Abstract
Although he does not provide a general analysis of argumentation, Aristotle is a highly influential source of modern argumentation theory. In his treatises the Topics, the Sophistical Refutations and the Rhetoric, Aristotle presents complementary aspects of a theory of sound arguments that are seen as the most effective means of persuasion. Aristotle’s central notion of a deductive argument (sullogismos) does not include references to an addressee, the situative context or non-verbal aspects of communication, and thus differs from some modern views on argumentation. A deductive argument in the Aristotelian sense is a sequence of intellectual steps where the conclusion follows of necessity from the premises. Aristotle does not relativize or relax this notion but takes other factors into account by providing supplementary theoretical elements. For example, he reflects on acceptable premises (endoxa), the adjustment of rhetorical arguments to the horizon of the audience, methods of finding premises on the basis of argumentative schemes (topoi), the use of non-argumentative means of persuasion, and a framework of implicit discourse rules. Many of these themes are, albeit under a different name, still discussed in modern argumentation theory.
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Notes
Toulmin (1958).
Cf. Aristotle, Topics VIII.
Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric I.3.
Cf. Aristotle, Topics I.1, 100a18–21.
Cf. Aristotle, Topics VIII.11.
Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric I.1, 1355b15 et seq.
Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric I.2, 1355b26 et seq.
Cf. the papers that are collected in van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2002) as well as van Eemeren’s contribution to this issue.
Rhetoric is a counterpart to dialectic: Rhetoric I.1, 1354a1; it is an offshoot of dialectic and the study of character: I.2, 1356a25–27, it is a part of dialectic: I.2, 1356a30 et seq., it is similar to it: I.2, 1356a31.
Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric I.1, 1355a4 et sq.
Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric I.1, 1355a5 et sq.
Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric I.1, 1355a8–10.
For a brief and useful overview see Kienpointner (2011, 10–12).
Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric III.1, 1403b18–20.
Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric II.1, 1377b21–24.
For an elaboration of this view, see Rapp (2012).
Put in such general terms, this goal seems to be congenial with more recent developments in MAT: “The Aristotelian rhetorical norm of successful persuasion is not necessarily in contradiction with the ideal of reasonableness that lies at the heart of the pragma-dialectical approach” (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 1999, 165). We owe this reference to Kientpointner (2011).
Cf. Toulmin (1996).
Cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, 1).
Cf. Aristotle, Topics I.12, 105a13 et seq.
Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric I.2, 1357b25–36.
Cf. Aristotle, Topics I.1, 100a25–27.
See Sect. 4, below; there will be, however, different uses of the accepted premises.
Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric, II.21, 1394b20–25.
There is a long-standing tradition that takes the enthymeme to be an incomplete syllogism. This is not Aristotle’s view: see below, Sect. 4.
Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric. I.2 1356b15–17. For a different interpretation cf. Burnyeat (1994).
At this point the supporter of relaxed rhetorical arguments could refer to one type of the sign-enthymeme, which, as Aristotle says, does not yield a sullogismos, but is nevertheless rated as “enthymeme”. The status of such arguments, however, is precarious, since in some passages Aristotle treats them straightforwardly as fallacies (see below, Sect. 7).
Cf. Perleman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, § 3 et seqq).
Cf. Aristotle, Topics I.1, 100a29–100b23.
Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric I.2, 1356b26 et seq.
Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric I.2, 1356b28–34.
Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric I.1, 1355a27.
Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric II.12–17. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, 20), refer to these chapters as contributions to the rhetorician’s knowledge of the audience.
Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric I.2, 1357a17–22.
Even if most of the general topoi in the Rhetoric are not really general in the same sense as the topoi of the Topics are; most are general only in the sense that they can be used in all three genres of speech, while the specific ones are always peculiar to one such genre or to one of the key notions of a genre, “just” in the judicial speech, “good” in the forensic speech, and “noble” in the epideictic speech. Still, the notion of a general topos in the Rhetoric clearly refers back to the project of the Topics, though only five out of 28 general topoi in Rhetoric II.23 clearly resemble the topoi of the Topics (1397a7–19, 1397a20–23, 1397b12–174, 1397b174–27, 1399a6–9). Insofar as the topoi in the Topics rest on, as we have said, semantic, logical or otherwise general rules it makes little sense to stress, as Warnick (2000, 111 et seq.) does, the cultural dependency of these topoi. As an example Warnick introduces the topos from the opposites—that if a and b are opposites and a has the quality q, the opposite of quality q can be predicated of b. To our mind, this is just one application of Aristotle’s complex logical system of opposites and does not indicate specific cultural preferences. Revealingly, Warnick uses the example that Aristotle gives afterwards to make her point, not the general scheme.
Cf. Toulmin (1958, Chapter 3).
