Skip to main content
Log in

Fair ticket pricing in public transport as a constrained cost allocation game

  • Published:
Annals of Operations Research Aims and scope Submit manuscript

A Correction to this article was published on 14 December 2017

This article has been updated

Abstract

Ticket pricing in public transport usually takes a welfare maximization point of view. Such an approach, however, does not consider fairness in the sense that users of a shared infrastructure should pay for the costs that they generate. We propose an ansatz to determine fair ticket prices that combines concepts from cooperative game theory and linear and integer programming. The ticket pricing problem is considered to be a constrained cost allocation game, which is a generalization of cost allocation games that allows to deal with constraints on output prices and on the formation of coalitions. An application to pricing railway tickets for the intercity network of the Netherlands is presented. The results demonstrate that the fairness of prices can be improved substantially in this way.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3
Fig. 4
Fig. 5
Fig. 6

Similar content being viewed by others

Change history

  • 14 December 2017

    The authors wish to correct the acknowledgement in page 68 from The work of Nam-Dũng Hoàng is funded by Vietnam National Foundation for Science and Technology Development (NAFOSTED).

Notes

  1. In Hoang (2010) those coalitions are called essential. However this name exists already in cooperative game theory. We therefore use another name to avoid confusion.

References

  • Borndörfer, R., & Hoang, N.-D. (2012). Determining fair ticket prices in public transport by solving a cost allocation problem. In H. G. Bock, X. P. Hoang, R. Rannacher, & J. P. Schlöder (Eds.), Modeling, simulation and optimization of complex processes (pp. 53–63). Berlin: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Borndörfer, R., Neumann, M., & Pfetsch, M. E. (2006). Optimal fares for public transport. In: Operations Research Proceedings 2005, pp. 591–596.

  • Borndörfer, R., Neumann, M., & Pfetsch, M. E. (2008). Models for fare planning in public transport, Technical Report, ZIB Report 08–16, Zuse-Institut Berlin.

  • Bussieck, M. R. (1998). Optimal lines in public rail transport, Ph.D. thesis. TU Braunschweig.

  • Danna, E., Rothberg, E., & Le Pape, C. (2005). Exploring relaxation induced neighborhoods to improve MIP solutions. Mathematical Programming Series A, 102, 71–90.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Engevall, S., Göthe-Lundgren, M., & Värbrand, P. (1998). The traveling salesman game: An application of cost allocation in a gas and oil company. Annals of Operations Research, 82, 453–471.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Faigle, U., Kern, W., & Paulusma, D. (2000). Note on the computational complexity of least core concepts for min-cost spanning tree games. Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 52, 23–38.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gately, D. (1974). Sharing the gains from regional cooperation: A game theoretic application to planning investment in electric power. International Economic Review, 15, 195–208.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hallefjord, Å., Helming, R., & Jørnsten, K. (1995). Computing the nucleolus when the characteristic function is given implicitly: A constraint generation approach. International Journal of Game Theory, 24, 357–372.

  • Hoang, N. D. (2010). Algorithmic cost allocation game: Theory and applications, Ph.D. thesis. TU Berlin.

  • Littlechild, S., & Thompson, G. (1977). Aircraft landing fees: A game theory approach. Bell Journal of Economics, 8, 186–204.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Maschler, M., Potters, J., & Tijs, S. (1992). The general nucleolus and the reduced game property. International Journal of Game Theory, 21, 85–106.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Straffin, P., & Heaney, J. (1981). Game theory and the tennessee valley authority. International Journal of Game Theory, 10, 35–43.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Young, H. P. (1994). Cost allocation. In R. J. Aumann & S. Hart (Eds.), Handbook of Game Theory (Vol. 2). Amsterdam: North-Holland.

    Google Scholar 

  • Young, H. P., Okada, N., & Hashimoto, T. (1982). Cost allocation in water resources development. Water Resources Research, 18, 463–475.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank three anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on the paper. The work of Nam-Dũng Hoàng is funded by Vietnam National Foundation for Science and Technology Development (NAFOSTED).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Nam-Dũng Hoang.

Additional information

A preliminary version of this paper appeared in the Proceedings of HPSC 2009 (Borndörfer and Hoang 2012). This journal article introduces better model and algorithms.

A correction to this article is available online at https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-017-2731-9.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Borndörfer, R., Hoang, ND. Fair ticket pricing in public transport as a constrained cost allocation game. Ann Oper Res 226, 51–68 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-014-1698-z

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-014-1698-z

Keywords

Mathematics Subject Classification

Navigation