Abstract
In a recent paper, Eric Schwitzgebel argues that if materialism about consciousness is true, then the United States is likely to have its own stream of phenomenal consciousness, distinct from the streams of conscious experience of the people who compose it. Indeed, most plausible forms of materialism have to grant that a certain degree of functional and behavioral complexity constitutes a sufficient condition for the ascription of phenomenal consciousness – and Schwitzgebel makes a case to show that the United States as a whole fulfills this condition. One way to avoid this counter-intuitive consequence of materialism about consciousness is to adopt what Schwitzgebel calls an “anti-nesting principle”: a principle that states that there can be no nested forms of phenomenal consciousness and that therefore a conscious whole cannot have parts that are themselves conscious. However, Schwitzgebel then proceeds in his paper to draw up various objections, notably based on thought experiments, in order to dismiss these kinds of “anti-nesting” principles. My aim in this paper is to present a version of a sophisticated anti-nesting principle that avoids Schwitzgebel’s objections. This principle is reasonable, intuitive, and as non-arbitrary as possible. Moreover, it can resist the objections mounted by Schwitzgebel against simple anti-nesting principles. This principle helps materialists avoid the implication that the United States has its own stream of consciousness, while granting consciousness to some entities which, in many cases, are intuitive instantiators of phenomenal consciousness (among which are cases of authentic group consciousness). This principle therefore constitutes a way out for a materialist who wants to deny that the United States is conscious.
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Notes
This is not exactly true, given that Schwitzgebel’s characterization of materialism is compatible with some forms of type-materialism (Schwitzgebel forthcoming, p. 8) which identify human consciousness with specific biological processes (McLaughlin 2007; Polger 2004). However, even if such theories are not committed to the supervenience thesis just stated, their most plausible versions have to accept that certain levels of complexity regarding the functional organization of a system constitute a condition for the presence of a stream of consciousness attached to this system. For reasons of simplicity however, I will focus on a functionalist understanding of materialism which implies that the phenomenally conscious states of a system supervene on its functional organization.
But not all of them, strictly speaking: see the first footnote of this paper.
Of course, it may be that a given theory will have to determine many properties of that sort. Ideally, it will have to give an exhaustive list of those, which will allow to refer to the property Z, described by the disjunctive statement of all the properties of the kind P. Z will be such that an entity having Z will constitute a necessary and sufficient condition for an entity having S.
I speak of P as a sufficient condition for S, but not as constituting S, because amongst the theories I am considering here are some anti-materialist theories of consciousness, such as Chalmers’ naturalistic dualism. And according to this kind of theory, the having of a functional property P by an entity can be considered as a sufficient condition for the having of a phenomenal property S by the same entity (the laws of nature being fixed) without the having of P constituting the having of S.
That is to say, it would no longer have the property Z, where Z is the (possibly disjunctive) property, the having of which by an entity is a necessary and sufficient condition for this entity having S.
An anonymous reviewer suggested a variation on that case which could constitute an objection to the SAP: let us suppose that the tiny clever organisms decide to make me talk about M by changing my brain directly in order to “insert” a conscious thought about M in me. It may seem that the SAP would imply that such thoughts cannot be conscious. This would be an utterly counter-intuitive consequence of the SAP : indeed, in that case, it is stipulated that the actions of the clever organisms only “cause” my thoughts about M, without “constituting” them, and it is hard to see why the fact that my thoughts have such causes rather than others, would make them less conscious – even though it could make them be out of my control, in such a way that I would not be their author (Shepherd forthcoming; Vosgerau and Voss 2014). However, I don’t think this is a problem for the SAP in the end. Indeed, when we detail this case, it can be described in two versions. In the first, we can imagine that the tiny clever organisms change my brain in a temporally localized manner, so that after the change I remain able to talk about the complex theorem by myself and without their intervention. In that version, I grant that I would have conscious thoughts about M, and denying that I am conscious of M would be very counter-intuitive. But this is perfectly compatible with the SAP, because the conscious intervention of the clever organisms changed (once and for all) my functional organization, but cannot be considered as a part of my own functional organization (while the SAP only applies when a whole has a conscious part playing a certain role in one’s functional organization). Indeed, for X to be a part of the functional organization of Y requires a certain lasting (even if merely dispositional) contribution of X to the causal properties of Y, and this is not the case when we only consider a temporally localized modification (in the same way as an act of brain surgery can change my functional organization, without this very act being in itself a part of this organization). In the second version of the case, we can suppose that a permanent intervention of the tiny organisms upon my brain is necessary to maintain the appropriate behavior and organization. In that case, the SAP indeed states that my “thoughts” about M won’t be conscious thoughts, as me having them requires that the conscious organisms play a certain role in my functional organization, a role which itself requires that these organisms have thoughts about me as a whole, and which could not be played by non-conscious, non-intelligent entities. In that case, the functional complexity that makes my “thoughts” be indeed about M really comes from the clever tiny organisms and requires that these organisms have mental states representing me; in a way, the actions of the organisms don’t only “cause” my thoughts, but also “constitute” them, as only they have the functional features which are required to make my thoughts be really about M. In this last version of the case, I would simply bite the bullet and claim that I don’t have conscious thoughts about M, but I don’t think that, so described, this would be such a counter-intuitive claim after all. Of course, the SAP does not lead to denying that, in this last version of the case, the intervention of the clever organisms can cause me to have a slightly different stream of consciousness compared to what I would have had without this intervention – however it would not give me conscious thoughts about M.
“Sirian Supersquids” (Schwitzgebel forthcoming, p. 3–4) are imaginary intelligent creatures, whose intellectual achievements are comparable to those of humans, but whose nervous system is distributed through their head and a thousand tentacles. They can detach those tentacles, but the nervous signals (based on light signals rather than chemical signals) can still be reliably transmitted from a distance. For this reason, their spatially discontinuous nervous system can remain fully and coherently integrated from a functional and cognitive point of view. Schwitzgebel takes it that denying a genuine stream of consciousness to Supersquids is arbitrary, and requires that we appeal to an unjustifiable form prejudice against spatially discontinuous cognitive systems (“contiguism”) according to which only spatially continuous entities can have their own streams of consciousness.
The meaning of “contiguism” has been explained in the previous note. “Neurochauvinism” refers to the kind of prejudice (unjustified according to Schwitzgebel) that would lead us to deny consciousness to any creature whose cognitive functioning and information-processing is not neuron-based.
This arbitrary aspect concerns materialist theories of consciousness, as well as some dualist theories of consciousness (like Chalmers’ (Chalmers 1996), which have to posit basic laws linking phenomenal properties to physical properties).
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Eric Schwitzgebel, Isabelle Montin, Julietta Rose and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments.
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Kammerer, F. How a Materialist Can Deny That the United States is Probably Conscious – Response to Schwitzgebel. Philosophia 43, 1047–1057 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9653-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9653-z