Abstract
Much of the recent metaphysical literature on the problem of the relational unity of complexes leaves the impression that Bradley (or some Bradleyan argument) has uncovered a serious problem to be addressed. The problem is thought to be particularly challenging for trope theorists and realists about universals. In truth, there has been little clarity about the nature and import of the original Bradley’s regress arguments. In this paper, I offer a careful analysis and reconstruction of the arguments in Bradley’s Appearance and Reality (1893). The analysis reveals that no less than three regress arguments against relations can be found. I show that none of them are compelling. I argue that, as a result, it is a serious misstep for philosophers today to offer metaphysical theses based on the unchallenged assumption that Bradley has established his regress result. I further analyze the underpinnings of the Bradley problem as it is frequently cast in contemporary literature and show that they rely on certain confusions and biases, which once brought to light, make current Bradley-inspired arguments against relations unconvincing.
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Notes
Bradley’s notions of “independent” and “internal” relations will be explained shortly.
I certainly do not wish to claim that Bradley’s aim was to argue in favor of the existence of internal relations; this would be a misreading of Bradley and it is not supported by AR and his posthumous paper “Relations” (1926).
In ch. II and ch. III of AR, Bradley frequently uses the terms “difference”, “distinctness” and “separation” interchangeably. He makes it clear that when he talks of qualities being different, he understands them to be genuinely separate from one another.
It has been suggested to me that Bradley’s understanding of internal relations has to do with the respect in which the relata occupy space and/or time. According to this suggestion, two things in space or time are internally related by virtue of having a position in a continuous medium. There is, however, no evidence that Bradley held such a view in AR. In fact, Bradley’s discussion of qualities and relations precedes his discussion of space and time both chronologically and conceptually. For instance, at the end of the chapter III of AR—the chapter on qualities and relations—Bradley states that “the reader who has followed and who has grasped the principle of this chapter, will have little need to spend his time upon those which succeed it. He will have seen that our experience, where relational, is not true; and he will have condemned, almost without a hearing, the great mass of phenomena.” (Bradley, AR, 34). The following chapter—chapter IV—is dedicated to space and time, and therein Bradley argues for unreality of space and time by applying the same arguments he presented against relations in the previous chapters. Indeed, for Bradley, space and time are to be understood in terms of relations; as Bradley puts it: “space is a relation—which it cannot be; and it is a quality or substance—which again it cannot be. It is a peculiar form of the problem which we discussed in the last chapter, and is a special attempt to combine the irreconcilable.” (Bradley, AR, 36). Thus, relations—including internal relations—seem to be prior to space and time for Bradley in both metaphysical and explanatory sense.
As we saw in the previous section, Bradley does not clarify in AR whether the qualities and relations that he is considering should be understood as universals or particulars. In “Relations” (1926), however, Bradley states that it is “terms,” understood as particulars and not qualities, entering into relations.
The term “trope” may not be the most fortunate but it has established itself in metaphysical literature in the past couple of decades as the preferred term for properties that are taken to be particular rather than universal. Other terms that have been used to pick out the same ontological denizens are, “particularized property” (David Armstrong), “moment” (Edmund Husserl), and “abstract particular” (Keith Campbell).
See also P. Simons (1994:558–9) for a similar statement of the problem.
In AR, when generating his three regress arguments, Bradley did not seem to have relations’ indpendence from a complex in mind, whether in sense (1) or (2). In “Relations”, however, Bradley at times talks about relations as only genuinely real if taken to be abstractions from relational facts or situations (Bradley 1926: 642–643, 648), and seems to express a worry that when taken that way, relations cannot relate.
Russell took relations to be capable of independent existence from complexes in sense (2). It is tempting to attribute this position to realists who embrace uninstantiated universals and trope theorists who admit unbundled tropes, but it is not entirely clear that this is indeed what the latter two usually have in mind.
Take again the example of “symmetry”. It occurs as a term being related in a complex Socrates studies symmetry, and as a relating relation in A’s being symmetric with B.
Thus, external relations are real; internal relations are not. The trouble with association of the ontological reality of a relation with its externality is that it rules out the possibility that externality and internality of a relation can come in degrees. While it is conceivable to allow for varying degrees of dependence of a relation on the relata’s intrinsic properties, this is not the case for varying degrees of ontological reality.
Since Vallicella’s (2000, 2002) this has become a common way of stating the problem for realist’s and trope theorist’s ontology. Maurin (2010), Weiland and Betti (2008) and Meinertsen (2008) all embrace this statement of the problem. As we have seen, Maurin even uses the very same Bradleyean example of the lump of sugar.
Simons (1994) uses examples from physics to state the problem in the way outlined above.
See Strawson (1959, p.167) for this kind of approach.
See for instance Armstrong (1997).
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Acknowledgments
I owe special thanks to my colleague Gregory Landini for invaluable feedback and discussion of previous drafts of this paper. Thanks go as well to my colleagues Richard Fumerton and Evan Fales.
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Perovic, K. The Import of the Original Bradley’s Regress(es). Axiomathes 24, 375–394 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-014-9229-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-014-9229-8