Abstract
This paper considers the charge that—contrary to the current widespread assumption accompanying the near-universal neglect of his work—Wilhelm Jerusalem (1854–1923) cannot count as one of the founders of the sociology of (scientific) knowledge. In order to elucidate the matter, Jerusalem’s “sociology of cognition” is here reconstructed in the context of his own work in psychology and philosophy as well as in the context of the work of some predecessors and contemporaries. It is argued that while it shows clear discontinuities with the present-day understanding of the sociology of (scientific) knowledge, Jerusalem’s sociology of cognition was not only distinctive in its own day but also anticipated in nuce a much-discussed theme in current history of science.
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Notes
“Wilhelm Jerusalem, who in his sociological theories agrees with regard to many points with the French sociologists, especially with Durkheim und Lévy-Bruhl, has also developed a sociology of knowledge. His sociology of cognition (which he also designated as ‘sociological epistemology’) constitutes… a part of social psychology. It does not fall into the field of proper sociology and thus does not belong to the discipline that today is called sociology of knowledge. In particular, the concept of the ‘social factor’, which according to Jerusalem the cognition of an individual person depends on, is not identical with the concept of ‘Seinsverbundenheit’ (existential connection), thus with the concept that so indisputably stands at the centre of the current sociology of knowledge that one could define it as the ‘theory of the Seinsverbundenheit (existential connection) of human thought’.” (1934, 20; all translations from sources where no English version is given in the references are by the present author). After the first sentence quoted Grünwald refered to Jerusalem (1923, 286ff), (1909a), (1921) and (1924), after the last one quoted to Mannheim (1931).
See Merton (1942).
A prize competition, organised in 1931 by the Sociological and Philosophical Societies in Vienna with the topic “The development of the sociology of cognition and knowledge since Wilhelm Jerusalem” was concluded without any award, having prompted only four inadequate contributions (see Kantstudien 36 (1931) 364 and 38 (1933) 494). No report of the results of the follow-up competition with a changed topic but also focusing on Jerusalem and with a due date at the end of 1934 were published, Kantstudien having been radically gleichgeschaltet as of vol. 40 (1935).
See Daston and Galison (2006).
See Eckstein (1935) and the autobiographical Jerusalem (1922), part one of which was enlarged in (1925b). It may be added that being born a Jew in the multi-national empire of Austria-Hungary (in his case Bohemia), Jerusalem perfectly fits J. C. Nyíri’s profile for founders of the discipline of the sociology of knowledge (1989).
Politically Jerusalem was no socialist and despite his concern for “just social policies” showed certain conservative tendencies; see, e.g., Jerusalem (1897a [1905a, 229–230]).
See, e.g., Kusch (1995, 15) who otherwise considers Jerusalem for his role in the psychologism dispute, or Stadler (1997 [2001, 41) who otherwise locates him in the intellectual background for the emergence of the Vienna Circle.
For the latter see his (1905b). Even in his later sociological phase he claimed: “Even the most universal propositions of logic and mathematics are regarded”—by the evolutionist in contrast to the apriorist thinker—“only as sedimentations, as condensations (Verdichtungen) of earlier experience. The evolutionist sees in these propositions the adaptation of thoughts to facts and to each other (Mach), he finds in these valuable measures from the point of the economy of thought.” (1909b, 809) For more on Verdichtungen see section “Jerusalem’s sociology of cognition” below.
By contrast, in ontological matters Jerusalem was no naturalist. While Jerusalem subscribed to a conception of Geisteswissenschaft for which sociology was to provide the foundation (1926, 3–17), it is to be noted that he did not understand the distinction between Natur- and Geisteswissenschaften along Windelband’s and Rickert’s lines (1904 [1905a, 59–60]), but as conditioned by the dualism of mind and body (1923, 362–363).
“Evolutionist philosophy is not science without presuppositions…. These presuppositions, however, are not the result of a critical theory of knowledge (Erkenntniskritik), but they are rather heuristic principles, which the results of empirical science made highly probable.” (1909b, 813) Husserl, his opponent in the psychologism dispute, was criticized for taking as essential structures of the mind what are but “associations that have become fixed and social solidifications (Verdichtungen), which are the result of the experiences and systematizing work of past generations” (1914 [1925a, 196]). Again, more on Verdichtungen in section “Jerusalem’s sociology of cognition” below.
Unlike most current naturalists, however, Jerusalem shared with contemporaries of his like Mach and Brentano the conception now known as methodological solipsism, the idea that our knowledge of the world was built up from phenomenalistic building blocks.
Jerusalem presented an interesting example of their continued usefulness at later stages: “In teaching, typical ideas have great significance. All maps, all schematic drawings, models, portraits produce typical ideas of great vivacity and enrich our knowledge much more effectively than could be done by descriptions or definitions.” (1902, 100).
