Abstract
This paper deals with the existence of anonymous mechanisms to realize the Lindahl correspondence. We consider, in turn, constant and decreasing returns to scale technologies for producing public goods. In each case, we provide a continuous (but not smooth) and weakly balanced mechanism, which meets the two conditions. We then remark that they satisfy a property (see property NC), which is related to, but in fact stronger than anonymity. Finally, we prove that if a mechanism has this property, if it is weakly balanced and implements the Lindahl correspondence, then it cannot be differentiable around Nash equilibria.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
de Trenqualye P (1994) Nash implementation of Lindahl allocations. Soc Choice Welf 11: 83–94
Hurwicz L (1979) Outcome functions yielding Walrasian and Lindahl allocation at Nash equilibrium points. Rev Econ Stud 46(2): 217–225
Hurwicz L (1986) Incentive aspects of decentralization. In: Arrow JK, Intriligator MD (eds) Handbook of mathematical economics, vol III. North Holland, Amsterdam, 1985
Hurwicz L et al (1984) Feasible implementation of social choice correspondences by Nash Equilibria, mimeo
Kim T (1993) A stable Nash mechanism implementing Lindahl allocations for quasi-linear environments. J Math Econ 22: 359–371
Kwan YK, Nakamura S (1987) On Nash implementation of the Walrasian or Lindahl correspondance in the two-agent economy. Discussion Paper No. 243, University of Minnesota
Li Q, Nakamura S, Tian G (1995) Nash-implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with decreasing returns to scale technologies. Int Econ Rev 36(1): 37–52
Miura R (1982) Counter-example and revised outcome function yielding the Nash-Lindahl equivalence for two or more agents. Keio University, Tokyo
Saijo T, Tatamitani Y, Yamato T (1996) Toward natural implementation. Int Econ Rev 37(4): 949–980
Tian Q (1989) Implementation of the lindahl correspondence by a single-valued, feasible and continuous mechanism. Rev Econ Stud 56(4): 613–621
Tian Q (1990) Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension. J Econ Theory 51: 443–452
Tian Q (1991) Implementation of Lindahl allocations with nontotal-nontransitive preferences. J Public Econ 46: 247–259
Tian Q (1993) Implementing Lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism. J Math Econ 22: 169–179
Walker M (1981) A simple incentive compatible scheme for attaining Lindahl allocations. Econometrica 49(1): 65–71
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Rouillon, S. Anonymous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence: possibility and impossibility results. Soc Choice Welf 40, 1179–1203 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0662-6
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0662-6