Abstract
This article proposes a setting that allows for technological cooperation in the cost sharing model. Dealing with discrete demands, we study two properties: additivity and dummy. We show that these properties are insufficient to guarantee a unit-flow representation similar to that of Wang (Econ Lett 64:187–192, 1999). To obtain a characterization of unit flows, we strengthen the dummy axiom and introduce a property that requires the cost share of every agent to be non-decreasing in the incremental costs generated by their demand. Finally, a fairness requirement as to the compensation of technological cooperation is examined.
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Bahel, E., Trudeau, C. A discrete cost sharing model with technological cooperation. Int J Game Theory 42, 439–460 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0320-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0320-3