibility.

  15. In this case, it is not necessary to assume that \(\lambda >1/2\) in (i). As long as assumption (ii) holds, an evidence is a perfect signal for his position regardless of the value of \(\lambda\). This corresponds to the observation of Hay and Spier that “it makes no difference what level of confidence is required”.

  16. Of course, this argument depends on what J knows. If he knows, for example, that a speed record is available in the car accident case, he may ask P the record. If P does not present it, it will be a strong indication that D was not negligent. However, if J does not know the availability, failure to present the speed record will not mean very much.

  17. They assume that the evidence indicates negligence or non-negligence to the required level of certainty.

  18. A probability distribution is called atomless if mass of any point is zero. In this case, it means that \(P(c=c_0 )=0\) for any \(c_0\).

  19. The meaning of a complement event of Y is ambiguous. The interpretation could be either that Y did not occur or that the evidence Y is not available, and clearly the two interpretations should be distinguished. However, in this proof, the two interpretations can be used interchangeably, since we are considering the strategy of presenting evidence if and only if it is available. Therefore, in formula (1), the interpretation of the first \(Y_{P}^{C}\) is that P does not present the evidence, while the interpretation of the second \(Y_{P}^{C}\) is that \(Y_P\) is not available to P, but given the strategy of P, the judge believes that \(Y_P\) is not available to P if and only if it is not presented.

References

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Correspondence to Jeong-Yoo Kim.

Additional information

I am grateful to participants at the annual conference of the Asian Law and Economics Association held at Hong Kong in 2011 and the WEAI conference held at San Francisco in 2012 and especially Kathy Spier for valuable comments.

Appendix

Appendix

1.1 Proof of Proposition 1

Claim 1

It is the dominant strategy for the party who bears the burden of proof to present the available evidence.

Proof

Without loss of generality, assume that the burden of proof is placed on the plaintiff. \(\square\)

First, I will show that the best response of P to presenting evidence is to present \(Y_P\). If he does not present \(Y_P\) so that D is the only one who presents evidence, the conditional probability that D was negligent can be similarly calculated as

$$\begin{aligned} P\left( x<\overline{x}\mid Y_{P}^{C}, Y_{D}\right) &= \frac{P\left( x< \overline{x}, Y_{P}^{C}, Y_{D}\right) }{P\left( Y_{P}^{C}, Y_{D} \right) } \nonumber \\ &= \frac{P\left( Y_{P}^{C}, Y_{D}\mid x<\overline{x}\right) P\left( x<\overline{x}\right) }{P\left( Y_{P}^{C}, Y_{D}\mid x<\overline{x}\right) P\left( x<\overline{x}\right) + P\left( Y_{P}^{C}, Y_{D}\mid x\ge \overline{x}\right) P\left( x\ge \overline{x}\right) }, \end{aligned}$$
(1)

where \(Y_{i}\) is the event that the evidence is available to i and \(Y_{i}^{C}\) is the complement of the event.Footnote 19

If P presents evidence as well as D, the conditional probability will be

$$\begin{aligned} P\left( x< \overline{x}\mid Y_{P}, Y_D \right) &= \frac{P\left( x< \overline{x}, Y_{P}, Y_{D} \right) }{P\left( Y_{P}, Y_{D}\right) } \nonumber \\ &= \frac{P\left( Y_{P}, Y_{D} \mid x<\overline{x}\right) P\left( x< \overline{x}\right) }{P\left( Y_{P}, Y_{D} \mid x< \overline{x}\right) P\left( x< \overline{x}\right) +P\left( Y_{P}, Y_{D}\mid x\ge \overline{x}\right) P\left( x\ge \overline{x}\right) }. \end{aligned}$$
(2)

Taking inverses yield

$$\left[ P\left( x<\overline{x}\mid Y_{P}^{C}, Y_{D}\right) \right] ^{-1} = 1+ \frac{ P\left( Y_{P}^{C}, Y_{D}\mid x\ge \overline{x}\right) P\left( x\ge \overline{x}\right) }{P\left( Y_{P}^{C}, Y_{D}\mid x<\overline{x}\right) P\left( x<\overline{x}\right) },$$
(3)
$$\left[ P\left( x< \overline{x}\mid Y_{P}, Y_D \right) \right] ^{-1}= 1+ \frac{P\left( Y_{P}, Y_{D}\mid x\ge \overline{x}\right) P\left( x\ge \overline{x}\right) }{P\left( Y_{P}, Y_{D} \mid x<\overline{x}\right) P\left( x< \overline{x}\right) }.$$
(4)

