Abstract
This study examines the effect of negotiators’ role (sellers vs. buyers), leadership tone (supportive vs. non-supportive), and social value orientation (prosocials vs. proselfs) on expected transfer prices outcomes as expressed by negotiation managers. Using a 2 × 2 experiment, we find that prosocial managers’ expected transfer prices are closer to an equal-profit price compared with those of proself managers. We further find that the transfer price expectation gap between proself selling managers and buying managers under a non-supportive leadership tone is larger than it is under a supportive leadership tone, suggesting that the negative effect of prosel.
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Notes
The phrase “expected” transfer price is used in this paper to include the “negotiated” or “predicted” transfer price. Note that the participants in this experimental study did not finalize the actual negotiation. Hence, the transfer price decided by the participants was their decision about the expected or predicted transfer price.
As described in Chang et al. (2008, p. 708), a loss frame (as opposed to a gain frame) is represented by uncertainties surrounding a negative consequence, and a gain frame is represented by uncertainties surrounding a positive consequence.
Madsen et al. (2005, p. 217) indicate that “the term of social relationships in workplace is primarily focused on employees’ feelings, attitudes, and perceptions (positive and negative) toward workplace colleagues (supervisors, subordinates, and peers) with whom they work directly or indirectly”.
Affect-based trust refers to interpersonal trust that is based on feelings rather than rational.
Willingness to cooperate refers to an individual’s motivation or willingness to strive for the benefit of the “collective” rather than give in to the temptation to be “greedy,” and expectation of others refers to an individual’s estimate of the likelihood that they will reciprocate cooperative behavior (Bogaert et al. 2008).
Kelley and Stahelski (1970), for example, find that if early contributions were unequal, pro-socials are willing to reduce their own payoffs to achieve equal outcomes.
In the original experimental instrument, we also manipulated the performance evaluation scheme (PES) at two levels (division profit vs. company profit) for the purpose of another related study. Given that the main objective of this paper is to examine the effect of leadership tone, negotiators’ role, and SVO on final expected transfer price, we removed PES from our model. The results from a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) suggest that the manipulation of PES does not have a significant effect on the dependent variable, and the exclusion of it from the analyses does not influence the main results.
The demographic data are not tabulated.
To test the robustness of the results to the exclusion of the responses that failed the manipulation check, three-way ANCOVA was conducted by including these responses in the analysis (n = 116). The dependent variable is the expected transfer price, and the independent variables are leadership tone (supportive vs. non-supportive), negotiators’ role (buyer vs. seller), and SVO (prosocial vs. proself). We included age, gender, type of student, and fairness concerns as control variables in the model. The results are consistent with the results in the main tests, except that the three-way interaction effect is not significant.
Prosocial choices are 1c, 2b, 3a, 4c, 5b, 6a, 7a, 8c, 9b; individualistic choices are 1b, 2a, 3c, 4b, 5a, 6c, 7b, 8a, 9c; and competitive choices are 1a, 2c, 3b, 4a, 5c, 6b, 7c, 8b, 9a.
Note that we consulted and received confirmation from Professor Van Lange regarding the appropriateness of combining individualists and competitors.
In a post-experiment questionnaire, Maas et al. (2012) find that a desire to ensure fair distribution of the bonus pool is the primary motivation that drives the price offer made by a manager, independent of the manipulations. Following Maas et al. (2012), our study considers fairness concerns a control variable for our model. This variable captures the subjects’ desire for fair allocation of the bonus pool, which is expected to affect the final expected prices but should not be influenced by the manipulations.
The five-item Likert-type scale from Mass et al. (2012) was originally used to capture a manager’s motivation to provide a fair allocation. This scale includes: Item 1 (I wanted to reward BU managers who acted cooperatively), Item 2 (I wanted to punish BU managers who did not act cooperatively), Item 3 (I thought it was important that BU managers who tried to get more than their fair share got punished), Item 4 (I thought it was important that BU managers who acted in the common interest got rewarded), and Item 5 (I thought it was important that BU managers who acted in the common interest got at least a fair return). Since we are interested in subjects’ perceived fairness in general and there was no manager-employer relationship as per Mass et al. (2012) in our experimental design, we have modified each item’s wording to reflect the current context. Specifically, in our questionnaire, Item 1 has been reworded to “Managers who act cooperatively should be rewarded,” Item 2 has been reworded to “Managers who do not act cooperatively should be punished,” Item 3 has been reworded to “Managers who act in the common interest should be rewarded,” Item 4 has been reworded to “Managers who act in the common interest should get a fair return,” and Item 5 has been reworded to “If managers are fair with me, I would be fair in return.”
