Abstract
Block (Trends Cogn Sci 7:285–286, 2003) and Prinz (PSYCHE 12:1–19, 2006) have defended the idea that SSD perception remains in the substituting modality (auditory or tactile). Hurley and Noë (Biol Philos 18:131–168, 2003) instead argued that after substantial training with the device, the perceptual experience that the SSD user enjoys undergoes a change, switching from tactile/auditory to visual. This debate has unfolded in something like a stalemate where, I will argue, it has become difficult to determine whether the perception acquired through the coupling with an SSD remains in the substituting or the substituted modality. Within this puzzling deadlock two new approaches have been recently suggested. Ward and Meijer (Conscious Cogn 19:492–500, 2010) describe SSD perception as visual-like but characterize it as a kind of artificially induced synaesthesia. Auvray et al. (Perception 36:416–430, 2007) and Auvray and Myin (Cogn Sci 33:1036–1058, 2009) suggest that SSDs let their users experience a new kind of perception. Deroy and Auvray (forthcoming) refine this position, and argue that this new kind of perception depends on pre-existing senses without entirely aligning with any of them. So, they have talked about perceptual experience in SSDs as going "beyond vision". In a similar vein, MacPherson (Oxford University Press, New York, 2011a) claims that “if the subjects (SSD users) have experiences with both vision-like and touch-like representational characteristics then perhaps they have a sense that ordinary humans do not” (MacPherson in Oxford University Press, New York, 2011a, p. 139).
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Notes
Thanks also to John Sutton for clarifying these issues.
So, we probably need a substantial amount of reports in order to make a strong statistical argument based on them.
The question of how to individuate the senses has a long history. Grice (1962) discussed four criteria (the proper objection criterion, the character of experience criterion, the physical features criterion, and the sensory organ criterion) that one might use to distinguish the senses and argued that there is an ineliminable role for the phenomenal character of experiences in individuating them. More recently, Nudds (2004) has argued that sense is an intuitive concept that we employ for certain everyday purposes. In particular, he suggests that the concept of sense relies on societal agreement and ‘convention’. Nudds thus embraces a folk-psychological understanding of the senses. Keeley (2002) has defended a neurobiological criterion for counting the senses, according to which token perceptions count as instances of different sense modalities because of the “character of the putative sense organs and their modes of connection with the brain” (2002: 13). Instead of differentiating the senses just on the basis of whether experience begins in the eyes, ears, nose, tongue or skin, Keeley argues we must also take into account whether the sense organ is, as he puts it, ‘appropriately wired up’ (Keeley 2009). So Keeley defends a scientific account of the senses. The question of how to individuate the senses has taken on fresh interest (Macpherson Macpherson 2011b) and a series of philosophers have recently proposed other views to specify what counts as a sense and how to individuate sensory modalities. See in particular O’Callaghan (2012); Matthen (forthcoming) and Stokes et al. (forthcoming).
In Kiverstein et al. (forthcoming), we address the debate on human sensory modalities and its link with sensory substitution, and offer a critical analysis of Keeley’s notion of dedication with respect to SSDs.
TDU or Tongue Display Unit is a sensory substitution device that belongs to the category of visual-to-tactile substitution features. The FSRS discussed above and the Brain Port are probably the most successful example of a TDU.
Ericsson et al. (1993) claims that it takes 10,000 h [20 h for 50 weeks a year for 10 years] of deliberate practice to become an expert in any particular activity. I do not wish to evaluate this controversial assumption, but rather use it to emphasise the role of experience in the development of skills and expertise.
For an in-depth analysis of the limitations of perceptual and cognitive processing associated with current sensory substitution devices see (Loomis 2010; Loomis et al. in press).
15 h of training are most probably not enough to turn a naïve subject into an expert user (see note 5 above). But 15 h of training are better than just 6–8 h (the standard amount of practice to which many TDU users were normally exposed in the past). So, even if the labels “expert users” or “over-trained participants” are not, by Ericsson’s standards, appropriate to define the subjects involved in this experiment; their usage appears legitimate when we compared these subjects to standard TDU users, who were tested after a much reduced period of training.
Not all forms of synaesthesia are laden with affect. So, this definitional aspect doesn’t seem to be strictly necessary.
Perhaps the most discussed of all these definitional aspects is the consistency criterion. Consistency or persistency over time is the idea that the same inducer always triggers the same concurrent type of synaesthetic experience. See Auvray and Deroy (forthcoming). For some criticism of the idea that consistency can be used as a gold-standard criterion for establishing the authenticity of an individual’s synesthesia see Simner (2012) instead.
Is the synesthetic occurrence experienced internally or rather perceived as having a spatial connotation? This is a much debated issue in the literature. Saying that synaesthesia is spatially extended might indeed depend on the projector/associator divide. It is important to note however that some authors, such as Simner (2012) and Rich and Mattingley (forthcoming) reject this divide and instead claim that there is a continuum between projectors and associators.
PF became blind at the age of 21 after an accident. She first used The vOICe in 1998. CC was born with rod dystrophy. She had very bad eyesight as a child and as a teenager but was registered blind only at the age of 33. She first used The vOICe in 2001.
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Acknowledgments
I would like to express my appreciation to the ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders (CCD) and to Macquarie University for generously financing my research. A special and rather large thanks goes to John Sutton for his invaluable support through the preparation of this paper. Thanks also to Malika Auvray, Anina Rich, Andy Clark, Kim Sterelny, Julian Kiverstein, Peter Meijer, and the anonymous reviewer for their stimulating feedback on earlier drafts of this manuscript. Needless to say, any remaining errors are mine alone.
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Farina, M. Neither touch nor vision: sensory substitution as artificial synaesthesia?. Biol Philos 28, 639–655 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-013-9377-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-013-9377-z