Abstract
Criminal law and economics rests on the expectation that deterrence incentives can be employed to reduce crime. Prison survey evidence however suggests that a majority of criminals are biased and may not react to deterrence incentives. This study employs an extra-laboratory experiment with criminals in a German prison to test the effectiveness of deterrence and compares it with data of student subjects. Subjects either face potential punishment when stealing, or they can steal without deterrence. We confirm Gary Becker’s deterrence hypothesis that deterrence works for criminals (and similarly for students). We observe significantly more risk-seeking criminals than students, although the vast majority (80.77 %) of criminals behaves risk-neutral or risk-averse.
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Notes
In this paper we use the terms ‘inmate’, ‘prisoner’, and ‘criminal’ synonymously to describe the subjects drawn from the prison population of our study, assuming that the vast majority of prisoners were convicted rightfully. Cases of wrongfully convicted individuals nevertheless occur periodically, so that we do not intend to make any judgments about the guilt of any specific prisoner in our study.
We acknowledge that men account for the majority of prisoners. Still current statistics report more than 625,000 female prisoners worldwide (Walmsley 2012). We therefore see no reason to disregard studies with prisoners on the grounds that the subjects are female.
Note that Block and Gerety (1995) also analyze decision making under risk of prison inmates. Their auction experiment does not involve stealing.
Note that either p or f needs to be increasing in h to avoid marginal deterrence issues (see Stigler 1970).
Additionally, both players were endowed with 7 Taler (which were needed to rule out negative payoffs).
In our experiment we observe decision making in a one-shot stealing game with only player 1, the criminal, making an active decision. Hence, we concentrate on distributional preferences and can neglect intention-based models, for instance on reciprocity (e.g. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004).
See Fig. 6 in Appendix 1 for point predictions of optimal stealing in DeterFine for a number of simple risk parameters using u α.
Further information (in German) on the JVA für Frauen in Vechta: www.jva-fuer-frauen.niedersachsen.de.
Despite our efforts to ensure credible anonymity, one may argue that some inmates may have acted in response to a demand effect. That is, some inmates may abstain from stealing as they believe that their actions will be traced. If this effect was present, it would work against finding a difference between NoDeter and DeterFine. Note that a decrease in stealing from NoDeter to DeterFine of the same subject cannot occur in our between-subject design.
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Acknowledgments
I am grateful to the JVA für Frauen in Vechta and especially Petra Huckemeyer and Elsbeth Lübbe for their dedicated cooperation and to the Kriminologischer Dienst in Lower Saxony for its permission to conduct this study. Funding and guidance for this experiment was provided by the chair of Andreas Lange at the University of Hamburg. Sarah Mörtenhuber and Jan Papmeier provided excellent research assistance. I thank an anonymous referee for very helpful comments.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Complementary figures
Point predictions of optimal stealing (h) depending on risk preferences in DeterFine. Note the results were obtained by using mathematical software to solve our model with different alpha parameters of u α
Z-tree monitor in NoDeter (translated from German into English)
Z-tree monitor in DeterFine (translated from German into English)
Appendix 2: English translations of the instructions
General instructions for participants
Welcome to the study!
Thank you for participating in our study today. You will be able to earn a considerable amount of money. It is therefore important that you read these instructions carefully.
It is prohibited to communicate with other participants during the study. Should you have any questions please raise your hand and an instructor will come to answer them. If you violate this rule, we will have to exclude you from the study and from all payments.
During the experiment you will make decisions anonymously, other participants will not learn about your decisions.
In any case you will earn [Field: a pack of coffee or a pack of tobacco; Lab: 5 Euros] for participation in this experiment. The additional earnings depend on your decisions [Field: and will be paid to your phone account]. During the study your earnings will be calculated in Taler. At the end of the experiment your earned Taler will be converted into Euros at the following exchange rate:
The study consists of five independent tasks. Your decision in a task does not have any impact on the other tasks.
The instructions for the five tasks will be handed out one after another. You will first receive instructions for task 1 and then make your decision at the computer terminal. After this task 1 is done.
Thereafter you will receive instructions for task 2 and again make your decision at the computer terminal. This procedure continues until the end of the study. In the end we will also ask you to answer some general questions.
At the end of the study you will receive your payment. Your payment is the sum of payments from all five tasks. All earned Taler will be converted to Euros and paid to you [Field: in addition to a pack of coffee or tobacco]. Hence you will get.
All payments will be done separately, without any other participant being able to see what you have earned. Apart from the instructor nobody will know what you have earned.
Instructions for Task 1
[The Stealing Game, NoDeter Treatment:]
In task 1 you need to decide how many Taler to transfer between your account and the account of another participant who is randomly matched with you. You will not receive information on the identity of the other participant. Neither will the other participant receive information on your identity.
At the end of the experiment one half of the participants will be randomly selected to be person 1, the other half will be person 2. Your own decision will count if you are selected as person 1. If you are selected as person 2, you will receive your payment in accordance with the decision of a person 1 who is matched with you.
There are 9 Taler in your account while the account of the other person holds 17 Taler.
You are able to decide freely how many Taler you would like to transfer between the account of the other person and your own account. That is, you are able to transfer up to 2 Taler from your account to the account of the other person (transfer “-2″) or up to 10 Taler from the account of the other person to your account (transfer “10”).
For example, if you decide to transfer -2 Taler, you will receive 7 Taler in this task while the person who is matched with you will receive 19 Taler. If you decide to transfer 7 Taler, then you will receive 16 Taler in this task and the matched person will receive 10 Taler.
In summary, your transfer between the account of the other person and your own account may be between “-2” and “10”.
Please make a decision on the screen to decide how many Taler to transfer to your account from the account of person 2.
Instructions for Task 1
[The Stealing Game, DeterFine Treatment:]
In task 1 you need to decide how many Taler to transfer between your account and the account of another participant who is randomly matched with you. You will not receive information on the identity of the other participant. Neither will the other participant receive information on your identity.
At the end of the experiment one half of the participants will be randomly selected to be person 1, the other half will be person 2. Your own decision will count if you are selected as person 1. If you are selected as person 2, you will receive your payment in accordance with the decision of a person 1 who is matched with you.
There are 9 Taler in your account while the account of the other person holds 17 Taler.
You are able to decide freely how many Taler you would like to transfer between the account of the other person and your own account. That is, you are able to transfer up to 2 Taler from your account to the account of the other person (transfer “-2”) or up to 10 Taler from the account of the other person to your account (transfer “10”).
If you decide to transfer Taler from the account of the other person to your own account, this transfer will only be successful half of the times, i.e. the probability of success is 50 %. If the transfer is not successful, you will have to pay a fee that is shown on your screen.
For example, if you decide to transfer -2 Taler, you will receive 7 Taler in this task while the person who is matched with you will receive 19 Taler. If you decide to transfer 7 Taler and your transfer is successful, then you will receive 16 Taler in this task and the matched person will receive 10 Taler. If your transfer is not successful, then you will receive the initial 9 Taler minus the fee and the person who is matched with you keeps 17 Taler.
In summary, your transfer between the account of the other person and your own account may be between “-2” and “10”.
Please make a decision on the screen to decide how many Taler to transfer to your account from the account of person 2. Mind the respective fee in case your transfer is not successful.
