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Cryptanalysis of an ad-hoc cryptosystem for mix-based e-voting robust against relation attacks

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Abstract

In this paper, an ad-hoc public-key cryptosystem recently proposed to implement a general countermeasure to relation attacks in mix-based e-voting is shown to be weak in the sense that the secret key is easily obtained from public-key parameters. The required measure to fix the previous flaw is analyzed and proven to lead to an unsecure system, so that we recommend the referred cryptosystem to be discarded.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics, Universitat de Lleida, C. Jaume II 69, 25001, Lleida, Spain

    Josep M. Miret & Francesc Sebé

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  1. Josep M. Miret
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  2. Francesc Sebé
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Correspondence to Francesc Sebé.

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Miret, J.M., Sebé, F. Cryptanalysis of an ad-hoc cryptosystem for mix-based e-voting robust against relation attacks. Int. J. Inf. Secur. 10, 387–389 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-011-0145-2

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