Abstract
Resource allocation is one of the most relevant problems in the area of Mechanism Design for computing systems. Devising algorithms capable of providing efficient and fair allocation is the objective of many previous research efforts. Usually, the mechanisms they propose deal with selfishness by introducing utility transfers or payments. Since using payments is undesirable in some contexts, a family of mechanisms without payments is proposed in this paper. These mechanisms extend the Linking Mechanism of Jackson and Sonnenschein introducing a generic concept of fairness with correlated preferences. We prove that these mechanisms have good incentive, fairness, and efficiency properties. To conclude, we provide an algorithm, based on the mechanisms, that could be used in practical computing environments.
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Notes
We will use the terms node, user, and player interchangeably.
By repeated games we refer to a scenario in which players interact by playing a similar (stage) game several times. Unlike a game played once, a repeated game allows for new strategies to be contingent on past moves, thus allowing for reputation and retribution effects.
Schummer and Vohra note that “ there are many important environments where money cannot be used as a medium of compensation. This constraint can arise from ethical and/or institutional considerations: many political decisions must be made without monetary transfers; organ donations can be arranged by ‘trade’ involving multiple needy patients and their relatives, yet monetary compensation is illegal.”
We denote by \(\Delta (S)\) the set of all probability distribution over some set S.
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Appendix A: Solution of the system with same number of resources
Appendix A: Solution of the system with same number of resources
We prove here the following theorem.
Theorem 6
The function \(\psi \) that optimizes the assignment with equal expected number of resources for two players defines a straight line \(\psi (\theta _1) = \theta _1 + \lambda \). The decision function is an assignment \(d = g_{\psi } (\theta ) = {\mathop {{{\mathrm{arg\,max}}}}_{1,2}}(\psi _1(\theta _1), \theta _2) = {\mathop {{{\mathrm{arg\,max}}}}_{1,2}}(\theta _1 + \lambda , \theta _2)\) when the objective is to maximize the utility, and \(d = g_{\psi } (\theta ) = {\underset{1,2}{{{\mathrm{arg\,min}}}}}(\psi _1(\theta _1), \theta _2) = {\underset{1,2}{{{\mathrm{arg\,min}}}}}(\theta _1 + \lambda , \theta _2)\) when the objective is to minimize.
Proof
What we want to prove is that the solution to the following system is \(\psi _1(x) = x + \lambda \).
In order to calculate the optimal decision function, we define
Inserting these expressions into the integral (Eq. 25), we obtain
Note that we are considering here the particular case of one independent variable (\(\theta _1\)), one function \(\psi (\theta _1)\), and an integrand that depends at most on the first derivative of the function. Using a Lagrange multiplier \(\lambda (\theta _1)\), this expression defines a functional that depends on \(\psi \). The Lagrange multipliers are, in general, functions of the independent variable. However, as it can be easily seen from above equation, when the integrand and the constraint are independent of \(\theta _1\) themselves, then each Lagrange multiplier is a constant (denoted by \(\lambda \)).
Thus, Eq. (29) is equivalent to
The usual variational procedure with respect to the function \(\psi (\theta _1)\) is to use the Euler–Lagrange equation
That leads to the following Euler–Lagrange equation
And,
Solving,
Our next step will be trying to simplify this expression. Using the Leibniz integral rule we have:
and
And then, Eq. (37) reduces to:
Solving \(\psi (x)\), we finally obtain the solution as:
Finally, note that \({\underset{i \in N}{{{\mathrm{arg\,min}}}}}(\psi _i(\theta _i)) = {\underset{1,2}{{{\mathrm{arg\,min}}}}}(\theta _1 + \lambda , \theta _2)\), given that,
Which completes the proof for the case of minimization. The proof for maximization is essentially identical. Observe that both cases lead to the same value of \(\lambda \). \(\square \)
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Santos, A., Fernández Anta, A., Cuesta, J.A. et al. Fair linking mechanisms for resource allocation with correlated player types. Computing 98, 777–801 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00607-015-0461-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00607-015-0461-x