Abstract
This paper studies the relationship between social conflict and skilled–unskilled wage inequality through the three-sector general equilibrium approach. In the basic model without the urban unskilled minimum wage, we find that when the government enhances the degree of controlling social conflict, the skilled–unskilled wage inequality will be narrowed down (resp. widened) if the urban skilled sector is more capital intensive (resp. labor intensive) than the urban unskilled sector. The extended models address the issue under different economic structures or different types of social conflict. In the extended model with the urban unskilled minimum wage, we find that the skilled–unskilled inequality will be widened when the degree of controlling social conflict is increased. In other extended models, we find that the above obtained results are still robust.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Here, it should be noted that social conflict in the sense of this paper does not include demonstrations, violence and racial conflicts. We thank an anonymous reviewer for reminding us of it. Similar to Bó and Bó (2011), we use social conflict in the sense of appropriation activities.
In this paper, social conflict is incurred by labor who does not work in the productive sectors, so social conflict can indirectly generate the negative impact on production. For example, when there exists social conflict, some workers leave from the productive sectors to undertake the activity of social conflict. Thus, it reduces the amount of labor in the productive sectors.
In order to better understand the differences in the perspectives, here we give some additional explanations. For social conflict, people engaged in such activities target factors owners and the owners’ corresponding returns (see Bó and Bó 2011). However, for corruption, it is treated like a tax on the productive sectors’ outputs levied by people involved in corruptive activities (see Mandal and Marjit 2010). For imperfect institutional quality, people engaged in unproductive activities directly misappropriates capital originally owned by the productive sectors (see Pi and Zhou 2013).
When it is necessary, the assumption that the capital market is closed in the basic model can be relaxed. The benefit of such an assumption is that it can enable a direct comparison to the effects found in the previous literature (e.g., Mandal and Marjit 2010; Pi and Zhou 2013). We thank an anonymous reviewer for reminding us of this point.
For example, according to Becker (1968), there are two ways to increase the cost of crime to reduce the criminal rate. The first is to raise the probability to discover the criminal behavior, which needs more people employed in the security sector and more funds invested in the security technology. The second way is to raise the punishment, which requires the government to enforce a stricter or more reasonable law. Comparing to the first approach, the second will bear less cost. Besides, the crime in some sectors (e.g., the financial sector) is profitable due to the shortcomings of institutional arrangements. In this case, the government can implement a more perfect regulation to reduce the crime. We thank two anonymous reviewers for pointing it out to us.
Here, the Inada condition works like that in Bó and Bó (2011) to ensure the existence of social conflict.
Using Eqs. (6)–(9), we can find that \({w_s}{\overline{L} _s} + {w_U}({\overline{L} _U} - {L_A}) + r\overline{K} + \tau \overline{T} \) is equal to \(({a_{SX}}{w_S} + {a_{KX}}r)X + ({a_{UY}}{w_U} + {a_{KY}}r)Y + ({a_{UZ}}{w_U} + {a_{TZ}}\tau )Z\) . Using Eqs. (1)–(3), we can find that\(({a_{SX}}{w_S} + {a_{KX}}r)X + ({a_{UY}}{w_U} + {a_{KY}}r)Y + ({a_{UZ}}{w_U} + {a_{TZ}}\tau )Z\) is equal to \({p_X}X + {p_Y}Y + Z\). In this paper, for the sake of simplification, a zero trade balance is assumed. That is, the implicit trade sectors are assumed to balance their payments. Such an assumption is also adopted by the existing literature on skilled–unskilled wage inequality (e.g., Marjit and Kar 2005; Chaudhuri and Yabuuchi 2007; Beladi et al. 2008, 2010; Mandal and Marjit 2010; Pi and Zhou 2012, 2013).
The dynamic adjustment process is similar to that we have discussed in Appendix 3, so we omit the details in order to save space.
Technically speaking, this is because that these cases will not essentially change the characteristic of the system matrices. When we use the Cramer’s rule to solve these determinants, a certain row will always be removed.
For example, agents who are plundered may take measures to protect themselves. This paper focuses on the governmental protection, not on the individual protection. In the future research, we can unify the governmental protection and the individual protection in an integrated framework.
