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Does the central bank contribute to the political monetary cycles in Bangladesh?

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Abstract

This study aims to explore the impact of elections on the inflationary process in Bangladesh i.e., to observe whether elections have any influence on monetary variables like money supply, exchanges rate and thus inflation. We used quarterly data as the incumbent in Bangladesh must give a maximum of 3 months’ time to the caretaker government to accomplish the election. Our full ARDL estimation suggested that an appreciation of the exchange rate just before the election reduced inflation significantly and an effective way of incumbent’s to gain popularity. We found that current inflation was positively associated (though not significantly) with the previous quarter’s money supply measured by M1. The incumbent took policies to reduce the inflation during election period as voters place more importance in the recent history. We find evidence of political monetary cycles in Bangladesh. Bangladesh Bank’s independence should be given priority so that it can withstand political pressure to stimulate the economy before elections or finance election-related increases in government spending.

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Notes

  1. The Caretaker Government of Bangladesh is a form of government system in which the country is ruled by a selected government for an interim period during the transition from one elected government to another, after the completion of tenure of the former. As the outgoing government hands over its power, the caretaker government comes into place. It is not empowered to take any policy decisions unless it is necessary. The main objective of the caretaker government is to create an environment within 90 days in which an election can be held in a free and fair manner without political influence by the outgoing government. The first Caretaker Government in Bangladesh was formed in 1990 and within 90 days, this government conducted the Parliament Election and handed over the power to the elected government. In this study, we consider 1 for the reign of political government and otherwise equal to 0 (whether it is Caretaker government or not). For this reason, we did not consider 1 for post-1990 election.

  2. Detailed methodology and the data are presented in the appendix.

  3. This approach is latter followed by Enisan Akinlo (2005).

  4. We inherited the specification of inflation equation with money supply from Nguyen (2015). In this study, the author estimated the impact of money supply on inflation using GMM estimators where both the lag of inflation and money supply used as regressors. The coefficient of money supply was found negative. This type of specification was also found in Kwon et al. (2009).

  5. Thanks the anonymous reviewer for pointing out this issue.

  6. See Appendix for the explanation of series and figure.

  7. The results are available upon request.

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Acknowledgments

Authors would like to thank the editor and the two anonymous referees for very helpful comments and suggestions that materially improved the paper. Joarder acknowledges financial assistance from Shahjalal University of Science and Technology, Sylhet-3114, Bangladesh. The draft version of this article was presented at the National Conference on Contemporary Issues in Economics (NCCIE), organized by the Department of Economics, Shahjalal University of Science & Technology, Sylhet-3114, Bangladesh during 23–24 February, 2011.

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Correspondence to Mohammad Abdul Munim Joarder.

Appendices

Appendix A

See Table 6.

Table 6 Summary statistic

1.1 Methodology for arriving quarterly GDP from yearly GDP data

First Step: Sector-wise quarterly weight is derived for each year for the sample period FY80–FY09. The derivation of sector-wise quarterly weight, i.e., agriculture, industry and service sector, for each year as follows:

A. Agriculture sector: Agriculture quarterly weight is derived based on crop production, i.e., Aus, Aman, Boro, and wheat.

$$ {\text{Weight for }}Q1 \, : {\text{Q}}1{\text{w}} = \frac{\text{ACP}}{\text{TCP}} \times 100 $$

where Q1 = July–September, w = weight, ACP = Aus crop production, and TCP = total crop production

$$ {\text{Weight for Q}}2:{\text{ Q}}1{\text{w}} = \frac{\text{AMCP}}{\text{TCP}} \times 100, $$

where, Q2 = October-December, AMCP = Aman crop production.

$$ {\text{Weight for Q}}3:{\text{Q}}3{\text{w}} = \frac{\text{BCP}}{\text{TCP}} \times 100 $$

where Q3 = January-March, BCP = Boro crop production.

$$ {\text{Weight for Q}}4:{\text{Q}}4{\text{w}} = \frac{\text{WCP}}{\text{TCP}} \times 100 $$

where Q4 = April-June, WCP = wheat crop production.

B. Industry Sector: Quarterly weights for Industry sector are derived based on monthly quantum industrial production index:

$$ {\text{Quarterly weight}} = \frac{{\sum\nolimits_{1}^{3} {\text{QIPm}} }}{{\sum\nolimits_{1}^{12} {\text{QIPm}} }} \times 100 $$

C. Service Sector: Quarterly service sector weight is distributed evenly due to lack of quarterly common yardsticks measure. Besides, this sector is less volatile.

Second Step: There are four sub-sectors in agriculture sector. First, yearly agriculture crop sub-sector’s production is decomposed into quarterly as per respective quarterly weight. Then, fishing, forest, and related services, and animal farming sub-sector’s production are decomposed into quarterly evenly. Secondly, sub-sector’s quarterly value is added to get quarterly overall agriculture GDP.

Third Step: Quarterly production value which is decomposed as per above mentioned formula are added to get quarterly GDP for each quarter.