Cf. Bird (1961).
Cf. Viehweg (1963, §§ 1–2).
What Perelman means by “metaphysical” is Aristotle’s system of the four predicables (definition, accidental predicate, genus, proprium), by which the topoi of the Topics are structured and from which many of the general rules that make up the topoi are taken. It is certainly true that, e.g., the difference between essential and accidental predicates rest on a certain metaphysics; it is still disputable whether this topical system is therefore “metaphysically loaded”. After all, the way in which the predicables are introduced in the Topics gives clear criteria for the distinction of four sorts of predicates and does not appeal to specific theorems of Aristotle’s metaphysics.
This is obviously the reason for Perelman’s somewhat surprising interest in the topoi of Aristotle, Topics III (Cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, § 21, and Perelman 1994, Chapter II.4). This narrow focus is surprising, since, as we already said, the topoi of book III of the Topics are in several respects exceptional within the Topics, most notably because they (also) apply to practical-particular and to philosophical-general questions.
Cf. Warnick (2000, 109): I. The quasi logical ones: contradiction, incompatibility (1), identity, definition, analyticity, tautology (2), reciprocity, rule of justice (3), transitivity, inclusion, division (4), weights, measures, probabilities (5), II. The ones based on the structure of reality: (liaisons of succession (6), liaisons of coexistence (7), symbolic liaisons, double hierarchies, differences of degree and order (8), III. The ones establishing the structure of reality: example (9), illustration (10), model and anti-model (11), analogy and metaphor (12), IV. Dissociation.—To be honest, we find not only Warnick’s general account of the general topoi questionable (see footnote 39 above), but also regard many of the similarities between Aristotle and The New Rhetoric she wishes to discover quite superficial. The problem is that many of the common or general topoi of the Rhetoric are—due to Aristotle’s use of historical speeches—too narrowly formulated and not really abstracted from the examples used.
Cf. Kienpointner (1997). Among the many titles by Walton we just want to mention one of his most recent works on argumentation schemes: Walton et al. (2008). This latter book generously includes a historical survey of argumentation schemes (chapter 8). Unfortunately, the section on Aristotelian topoi turns out to be quite distorting, so that no informative conclusion about Walton’s view of Aristotle can be drawn. For Kienpointner on Aristotle see Kienpointner (2005, 2011).
Cf. Rigotti (2007).
Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Arist. Top. II, 135, 2 et seq. (Wallies); for the idea of grouping several topoi under more general headings, see also Rapp (2000).
The same is also true of rhetorical arguments or enthymemes, which are defined as sorts of sullogismoi (see above, Sect. 3).
This contrast is emphasized by Toulmin (1986), passim. According to an often quoted example from Toulmin (1958) the premise that a Swede can generally be taken not to be a Roman Catholic can be used as warrant for the inference that, if Peter is a Swede, he is almost certainly not a Roman Catholic. If such empirical facts belong to what Toulmin takes to be “material” in contrast to “formal”, then none of Aristotle’s general or common topoi and only a few of his specific topoi would qualify as material.
Some attempts at construing specific topoi not as ready-premises, but as tools that are supposed to generate arguments, are made in Rapp (2002, vol. II, 290–298).
Cf. Aristotle, Poetics 6, 1450b8 et seq.
Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric II.1, 1378a20 et sqq.
Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric II.2, 1378a31 et sqq.
Although, of course, MAT has already incorporated the concept of relevance into its agenda; cf. e.g. van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, chapter 4).
This second criticism resembles a motif that we already encountered in Perelman: cf. footnote 43.
Cf. the contribution by Pieter Sjoerd Hasper to this issue.
Some commentators think that in Rhetoric I.2 Aristotle regards sign-enthymemes as acceptable arguments, even if they are non-conclusive. However, he does not express his appreciation for sign-enthymemes in so many words. In Rhetoric II.24 he straightforwardly classifies sign-enthymemes as fallacies. The example given in this latter chapter clearly involves a dilution; possibly, Aristotle thinks that people could accept the sign-examples in Rhetoric I.2—without being deluded. For the ancient and, in particular, Aristotelian treatment of fallacies see also Pieter Sjoerd Hasper and Christof Rapp (eds.), Ancient Fallacies. In Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 15, forthcoming.
Cf. van Eemeren et al. (1996, 284: Rule (8) with fn. 23).
Cf. loc. cit.: Rule (10).
Cf. loc. cit.: Rules (1) and (6).
Cf. Aristotle, Topics VIII.6, 160a3–6.
Cf. Aristotle, Topics VIII.11, 161b19–33.
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Rapp, C., Wagner, T. On Some Aristotelian Sources of Modern Argumentation Theory. Argumentation 27, 7–30 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-012-9280-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-012-9280-9