Then, it follows from Condition [CI] that \(P(x< \overline{x}\mid Y_{P}, Y_D )> P(x< \overline{x}\mid P(Y_{P}^{C}, Y_{D} )\), since

$$\frac{P\left( Y_P, Y_D \mid x\ge \overline{x}\right) }{P\left( Y_P, Y_D \mid x< \overline{x}\right) }=\frac{ \left( 1-\lambda \right) P\left( Y_D \mid x \ge \overline{x}\right) }{\lambda P\left( Y_D \mid x< \overline{x}\right) }<\frac{\lambda P\left( Y_D \mid x \ge \overline{x}\right) }{\left( 1-\lambda \right) P\left( Y_D \mid x< \overline{x}\right) }=\frac{P\left( Y_{P}^{C}, Y_D \mid x\ge \overline{x}\right) }{P\left( Y_{P}^{C}, Y_D \mid x< \overline{x}\right) }.$$

Second, I will show that the best response of P to not presenting evidence is to present \(Y_P\) whenever it is available. If P presents the evidence the judge’s inference will proceed based on the evidence as follows.

$$\begin{aligned} P\left( x<\overline{x}\mid Y_{P}, Y_{D}^{C}\right) &= \frac{P\left( x< \overline{x}, Y_{P}, Y_{D}^{C} \right) }{P\left( Y_{P}, Y_{D}^{C}\right) } \nonumber \\ &= \frac{P\left( Y_{P}, Y_{D}^{C}\mid x< \overline{x}\right) P\left( x< \overline{x}\right) }{P\left( Y_{P}, Y_{D}^{C}\mid x< \overline{x}\right) P\left( x< \overline{x}\right) +P\left( Y_{P}, Y_{D}^{C}\mid x\ge \overline{x}\right) P\left( x\ge \overline{x}\right) }, \end{aligned}$$
(5)

and if he does not, the posterior belief will be

$$\begin{aligned} P\left( x< \overline{x}\mid Y_{P}^{C}, Y_{D}^{C}\right) &= \frac{P\left( x< \overline{x}, Y_{P}^{C}, Y_{D}^{C} \right) }{ P\left( Y_{P}^{C}, Y_{D}^{C}\right) } \nonumber \\ & = \frac{P\left( Y_{P}^{C}, Y_{D}^{C}\mid x< \overline{x}\right) P\left( x< \overline{x}\right) }{P\left( Y_{P}^{C}, Y_{D}^{C}\mid x<\overline{x}\right) P\left( x< \overline{x}\right) +P\left( Y_{P}^{C}, Y_{D}^{C}\mid x\ge \overline{x}\right) P\left( x\ge \overline{x}\right) }. \end{aligned}$$
(6)

Similarly, it can be shown that \(P(x< \overline{x}\mid Y_{P}, Y_{D}^{C} )> P(x< \overline{x}\mid P(Y_{P}^{C}, Y_{D}^{C} )\). This means that presenting evidence is the dominant strategy of the plaintiff (with the burden) once the evidence is available.

Claim 2

It is the dominant strategy for the party who does not bear the burden of proof to present the available evidence.

Proof

Even if D does not bear the burden of proof, he can present the evidence voluntarily. Whether he presents \(Y_D\) voluntarily or not depends on the relative size of \(P(x\ge \overline{x} \mid Y_{D}^{C}, Y_P )\) and \(P(x\ge \overline{x}\mid Y_D, Y_P )\) if P presents \(Y_P\), and the relative size of \(P(x\ge \overline{x} \mid Y_{D}^{C}, Y_{P}^{C})\) and \(P(x\ge \overline{x}\mid Y_D, Y_{P}^{C})\) otherwise. Then, due to the symmetry between \(Y_P\) and \(Y_D\), the proof is immediate. \(\square\)

