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A Dynamic Version of Hylomorphism

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Abstract

This paper presents a version of hylomorphism that intends to solve problems faced by contemporary hylomorphism. After showing that attempts to understand form as sets or relation of essential properties fail at taking into account the dynamic development of substances, the paper suggests another version of hylomorphism able to solve these difficulties. A functionalist version of hylomorphism is then defended: the best way to understand how form can be present throughout all the developmental stages of a substance is to understand it as a certain kind of function.

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Notes

  1. See for instance Rea (2011): "Hylomorphism is on the rise in contemporary metaphysics. But none of its contemporary defenders have remedied… (its) inability to identify viable candidates for matter and form in nature, or to characterize them in terms of primitives widely regarded to be intelligible".

  2. Expression borrowed from Pasnau (2011: 179).

  3. See especially Fine (1994, 2003), Koslicki (2008: pp. I–II).

  4. A good example of this tendency can be found in Rea's account of natures as powers, see Rea (2011).

  5. This aspect was responsible for discussions among historians of philosophy about the possible identification of Aristotelian hylomorphism to a type of functionalism. For an (opiniated but synthetic) introduction to the controversy between Putnam, Nussbaum, Sorabji and Burnyeat, see for instance Cohen (1995). As will appear, the version of hylomorphism presented here endorses a functionalist view about form (see Sect. 3.1).

  6. Especially among medieval interpretations of hylomorphism. See for instance Pasnau (2011: 557–565).

  7. I leave the question as to whether matter is included in the essence of the things according to Aristotle, as it will be for its medieval interpreters, through the notion of forma totius. See Peramatzis (2011) for a recent discussion of the problem.

  8. See Pasnau (2011: 551). See also Marmodoro (2013), Oderberg (2007: 156–162), and Feser (2011: 230–235).

  9. For instance, this example is used in Johnston (2006) to illustrate the idea that form should be regarded as a certain type of unifying relation. Similar ideas are found in Koslicki (2008). See also Simons (2006: 609) on discussing the usual notion of relations for describing structured wholes. Simons aims at replacing it by a stronger notion of relation ("welding relation") which is more adequate for non-standard mereology. Simons's considerations about occurrents is intended to cover cases in which events can be considered as structured wholes: "A part of a concrete individual—whether continuant or occurrent—is something which plays a distinct, unified and identifiable causal or, more broadly, functional role within the individual or its life". Let us note that non-extensional mereological account of wholes need not necessarily accept this point.

  10. This point refers to the traditionnal problem of the plurality of forms. See Thobe (1968) for a discussion on the possibility of integrating the various physical levels (molecular, cellular) into a coherent hylomorphic account of substances.

  11. See below Sect. 3.1.

  12. See Koslicki (2008).

  13. See Marmodoro (2013), and also Oderberg (2013).

  14. See also Simons (2010: 29) on the lack of functionalist and dynamic considerations in the contemporary focus on structures.

  15. See Johnston (2006) for similar considerations about the role of form and self-regulation.

  16. From a purely historical point of view, this view would better fit with the dynamic metaphysics of form exposed in Aristotle’s Metaphysics than with the substrate-oriented ontology depicted in his Categories.

  17. For a general introduction to dynamical system theory, see Leunberger (1979).

  18. See for instance the famous results published by Smith and Thelen (1994).

  19. Van Gelder and Port (1995).

  20. In this regard, forms understood as functions are correlative of Boyd's theory of cluster of homeostatic properties for defining species in biology. See Boyd (1999).

  21. See for instance Lewis (1969) and Richardson (1979) for the logical validity of multiple realizability and Zangwill (1992) for its application to biology.

  22. See Wagner (1999).

  23. For a general discussion, see for instance Ellis (2008).

  24. On the reference to complex systems and organizational levels in biological explanations, see Kitano (2002) and Service (1999).

  25. See Mitchell (2009) for a discussion about reductionism and explanations for complex systems.

  26. See also Britton (2012) for a discussion of the relevance of hylomorphism in various fields of application.

  27. The fundamental character of the ontological distinction between real (living) things and mere aggregates would be similar to the conclusions reached by Van Inwagen (1990).

  28. This view is quite similar to Molnar's definition of the fundamentally dispositional character of matter as physical intentionality.

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  1. University of Rennes, Rennes, France

    Sylvain Roudaut

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Roudaut, S. A Dynamic Version of Hylomorphism. Axiomathes 28, 13–36 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-017-9326-6

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