Abstract
We define a class of Nash based mechanisms that implement Lindahl allocations in standard public good economies. As those that first proved Nash implementation of Lindahl allocations, defined by Hurwicz (1979) and Walker (1981), the mechanisms provided here are continuous, feasible, and independent of agents' characteristics. In economies with two agents (e.g., bilateral monopolies, duopolies, principal-agent models), our mechanisms are also applicable, in contrast to the well-behaved mechanisms in the literature, and they satisfy favourable stability properties.
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de Trenqualye, P. Nash implementation of Lindahl allocations. Soc Choice Welfare 11, 83–94 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00182899
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00182899