Appendix B: characteristics of money supply

We estimated the trend line of the growth rate of money supply for our sample period. The trend line is negatively slopped. We ran the following trend equation:

$$ \left[ {\text{Growth Rate of Money Supply}} \right]_{t} = {\text{ a}}_{1} + {\text{ a}}_{2} *{\text{Time}} $$
(B1)

See Table 7.

Table 7 Trend regression of growth rate of money supply

The following Figs. 3, 4 and 5 show the scatter plot and trend line and, line plot and trend line of growth rate of money supply and trend line of growth rate of money supply. And the money supply.

Fig. 3
figure 3

Scatter plot and trend line

Fig. 4
figure 4

Line plot and trend line

Fig. 5
figure 5

Money supply

These figures clearly depict the downward trend of growth rate of money supply, which facilitates the negative association between money supply and inflation in Eq. (5).

 

Sectoral weight distribution (in %)

Agriculture

Industry

Service

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Total

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Total

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Total

FY80

21.00

55.00

18.00

6.00

100.00

22.00

27.00

29.00

22.00

100.00

25

25

25

25

100

FY81

22.00

53.00

18.00

7.00

100.00

19.00

26.00

31.00

24.00

100.00

25

25

25

25

100

FY82

22.00

49.00

21.00

8.00

100.00

24.00

25.00

27.00

24.00

100.00

25

25

25

25

100

FY83

20.00

50.00

23.00

7.00

100.00

23.00

25.00

27.00

25.00

100.00

25

25

25

25

100

FY84

20.00

50.00

21.00

9.00

100.00

21.00

26.00

28.00

25.00

100.00

25

25

25

25

100

FY85

17.00

50.00

24.00

9.00

100.00

23.00

26.00

25.00

26.00

100.00

25

25

25

25

100

FY86

17.00

53.00

23.00

7.00

100.00

26.00

25.00

25.00

24.00

100.00

25

25

25

25

100

FY87

19.00

50.00

24.00

7.00

100.00

25.00

28.00

24.00

23.00

100.00

25

25

25

25

100

FY88

18.00

47.00

29.00

6.00

100.00

25.00

26.00

27.00

22.00

100.00

25

25

25

25

100

FY89

17.00

41.00

35.00

7.00

100.00

23.00

25.00

26.00

24.00

98.00

25

25

25

25

100

FY90

13.00

49.00

33.00

5.00

100.00

24.00

26.00

26.00

24.00

100.00

25

25

25

25

100

FY91

12.00

48.00

34.00

6.00

100.00

24.00

25.00

27.00

24.00

100.00

25

25

25

25

100

FY92

11.00

48.00

35.00

6.00

100.00

25.00

25.00

26.00

24.00

100.00

25

25

25

25

100

FY93

11.00

50.00

34.00

5.00

100.00

24.00

24.00

25.00

27.00

100.00

25

25

25

25

100

FY94

9.00

49.00

35.00

7.00

100.00

23.00

25.00

27.00

25.00

100.00

25

25

25

25

100

FY95

10.00

47.00

36.00

7.00

100.00

22.00

25.00

27.00

26.00

100.00

25

25

25

25

100

FY96

8.00

46.00

38.00

8.00

100.00

25.00

24.00

24.00

27.00

100.00

25

25

25

25

100

FY97

9.00

47.00

37.00

7.00

100.00

26.00

25.00

23.00

26.00

100.00

25

25

25

25

100

FY98

9.00

43.00

39.00

9.00

100.00

26.00

25.00

23.00

26.00

100.00

25

25

25

25

100

FY99

7.00

35.00

48.00

10.00

100.00

25.00

26.00

23.00

26.00

100.00

25

25

25

25

100

FY00

7.00

41.00

44.00

8.00

100.00

25.00

25.00

24.00

26.00

100.00

25

25

25

25

100

FY01

7.00

42.00

44.00

7.00

100.00

26.00

25.00

23.00

26.00

100.00

25

25

25

25

100

FY02

7.00

42.00

46.00

5.00

100.00

25.00

24.00

25.00

26.00

100.00

25

25

25

25

100

FY03

7.00

42.00

46.00

5.00

100.00

25.00

24.00

25.00

26.00

100.00

25

25

25

25

100

FY04

5.00

42.00

47.00

6.00

100.00

25.00

24.00

25.00

26.00

100.00

25

25

25

25

100

FY05

6.00

37.00

53.00

4.00

100.00

25.00

23.00

25.00

27.00

100.00

25

25

25

25

100

FY06

6.00

38.00

50.00

6.00

100.00

25.00

24.00

25.00

26.00

100.00

25

25

25

25

100

FY07

5.50

38.00

52.00

4.50

100.00

26.00

24.00

25.00

25.00

100.00

25

25

25

25

100

FY 08

6.00

36.00

53.00

5.00

100.00

25.00

23.00

26.00

26.00

100.00

25

25

25

25

100

FY 09

5.50

37.00

53.50

4.00

100.00

23.00

25.00

26.00

26.00

100.00

25

25

25

25

100

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Joarder, M.A.M., Hossain, A.K.M.N. & Ahmed, M.U. Does the central bank contribute to the political monetary cycles in Bangladesh?. Econ Change Restruct 49, 365–394 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10644-015-9179-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10644-015-9179-1

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