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Parfitians as Exdurantists

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Abstract

Derek Parfit’s thesis that identity doesn’t matter in survival has been extensively discussed except for its metaphysical robustness. How can we justify the abandonment of identity in the way Parfit suggests? My argument is the following. Those who want to endorse the thesis that identity doesn’t matter (and, therefore, abandon identity across time) should adopt exdurantism, i.e. a metaphysics according to which the world is composed by temporal parts each existing at a time and according to which there is nothing as a numerically same entity which exists at different times. I do that by showing that the metaphysics behind Parfit’s theory is neither compatible with endurantism, according to which object persists by being wholly present at different times, nor with perdurantism, according to which entities are aggregates of temporal and spatial parts.

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Notes

  1. Shoemaker (2016).

  2. Parfit (1984: §3, Ch. 12).

  3. This is not the only metaphysical worries about IDMV: prima facie it collides also with the so-called “the only a and b principle”. Given that there are arguments to avoid it for endurantism, perdurantism and exdurantism (Noonan 2003; Sider 2001), I'm not taking it into account as a reason to prefer a particular metaphysical theory or another.

  4. Cf. Varzi (2003a, 61), Sider (2001).

  5. Thanks to an anonymous referee for this helpful comment.

  6. The distinction between “substantial sortals” and “phase sortals” appears in Wiggins (1967).

  7. Parfit (2012: 8–9).

  8. Parfit (2012: 26).

  9. Lewis is not the only one who believes that IDMV can be endorsed in a four-dimensional framework. Merricks (1999) argues that IDMV, along with all the psychological theories of personal identity, is committed to a four-dimensional metaphysics.

  10. Moreover, Lewis and Parfit’s view can be both counted in the field of the psychological criteria of personal identity.

  11. Cf. Sider (2001, 152–153).

  12. Cf. Parfit (1971, 1984).

  13. It is not clear if the fact that two temporal parts are I-related implies that they are also R-related, but we can skip this concern.

  14. See Sattig (2008), Sider (2001, 194).

  15. See Sider (2001), Varzi (2016).

  16. Cf. Sattig (2008, 183).

  17. See Varzi (2003a, b).

  18. That is the reason why, even if some exdurantists, in various way, give an important role to identity (Sider 2001; Hawley 2004) this does not weaken my argument.

  19. For an exhaustive treatment of puzzles of identity through time and the metaphysics of persistence see Sider (2001), Hawley (2004), Loux (2002: §8), Balashov (2013).

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  1. Università degli Studi di Genova, Via Balbi 30, DAFIST Sez. Filosofia, Genoa, Italy

    Fabio Patrone

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  1. Fabio Patrone
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Patrone, F. Parfitians as Exdurantists. Axiomathes 27, 721–729 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-017-9331-9

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