References
Becker GS (1968) Crime and punishment: an economic approach. J Polit Econ 76(2):169–217
Beladi H, Chaudhuri S, Yabuuchi S (2008) Can international factor mobility reduce wage rate inequality in a dual economy? Rev Int Econ 16(5):893–903
Beladi H, Chakrabarti A, Marjit S (2010) Skilled-unskilled wage inequality and urban unemployment. Econ Inq 48(4):997–1007
Benhabib J, Rustichini A (1996) Social conflict and growth. J Econ Growth 1(1):125–142
Benoît J-P, Osborne MJ (1995) Crime, punishment, and social expenditure. J Inst Theor Econ 151(2):326–347
Bhagwati J (1982) Directly unproductive, profit seeking (DUP) activities. J Polit Econ 90(5):988–1002
Bó ED, Bó PD (2011) Workers, warriors, and criminals: social conflict in general equilibrium. J Eur Econ Assoc 9(4):646–677
Burdett K, Lagos R, Wright R (2003) Crime, inequality, and unemployment. Am Econ Rev 93(5):1764–1777
Chaudhuri S, Yabuuchi S (2007) Economic liberalization and wage inequality in the presence of labor market imperfection. Int Rev Econ Finance 16(4):592–603
Chaudhuri S (2008) Wage inequality in a dual economy and international mobility of factors: do factor intensities always matter? Econ Model 25(6):1155–1164
Ehrlich I (1973) Participation in illegitimate activities: a theoretical and empirical investigation. J Polit Econ 81(3):521–565
Ehrlich I (1981) On the usefulness of controlling individuals: an economic analysis of rehabilitation, incapacitation, and deterrence. Am Econ Rev 71(3):307–322
Esteban J-M, Ray D (1999) Conflict and distribution. J Econ Theory 87(2):379–415
Fajnzylber P, Lederman D, Loayza N (2002) Inequality and violent crime. J Law Econ 45(1):1–40
Gonzalez FM (2007) Effective property rights, conflict and growth. J Econ Theory 137(1):127–139
Grossman HI, Kim M (1995) Swords or plowshares? A theory of the security of claims to property. J Polit Econ 103(6):1275–1288
Harris R, Todaro M (1970) Migration, unemployment, and development: a two-sector analysis. Am Econ Rev 60(1):126–142
İmrohoroğlu A, Merlo A, Rupert P (2000) On the political economy of income redistribution and crime. Int Econ Rev 41(1):1–26
Jones RW (1965) The structure of simple general equilibrium models. J Polit Econ 73(6):557–572
Jones RW (1971) A three-factor model in theory, trade, and history. In: Bhagwati J (ed) Trade, balance of payments and growth. North-Holland, Amsterdam
Jones RW, Marjit S (2003) Economic development, trade and wages. Ger Econ Rev 4(1):1–17
Kelly M (2000) Inequality and crime. Rev Econ Stat 82(4):530–530
Krueger AO (1974) The political economy of the rent-seeking society. Am Econ Rev 64(3):291–303
Mandal B, Marjit S (2010) Corruption and wage inequality? Int Rev Econ Finance 19(1):166–172
Marjit S, Kar S (2005) Emigration and wage inequality. Econ Lett 88(1):141–145
Marjit S, Mandal B (2012) Domestic trading costs and pure theory of international trade. Int J Econ Theory 8(2):165–178
Marjit S, Mandal B, Roy S (2014) Trade openness, corruption and factor abundance: evidence from a dynamic panel. Rev Dev Econ 18(1):45–58
Neary HM (1997) Equilibrium structure in an economic model of conflict. Econ Inq 35(3):480–494
Pi J, Zhou Y (2012) Public infrastructure provision and skilled-unskilled wage inequality in developing countries. Labour Econ 19(6):881–887
Pi J, Zhou Y (2013) Institutional quality and skilled-unskilled wage inequality. Econ Model 35:356–363
Pi J, Zhou Y (2014) Foreign capital, public infrastructure, and wage inequality in developing countries. Int Rev Econ Finance 29:195–207
Acknowledgments
We are grateful to the Editor Giacomo Corneo and two anonymous referees for their helpful and detailed comments and suggestions. Pi acknowledges the financial support provided by the Program for New Century Excellent Talents in University, the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities, and the Collaborative Innovation Center for China Economy. Any remaining errors are ours.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Appendices
Dynamic adjustment process of the basic model
The dynamic adjustment process is based on the idea of the excess demand function, including the Marshallian quantity adjustment process and the Walrasian price adjustment process. Our method is in line with Beladi et al. (2008). According to the excess demand functions of the basic model, the differential equations can be constructed as:
where \(d_{i} >0 \quad \left( {i=1,2,...,8} \right) \) represents the speed of adjustment. The notation “.” denotes the differentiation with respect to time (e.g., \(\dot{{X}}=\frac{dX}{dt})\). The determinant of the Jacobian matrix of Eqs. (A1)–(A8) (denoted as \(\Phi _{1} )\) can be written as:
where \(H=\frac{\prod \nolimits _{i=1}^8 {d_{i} \left( {1-A\left( {\alpha ,L_{A} } \right) } \right) p_{X} p_{Y} \left( {\bar{{L}}_{U} -L_{A} } \right) \bar{{L}}_{S} \bar{{K}}\bar{{T}}} }{w_{S} r\tau XYZL_{A} }>0\).
According to the Routh–Hurwitz theorem, the local stability can be achieved if \(\Phi _{1} >0\), which implies that \(\Delta _{1} >0\). In order to make our economic system locally stable, we need \(\Delta _{1} >0\).
Dynamic adjustment process of the model in Sect. 3.1
Replace (A2) and (A8) with the following differential equations, respectively:
Under similar demonstrations in Appendix 1, we need \(\Delta _{2} >0\) in order to make our economic system in Sect. 3.1 locally stable.
Dynamic adjustment process of the model with full employment in Sect. 3.2
Replace (A4), (A7), and (A8) with the following differential equations, respectively:
The determinant of the Jacobian matrix of Eqs. (A1)–(A3), (A5), (A6), and (A9)–(A11) (denoted as \(\Phi _{2} )\) can be written as:
where \(I=\frac{\prod \limits _{i=1}^8 {d_{i} \left( {1-A\left( {\alpha ,L_{A} } \right) } \right) p_{X} p_{Y} \bar{{L}}_{U} \left( {\bar{{L}}_{S} -L_{A} } \right) \bar{{K}}\bar{{T}}} }{w_{U} r\tau XYZL_{A} }>0\).
According to the Routh–Hurwitz theorem, the local stability can be achieved if \(\Phi _{2} >0\), which implies that \(\Delta _{3} >0\). Thus in order to make our economic system locally stable, we need \(\Delta _{3} >0\).
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Pi, J., Zhang, P. Social conflict and wage inequality. J Econ 121, 29–49 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-016-0515-3
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-016-0515-3