Compare Peter Strawson’s proposal that our knowledge of causality develops from imaginative projections on our part: “In a great boulder rolling down the mountainside and flattening the hut in its path we see an exemplary instance of force; and perhaps, in so seeing it, we are in some barely coherent way identifying with the hut (if we are one kind of person) or with the boulder (if we are another): putting ourselves imaginatively in the place of one or the other.” (1985, 123).
Jerusalem had high hopes for “modern ethnology”, namely to replace European enthnocentrism by a “healthy scientific cosmopolitianism” (1897a [1925a, 234])—even though he did not question but saw confirmed, by his theory of cognitive evolution, the widespread idea of a division between Natur- and Kulturvölker as propounded by Vierkandt (1886); see Jerusalem (1905b, 161). For some remarks on the problematical nature of this distinction, see Uebel (2003).
“Religious ideas, mythological interpretations of the course of nature often emerge from the heads of single human beings. Yet they only gain historical significance if they are sustained by some community, become the common property of a clan, a tribe or a people. Once one adds that language too becomes capable of forming and transmitting thoughts only in this fashion, that it is social in its nature of connecting a group of people, then one becomes convinced that in the development of cognition too the social factor plays a role. It would be a task equally meritorious and difficult to characterize this social factor in its historical development.” (1897a [1905a, 238]).
Literally meaning “thickening”, “increase of density” and “compression” in technical contexts and “condensation” in figurative contexts, the translators of Fleck who twice quoted the term from Jerusalem used “consolidation” (1935 [1979, 47, 172]), while the translators of Freud who also used the term used “condensation”; see Laplanche and Pontalis (1967 [1980, 83]).
His paper at the 1908 Heidelberg Congress shows that by then Jerusalem had begun to integrate the social dimension into his developmental psychology: “The biological universal of the typical idea and the economic universal of concept words are modified and condensed in ways hardly yet conceived of by the plain fact which may be neglected but not disputed, namely that the thought structures so formed are the products of common work, of the total experience of the tribe. They confront the individual as something supra-personal, he permanently remains subject to their suggestive effects and so grows unconsciously into the sociological universal which plays a role in building the self that cannot be considered too highly.” (1909b, 812, emphases added).
Agreements in line with “morality and custom” are recognized to license behavioral responses to typical situations, but given Jerusalem’s interest in the present context they are not further discussed (1909a [1925a,150).
In passing we note the potential tension in these passages with others (e.g., 1923, 98, quoted above) where the objective criterion does not altogether replace the intersubjective criterion but rather becomes the decisive one.
That the periodic need for the revision of scientific “auxiliary” concepts played a central role on Mach’s historic-critical conception of science was noted explicitly by Jerusalem, but also independently by Frank (1917). Jerusalem here also credited Mach with the recognition that certain scientific principles (like that of the conservation of energy) are “pre-formed in instinctual, that is wholly socially determined thinking.”
The term Verdichtung does not, however, appear in Section 4.4 of Mach (1882), which is dedicated to the same topic, the economy of science, though the process and result designated by it is very well described there.
Precisely in this sense it was also employed, for instance, by Friedrich Adler in his German translation of Duhem’s La théorie physique, son object et sa structure when the latter speaks, with reference to Mach, of the “doubling” of the economy of thought first afforded by the replacement of individual facts by laws, namely by “laws being condensed in theories” (Duhem 1906 [1908/1978, 24]).
In his translation of James’s Pragmatism, Jerusalem used the term “verdichtet” for “funded” as in “funded truths” and “experience funded” (1907 [1908/1994, 142, 148, 170]).
For further uses by Simmel of Verdichtung, see (1892a [1989, 28–29]), assigning to it the job of solidifying morals in customs, and (1892b [1989, 318]), implicating it in the empathetic understanding of other minds. Köhnke (1996, 346–348) points to a use which denotes the Verdichtung of intuitive ideas in abstract concepts.
For thoughts on why Dilthey and Simmel, among others may have failed to mention Lazarus, see Köhnke (2005a). One of these is unlikely to apply in the case of Jerusalem. Not only was he, like Lazarus und Steinthal, Jewish himself but his Nachruf for Steinthal made a point of recounting his lectures to the Hochschule für die Wissenschaft vom Judentum (Academy for Jewish Studies) in Berlin (cofounded by Lazarus) and compared him to Lessing’s Nathan the Wise (1899b [1905a, 210–211]).
See Jerusalem (1895, 150). Jerusalem once compared Lazarus to Steinthal as possessing the greater “gift of subtle psychological analysis” and referred to his Das Leben der Seele, Band 2: Geist und Sprache in support (1899b [1905a, 207]). That, of course is just the book in which Lazarus had first formulated the ideas of his later paper on Verdichtung published in 1862: Eckstein (1935, 90) identified Jerusalem’s mention (at 1895, 150) of Lazarus’s origination of the term as pointing to Lazarus (1856–1857, vol. II, 160).
