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On the spatial representation of preference profiles

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Abstract

Given a set of alternatives with multiple attributes, I characterize the set of preference profiles that are representable by weighted versions of a class of utility functions indexed by a parameter δ > 0, where δ ≥ 1 corresponds to the set of Minkowski’s (1886) metric functions. In light of the starkly different consequences between representability with δ ≤ 1 or with δ > 1, I propose a test to empirically estimate δ and I discuss the theoretical and empirical implications for spatial models of political competition.

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  1. New York University, 19 West 4th, 2nd floor, New York, NY, 10012, USA

    Jon X. Eguia

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  1. Jon X. Eguia
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Correspondence to Jon X. Eguia.

Additional information

I am grateful to Miguel A. Ballester, Christian Hellwig, Navin Kartik and Efe Ok for their inspiring suggestions. I also thank Patrick Le Bihan, Macartan Humphreys, Wolfgang Pesendorfer, and participants at the 2009 Economics and Philosophy Summer School (Donostia), 2009 ESSET (Gerzensee) and seminars at Berkeley, Málaga, Rutgers, Warwick and Wash. U. in St. Louis for their valuable comments. I wrote the current version while visiting the Kellogg School of Management (Northwestern University), and I am grateful for financial support from its Ford Motor Company Center for Global Citizenship and from its Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Sciences.

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Eguia, J.X. On the spatial representation of preference profiles. Econ Theory 52, 103–128 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0669-8

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