The factor loadings for Item 2 (“Managers who do not act cooperatively should be punished”) and Item 5 (“If managers are fair with me, I would be fair in return”) are both below 0.500; therefore, they were dropped from the analysis. After excluding these items, the factor analysis of the remaining three-item scale reveal the unidimensional nature of fairness concerns scale, with factor loadings as follows: Factor 1 = 0.691, Factor 3 = 0.839, and Factor 4 = 0.825. Total variance explained was 62.102%.
We conducted ANOVA without controlling for fairness concerns, gender, and type of student. The results are consistent with those reported in the main test, except the significance of the main effect of SVO and three-way interaction effect dropped to 10%, and negotiators’ role is significant at the 10% level.
To deal with the problem of unequal sample sizes for the two conditions of social value orientation, we firstly conducted a Levene’s Test to assess the equality of variance of final expected transfer prices calculated for the two conditions of social value orientation. It tests the null hypothesis that the population variances are equal. The mean difference of final expected transfer prices between the prosocial and proself condition is 26.404 (not tabulated). The F-statistic is 0.901 and p-value is 0.345, suggesting that the null hypothesis of equal variance is not rejected. That is, it is reasonable to assume the two conditions of social value orientation have equal variance.
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Acknowledgements
We thank Janne Chung, Chong Lau, Stijn Masschelein, Lokman Mia, John Sands, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper. Comments by participants in the research seminars at Curtin University, Griffith University, and The University of Western Australia are appreciated. An earlier version of this paper was presented the 2015 European Accounting Association Annual Congress, Glasgow, United Kingdom, and the 2019 Asian Academics Accounting Association Conference, Seoul, Korea. We gratefully acknowledge the research funding support from the UWA Business School, The University of Western Australia. We greatly appreciate Linda Chang, Mandy Cheng and Ken Trotman sharing their research instrument with us.
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Appendix: A sample of one of the experimental conditions
Appendix: A sample of one of the experimental conditions
[Negotiator’s role = Seller; Leadership tone = Non-supportive]
1.1 Organizational structure
XYZ is a medium-size manufacturing company which has the following two operating divisions:
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1.
PARTS division which manufactures parts for use by ASSEMBLY division and also for sale to outside buyers, and.
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2.
ASSEMBLY division which buys parts from the PARTS division and from outside sellers, and assembles them into Final Product for sale to outside customers.
1.2 Your role
You are to assume the role of Manager P of the PARTS division of XYZ Company.
1.3 Your workplace
At an executive meeting several years ago, senior management of XYZ called for ideas on how to increase work productivity. A manager suggested one way of increasing work productivity was to have good working relationships with other employees within the company.
Senior management disagreed with this view, declaring that the promotion of work relationships within the company was irrelevant to increasing productivity and that employees should concentrate on the work at hand instead of wasting time socialising. Senior management felt that they should be the ones setting the pace of the environment and took it upon themselves to implement a system of performance review that focused on meeting individual goals set by senior management.
A recent survey carried out in XYZ showed that most employees were unhappy and uncomfortable within the company. They did not feel valued and felt remote both within their own division and with colleagues in other divisions.
At the moment, you rarely interact with Manager A of the ASSEMBLY division.
1.4 Your total compensation
Your performance is assessed by senior management based on your division’s performance and efficiency. Your total compensation consists of a fixed salary and a bonus. The bonus is tied to your division’s profits.
This year, your division manufactured several batches of parts called Alpha. You can sell Alpha either to the ASSEMBLY division or to outside buyers (see diagram below).
The transfer price that you receive when you sell Alpha to ASSEMBLY is negotiated by you and Manager A, the manager of ASSEMBLY division. Both of you are free to consider whatever factors are appropriate in setting the price and to choose a transfer price for Alpha that is satisfactory to both of you.
If you and Manager A cannot agree on a price, you can always sell to outside buyers and ASSEMBLY can buy from outside sellers. You will, however, each incur extra fixed costs when you trade with outsiders that you do not have when you trade internally.
Trading with outsiders:
You already know how much Final Product will sell for on the market, so once you and Manager A decide on the transfer price, both will know how much profit each division will make on this transfer. The table below shows the total profit from trading per part of Alpha and how this profit is divided at selected transfer prices, in thousands of dollars.
See Table
As you can see, in the absence of outside costs, the total company profit to be divided between the two divisions is $600,000. If the transfer price is agreed at $200 per part of Alpha, then all $600,000 goes to ASSEMBLY whereas at $800 per part of Alpha, all $600,000 goes to PARTS. At prices between $200 and $800 per part of Alpha, the profit is divided, as shown in Table 4. The exact transfer price has no impact on total company profits of $600,000 but affects how it is split between the divisions.