1.2 Proof of Proposition 2

I will use a fixed point argument to prove the existence of \(\bar{c}\). Suppose there is some \(\tilde{c}>0\) such that a legal party who has evidence does not present it for any \(c\ge \tilde{c}\). Since \(P( c\le \tilde{c})=F(\tilde{c})\) and F(c) is atomless, let \(\alpha = P( c\ge \tilde{c})=1-P(c\le \tilde{c})=1-F(\tilde{c})\). That is, \(\alpha\) is the probability that a legal party who has evidence does not present it. If P does not present evidence, the judge believes that P either has no evidence or has the evidence but the disclosure cost is high (\(c\ge \tilde{c}\)). Under [XI] condition, Bayesian updating implies that

$$\begin{aligned} P\left( x<\overline{x}\mid \emptyset , Y_D \right) &= \frac{P\left( x<\overline{x}, \, Y_D \right) }{P\left( {\emptyset}, Y_D \right) } \nonumber \\ &= \frac{\left( 1-\lambda \right) q+\alpha \lambda q}{\left( 1-\lambda \right) q+\lambda (1-q)+\alpha \left\{ \lambda q+\left( 1-\lambda \right) (1-q)\right\} }, \end{aligned}$$
(7)

where \(\emptyset\) is the event that no evidence is presented. If P presents evidence, the conditional probability is simply as

$$\begin{aligned} P\left( x<\overline{x}\mid Y_{P}, Y_{D}\right) &= \frac{P\left( x< \overline{x}, Y_{P}, Y_{D} \right) }{P\left( Y_{P}, Y_{D}\right) } \nonumber \\ &= \frac{P\left( Y_{P}, Y_{D}\mid x< \overline{x}\right) P\left( x< \overline{x}\right) }{P\left( Y_{P}, Y_{D}\mid x< \overline{x}\right) P\left( x< \overline{x}\right) +P\left( Y_{P}, Y_{D}\mid x\ge \overline{x}\right) P\left( x\ge \overline{x}\right) } \nonumber \\ &= \frac{\lambda q}{\lambda q+\left( 1-\lambda \right) (1-q)}. \end{aligned}$$
(8)

To compare (7) and (8), I need the following lemma.

Lemma 1

\(\frac{Q}{R}>\frac{S}{T}\) implies that \(\frac{Q}{R}>\frac{S+\alpha Q}{T+\alpha R}\).

Proof

\(\psi \equiv Q(T+\alpha R)-R(S+\alpha Q)=QT-RS\) since \(\frac{Q}{R}>\frac{S}{T}\). \(\square\)

It directly follows from Lemma 1 that \(P(x<\overline{x}\mid Y_P, Y_{D})>P(x<\overline{x}\mid {\emptyset}, Y_{D})\) for any \(\alpha \in [0,1]\). Let \(\Delta (\alpha )=P(x<\overline{x}\mid Y_{P}, Y_{D})-P(x<\overline{x}\mid {\emptyset}, Y_{D})>0\). Note that \(\Delta (\alpha (\tilde{c}))\) is increasing in \(\alpha\) so decreasing in \(\tilde{c}\), since \(\alpha\) is decreasing in \(\tilde{c}\). Therefore, there exists some value for \(\tilde{c}\) such that

$$w\Delta \left( \alpha \left( \tilde{c}\right) \right) =\tilde{c}.$$
(9)

We will denote the value for \(\tilde{c}\) (i.e., satisfying Eq. 9) by \(\bar{c}\). That is, \(\bar{c}\) is a fixed point of the function of \(c, w\Delta (\alpha (c))\). Clearly, P strictly prefers presenting evidence if \(c<\bar{c}\), and strictly prefers not presenting evidence if \(c>\bar{c}\). This implies that if \(c<\bar{c}\), presenting evidence is the dominant strategy of P regardless of whether or not D presents \(Y_D\). By symmetry, presenting evidence is also the dominant strategy of D if \(c<\bar{c}\). Since this is the case regardless of the burden of proof assignment, the proof is completed.

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Kim, JY. A note on burdens of proof in civil litigation. Eur J Law Econ 42, 325–337 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-015-9496-x

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