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Mutual Fund Activism and Market Regulation During the Pre-IFRS Period: The Case of Earnings Informativeness in China from an Ethical Perspective

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Abstract

This paper investigates the emerging effect of mutual fund involvement on the agency problem between majority and minority shareholders during the pre-IFRS period in China indicated by earnings informativeness from an ethical perspective. We find that the presence of mutual fund hampers earnings informativeness implying that mutual funds in general, at their early stage in China, are not yet capable of serving as an effective monitor. This finding is in sharp contrast to the role of institutional investors in mature markets as documented in the literature. However, mutual funds affiliated with banks have been found to be effective to improve earnings informativeness of Chinese listed companies, and the impact is more pronounced among those affiliated with joint-equity banks compared to their counterparts affiliated with state-owned banks.

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Notes

  1. The Huai River between the Yellow River and the Yangtze River, and with Tsinling Mountains, marks the geographical boundary between north and south China.

  2. Both Qi and Chu are two states in China that struggled against each other during the Spring and Autumn and the Warring States period (770 B.C.–221 B.C.).

  3. For instance, Mr. Xiaochuan Zhou, the then president of the CSRC, and Mr. Siwei Cheng, the then vice chairman of the Standing Committee of National People’s Congress, both pointed out that developing mutual funds should be given priority (Shen 2000).

  4. Ho and Wong (2001) argue that the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis was mainly due to the lack of corporate transparency; the current financial crisis worldwide is also described by Dr. Harry Markowitz, who won the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 1990, as the “Financial Transparency Crisis”.

  5. A reform to liquidate the non-tradable shares was launched in 2005, but the newly liquidated shares are still subject to lock up provisions.

  6. Our source for annual reports is the official website of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Some annual reports, especially those from 2001 to 2002, are not available online, and, therefore, are not coded.

  7. Since there are both tradable and non-tradable shares, we first coded a set of fund variables based on tradable shares, and then we coded the same set based on total shares.

  8. As claimed by previous studies in the literature (e.g., Firth et al. 2007; Yuan et al. 2008), considering non-tradable shares when studying issues related to Chinese public companies is not very meaningful, and, therefore, the results presented in the current study will be all based on tradable shares only. To ensure the robustness of the conclusions made, however, we also adopt six variables to measure fund involvement on the basis of all the shares, including both tradable and non-tradable ones. No qualitative change has been found.

  9. In a recent study examining the effect of fund involvement on firm performance, Yuan et al. (2008) documented that the average ownership held by mutual funds in China is about 7 %. Their calculation is from 2001 to 2005 and is based on tradable shares, as well. Our data suggest that mutual funds increasingly hold more tradable shares in recent years.

  10. If the shareholder of a mutual fund management company is a bank, or an entity controlled by a bank, or affiliated to a mother company together with a bank, we regard mutual funds managed by this company as bank-affiliated funds.

  11. The instrumental variable and fund variables are highly and significantly correlated; for instance, the correlation between the instrument variable and the variable Fund is 0.2707 which is significant at the 1 % level. The relevance of the instrumental variable has also been tested, and the F-statistics of a joint test indicate that the instrument is valid.

  12. When market return is negative, mutual funds may still have a chance to speculate since stock prices are volatile. However, the possibility should be significantly reduced.

  13. These results are available upon request. To save space, they are not presented here.

  14. Only results based on the dummy variables BankFund and SOBFund are presented in Table 6. While those based on the variables BankFund % and SOBFund % are not presented in Table 6, they are available upon request.

  15. The ten largest tradable shareholders were not disclosed at the beginning our of sample period.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Telfer School of Management, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON, Canada

    Shujun Ding

  2. Guanghua School of Management, Peking University, Beijing, China

    Chunxin Jia

  3. I.H. Asper School of Business, University of Manitoba, 416 Drake Centre, Winnipeg, MB, R3T 5V4, Canada

    Zhenyu Wu

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Ding, S., Jia, C. & Wu, Z. Mutual Fund Activism and Market Regulation During the Pre-IFRS Period: The Case of Earnings Informativeness in China from an Ethical Perspective. J Bus Ethics 138, 765–785 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-015-2797-8

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