From Table 4, you can also see that every $25 difference in transfer price changes divisional profits by $25,000. Therefore, a change in the transfer price will change division profits in $25,000 increments.
For example, if you negotiate (in dollars).
Transfer Price | Your Division’s (PARTS) Profit | ASSEMBLY Division’s Profit |
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475 | 275 | 325 |
500 | 300 | 300 |
525 | 325 | 275 |
If both of you cannot agree on a transfer price, both divisions will trade with outsiders at the current market price of $700 per part of Alpha. That is, PARTS will get $700 per part of Alpha selling to outsiders, and ASSEMBLY will pay $700 per part of Alpha buying from outsiders. If an agreement had been reached at $700, then according to Table 1, the $600,000 profit would be split $500/$100. IN the absence of agreement, transacting with outside means outside costs will be incurred, and profits will be reduced as follows:
Failure to reach an agreement will thus result in overall company profits (and aggregate divisions’ profits) being lower due to the outside costs incurred. PARTS and ASSEMBLY are about the same size in terms of invested capital and divisional profit, and the price of Alpha is important to both divisions. PARTS’ production costs and ASSEMBLY’s assembling costs for Final Product are approximately equal.
Think about the profit your division is likely to attain and the level of profit you can get Manager A to accept, given outside market opportunities. This should give some idea as to what price YOU would aim at in negotiating with Manager A.
Assuming agreement is reached, what would you expect the final negotiated (expected) transfer price to be? (You may choose a price between $200 – $800 from the table).
1.5 Manipulation check questions
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1.
What role did you take when completing the experimental task?
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A.
I was the PARTS manager
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B.
I was the ASSEMBLY manager
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A.
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2.Based on the business environment of XYZ, the company:
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A.
Supports maintaining a good relationship and/or relationship building within the company
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B.
Does not support relationship building within the company
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A.
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3.Your bonus depends on:
-
A.
Divisions’ profit levels
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B.
Company profit levels
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A.
1.6 Fairness concerns scale
Please respond to each of the following questions by circling a number from 1 to 5.
Strongly disagree | Strongly agree | |||||
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1 | Managers who act cooperatively should be rewarded | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
2 | Managers who do not act cooperatively should be punished | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
3 | Managers who act in the common interest should be rewarded | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
4 | Managers who act in the common interest should get a fair return | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
5 | If managers are fair with me, I would be fair in return | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
1.7 Social value orientation scale
In this task, we ask you to imagine that you have been randomly paired with another person, whom we will refer to simply as the "Other." This other person is someone you do not know and that you will not knowingly meet in the future. Both you and the "Other" person will be making choices by circling either the letter A, B, or C. Your own choices will produce points for both yourself and the "Other" person. Likewise, the other's choice will produce points for him/her and for you. Every point has value: The more points you receive, the better for you, and the more points the "Other" receives, the better for him/her.
Here's an example of how this task works:
In this example, if you chose A, you would receive 500 points, and the other would receive 100 points; if you chose B, you would receive 500 points and the other 500; and if you chose C, you would receive 550 points and the other 300. So, you see that your choice influences both the number of points you receive and the number of points the other receives. Before you begin making choices, please keep in mind that there are no right or wrong answers–choose the option that you, for whatever reason, prefer most. Also, remember that the points have value: The more of them you accumulate, the better for you. Likewise, from the "other's" point of view, the more points s/he accumulate, the better for him/her.
For each of the nine choice situations below, circle A, B, or C, depending on which column you prefer the most. Please proceed in the order the choices appear.
A | B | Ct | ||
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1 | You get | 480 | 540 | 480 |
Other gets | 80 | 280 | 480 | |
2 | You get | 560 | 500 | 500 |
Other gets | 300 | 500 | 100 | |
3 | You get | 520 | 520 | 580 |
Other gets | 520 | 120 | 320 | |
4 | You get | 500 | 560 | 490 |
Other gets | 100 | 300 | 490 | |
5 | You get | 500 | 490 | 560 |
Other gets | 500 | 90 | 300 | |
6 | You get | 500 | 500 | 570 |
Other gets | 500 | 100 | 300 | |
7 | You get | 510 | 560 | 510 |
Other gets | 510 | 300 | 110 | |
8 | You get | 550 | 500 | 500 |
Other gets | 300 | 100 | 500 | |
9 | You get | 480 | 490 | 540 |
Other gets | 100 | 490 | 300 |
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Chong, V.K., Loy, C.Y., Wang, I.Z. et al. The effect of negotiators’ role, leadership tone, and social value orientation on expected transfer prices: additional evidence. J Manag Control 32, 299–332 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00187-021-00321-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00187-021-00321-8