Summary
We investigate strategic situations where the zero-sum two-person game in normal form is composed of a sequence of choices where the players are informed about the past and its relations between the orders of realizing them. The minimax theorem is improved for games having cartesian products as strategy sets.
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Reference
Burger, E.: Einführung in die Theorie der Spiele. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1959 (english translation: Englewood-Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall 1963).
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Marchi, E. A note on temporal games. Z. Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie verw Gebiete 12, 98–106 (1969). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00531643
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00531643