Abstract
The honesty of animal communication is in the spot lights in the last 30 years. During most of this time the field was dominated by one explanation: Zahavi’s handicap principle (Zahavi, J Theor Biol 67:603–605, 1975; Grafen, J Theor Biol 144:517–546, 1990). Grose (Biol Philos 2011) embarks to explain both the success of the theory and the empirical difficulties that exist despite this success. While I wholeheartedly agree with the criticism offered by Grose and with almost all the claims he makes, the treatment of the issue is far from complete and it still leaves much to be explained. Accordingly, my commentary consist of six sections: in the first section I clear up some technical issues left unexposed, most importantly the role of strategic cost in handicap signalling; in the second section I relate this to empirical testing; in the next section I comment on the historical development of the handicap principle; in the fourth section I review the biological models that came up with conclusions that contradict the handicap principle; in the fifth section I discuss the reasons behind the success of the handicap theory; finally, in the last section I discuss the application of the handicap theory to anthropology and human sciences.
References
Bergstrom C, Lachmann M (1998) Signaling among relatives. III. Talk is cheap. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 95:5100–5105
Bergstrom CT, Számadó S, Lachmann M (2002) Separating equilibria in continuous signalling games. Phi Trans R Soc Lond B 357:1595–1606
Bro-Jorgensen J, Johnstone RA, Evans MR (2007) Uninformative exaggeration of male sexual ornamanets in barn swallows. Curr Biol 17:850–855
Getty T (1998a) Handicap signalling: when fecundity and viability do not add up. Anim Behav 56:127–130
Getty T (1998b) Reliable signalling need not be a handicap. Anim Behav 56:253–255
Getty T (2006) Sexually selected signals are not similar to sports handicaps. Trends Ecol Evol 21:83–88
Godfray HJC (1991) Signalling of need by offspring to their parents. Nature 352:328–330
Grafen A (1990) Biological signals as handicaps. J Theor Biol 144:517–546
Grose J (2011) Modelling and the fall and rise of the handicap principle. Biol Phil. doi:10.1007/s10539-011-9275-1
Hurd PL (1995) Communication in discrete action-response games. J Theor Biol 174:217–222
Hurd PL (1997) Is signalling of fighting ability costlier for weaker individuals? J Theor Biol 184:83–88
Johnstone RA (1997) The evolution of animal signals. In: Krebs J, Davies N (eds) Behavioural ecology, an evolutionary approach, 4th edn. Blackwell Scientific Publications, Oxford, pp 155–178
Kotiaho J (2001) Cost of sexual traits: a mismatch between theoretical considerations and empirical evidence. Biol Rev 76:365–376
Krebs JR, Dawkins R (1984) Animal signals: mindreading and manipulation. In: Krebs JR, Davies NB (eds) Behavioural ecology. An evolutionary approach. Blackwell Scientific Publications, Oxford, pp 380–402
Lachmann M, Számadó S, Bergstrom CT (2001) Cost and conflict in animal signals and human language. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 98:13189–131394
Maynard Smith J (1991) Honest signalling: the Philip Sidney game. Anim Behav 42:1034–1035
Maynard Smith J, Harper DGC (1995) Animal signals: models and terminology. J Theor Biol 177:305–311
Maynard Smith J, Harper DGC (2003) Animal signals. Oxford University Press, Oxford
McCarty JP (1996) The energetic cost of begging in nestling passerines. Auk 113:178–188
Moreno-Rueda G (2007) Is there empirical evidence for the cost of begging? J Ethol 25:215–222
Oberweger K, Goller F (2001) The metabolic cost of birdsong production. J Exp Biol 204:3379–3388
Roberts ML, Buchanan KL, Evans MR (2004) Testing the immunocompetence handicap hypothesis: a review of the evidence. Anim Behav 68:227–239
Searcy WA, Nowicki S (2005) The evolution of animal communication. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Spence AM (1973) Job market signaling. Quart J Econ 87:355–374
Számadó S (1999) The validity of the handicap principle in discrete action-response games. J Theor Biol 198:593–602
Számadó S (2003) Threat displays are not handicaps. J Theor Biol 211:327–348
Számadó S (2008) How threat displays work: species-specific fighting techniques, weaponry and proximity risk. Anim Behav 76:1455–1463
Számadó S (2011a) The cost of honesty and the fallacy of the handicap principle. Anim Behav 81:3–10
Számadó S (2011b) Long term commitment promotes honest status signalling. Anim Behav. doi:10.1016/j.anbehav.2011.04.024
Zahavi A (1975) Mate selection—a selection for handicap. J Theor Biol 53:205–214
Zahavi A (1977) The cost of honesty. J Theor Biol 67:603–605
Zahavi A (2007) Sexual selection, signal selection and the handicap principle. In: Jamieson B (ed) Reproductive biology, phylogeny of birds. Science Publishers Enfield, New Hampshire England
Zahavi A (2008) The handicap principle and signalling in collaborative systems. In: d’Ettore P, Hughes DP (eds) Sociobiology of communication. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 1–11
Zahavi A, Zahavi A (1997) The handicap principle. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Számadó, S. The rise and fall of handicap principle: a commentary on the “Modelling and the fall and rise of the handicap principle”. Biol Philos 27, 279–286 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-011-9299-6
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-011-9299-6