See §4 above. Elsewhere he also criticized Vaihinger for adopting “the mechanics of mental life introduced by Herbart and developed by Steinthal” that unduly postulates wholly separate elements unable to merge with each other (1912 [1925a, 179–180]). Jerusalem also rejected Herbart’s principle— endorsed by Lazarus and Steinthal (1851 [2005, 22])—of the “limitation of the human mind” (Enge des Geistes) and instead accepted Wundt’s “law of the growth of mental energy or the new creation of mental powers,” interpreting the creation of new tools of thought as the “enlargement of mental powers” (1897b [1905a, 173]).
“Nothing is more ridiculous than the attempt to explain the mind of an educated person in terms of his inborn mental powers. Even so, just about everything that’s been said about reason in recent times has to be classed as such patent foolishness.” Herbart (1815 [1821/1993, 318]).
See Köhnke (2005b, 248 n. 440).
Note that, by contrast, Jerusalem criticized Wilhelm Wundt’s later version of Völkerpsychologie not only as still much too individualist but also stated that—unlike with Lazarus and Steinthal—he “missed the constant attention to the social nature of language” (1905c, 281).
See Köhnke (2005a, xl and xxxi).
Of course, Lazarus too employed Wechselwirkung to describe the interaction of individuals in society but not as explicitly as Simmel as constituting both individuals and society. See, e.g., Simmel (1890 [1989, 129–131]), a section summarised elsewhere as: “The unity of society as the reciprocal action of its parts. The condensation of this reciprocal action into objective structures.” (Ibid., 111).
To be sure, Simmel’s project of a sociology of culture in its most general sense is a much richer sociology than Jerusalem’s more anthropological account which, as we saw, mostly leaves off where more modern sociologies of knowledge start, but even the latter pale in comparison with the range of Simmel’s enterprise.
“Only once humans emerge from the herd, once they become individuals, do they begin to create more precise instruments of thought. … In this the most significant alteration in the nature of man is due to the social differentiation by the ever increasing division of labour.” (1909a [1925a, 146]) In his Preface to his edition of Lévy-Bruhl he wrote, referring to the period before Durkheim had reviewed his 1909 paper: “I had already become familiar with the works of the French school of sociologists led by Durkheim and recognized how closely their point of view was related to mine. It was especially the works of Hubert, of Mauss, and those by Durkheim himself, which provided me with rich instruction and stimulation.” (1921, v) This suggests (as does a passage in 1924, 184) that he had been aware of Durkheim and Mauss (1903) for some time though it does not indicate since when exactly. But Jerusalem did not have an infallible grasp of the details of the Durkheim school: Lévy-Bruhl was not a student of Durkheim’s, contrary to Jerusalem’s assertion (1924, 186).
Significantly, Jerusalem speaks of the typical ideas of early man as “collective representations” only in (1924, 187–188), but not in (1909a). However, that Jerusalem earlier picked up on the Durkheimian idea of collective representations is suggested by his mention of not only Mauss but also Hubert in his recollection (1921a, v). Henri Hubert and Mauss had published “certain seminal observations on time and space which are direct precursors of the [Durkheim-Mauss] essay on classification (Année sociologique, vol. V, 1902, p. 248)” (Needham 1963, xxix–xxx).
See Durkheim and Mauss (1903 [1963, 85)) and Durkheim (1912 [1915, 440)). That Durkheim’s explanation fails is widely acknowledged; see, e.g., Needham (1963) or Bloor (1982), and not that Schmaus’s critique of Bloor’s interpretation of Durkheim does not dispute this point (1994, 66, 259–260; cf. his 2000).
Prior to more recent post-Mertonians only Fleck spent much time on the shaping of the perceptual sensibilities of experimental scientists. This marks him out in the classical period of the discipline and links him by anticipation to Kuhn’s idea of the central role exemplary problem solutions in the socialization of scientists and by continuation to Jerusalem’s notion of Verdichtung as a process creative of shared typical ideas and concepts. (For Fleck’s own adoption of Jerusalem’s conception of Verdichtung in his own account, see his (1935 [1980, 37]) where the term is rendered as social reinforcement).
Philipp Frank and Otto Neurath set out to explore how Duhem’s underdetermination of theory by evidence—a phenomenon not taken account of by Jerusalem—allowed social factors to play a role in the acceptance of theories; see Uebel (2000). Neurath’s distinctive addition to this consisted in placing testimony in a central place for the epistemology of science; see Uebel (2009).
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I wish to thank Tamas Demeter for his invitation to contribute to this special issue and an anonymous reviewer for thoughtful and constructive criticism.
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Uebel, T. But is it sociology of knowledge? Wilhelm Jerusalem’s “sociology of cognition” in context. Stud East Eur Thought 64, 5–37 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11212-012-9156-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11212-012-9156-4