Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Killing the straw man: Dennett and phenomenology

  • Published:
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Can phenomenology contribute to the burgeoning science of consciousness? Dennett’s reply would probably be that it very much depends upon the type of phenomenology in question. In my paper I discuss the relation between Dennett’s heterophenomenology and the type of classical philosophical phenomenology that one can find in Husserl, Scheler and Merleau-Ponty. I will in particular be looking at Dennett’s criticism of classical phenomenology. How vulnerable is it to Dennett’s criticism, and how much of a challenge does his own alternative constitute? I will argue that there are some rather marked differences between these two approaches to consciousness, but as I also hope to make clear, Dennett’s own account of where the differences are located is off target and ultimately based on a somewhat flawed conception of what classical phenomenology amounts to.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. When I in the following talk about heterophenomenology, I will always be referring to Dennett’s heterophenomenology unless otherwise noted.

  2. For a more comprehensive account, cf. Zahavi, 2003.

  3. For a discussion of the unity of the phenomenological tradition, cf. Zahavi, 2007.

  4. For a recent, quite similar claim, cf. Noë, 2005, 179.

  5. Husserl’s technical name for this investigation is that it is an analysis of the noesis-noema correlation. His theory of intentionality is firmly located in the context of this correlation, and as Marbach has quite correctly pointed out, the noetic structures that Husserl manages to unearth in his sophisticated analysis are structures that are completely overlooked in Dennett’s own account (cf. Marbach, 1994). For a more detailed account of Husserl’s theory of intentionality, cf. Drummond, 1990; Marbach, 1993.

  6. This is only part of the story though, since Merleau-Ponty also emphasizes the first-personal givenness of consciousness and argues that I don’t live through, say, the anger and grief of another in the same way as that person him- or herself (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, 409, 418).

  7. I also find the discussion of whether or not heterophenomenology actually matches the established practice in cognitive science spurious (Dennett, 1993a, 50). The pertinent question is not this question, but the question of whether or not the practice in question is able to do justice to consciousness.

  8. See, for instance, Gallagher, 1997, 2003; Marbach, 1993, 1994; Parnas, 2003; Petitot, Varela, Pachoud, & Roy, 1999; Sass & Parnas, 2007; Sheets-Johnstone, 1999; Varela, 1996; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991; Zahavi, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2004d, 2005.

  9. This study was funded by the Danish National Research Foundation. Back in 2001, Dennett served as one of the international evaluators of a proposal to establish a Center for Subjectivity Research in Copenhagen. The proposal was subsequently accepted by the Danish National Research Foundation. I would like to use this occasion to express my gratitude to Dennett for his generous evaluation.

References

  • Avramides, A. (2001). Other minds. London, UK: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cerbone, D. R. (2003). Phenomenology: Straight and hetero. In C. G. Prado (Eds.), A house divided: Comparing analytical and continental philosophy (pp. 105–138). Amherst, MA: Humanity Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davidson, D. (2001). Subjective, intersubjective, objective. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, D. C. (1979). On the absence of phenomenology. In D. Gustafson & B. Tapscott (Eds.), Body, mind, and method (pp. 93–113). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, D. C. (1982). How to study human consciousness empirically, or, nothing comes to mind. Synthese, 53, 159–180.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, D. C. (1987). The intentional stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness explained. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, D. C. (1993a). Caveat emptor. Consciousness and Cognition, 2, 48–57.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, D. C. (1993b). Living on the edge. Inquiry, 36, 135–159.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, D. C. (1994). Tiptoeing past the covered wagons: A response to Carr. http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/tiptoe.htm.

  • Dennett, D. C. (2001). The fantasy of first-person science. http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/chalmersdeb3dft.htm.

  • Dennett, D. C. (2003). Who’s on first? Heterophenomenology explained. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(9–10), 19–30.

    Google Scholar 

  • Drummond, J. J. (1990). Husserlian intentionality and non-foundational realism. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gallagher, S. (1997). Mutual enlightenment: Recent phenomenology in cognitive science. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 4(3), 195–214.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gallagher, S. (2003). Phenomenology and experimental design: Toward a phenomenologically enlightened experimental science. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(9–10), 85–99.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gurwitsch, A. (1966). Studies in phenomenology and psychology. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gurwitsch, A. (1979). Human encounters in the social world. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heidegger, M. (1986). Sein und Zeit. Tübingen, Germany: Max Niemeyer; Being and time. Albany, NY: SUNY, 1996.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heidegger, M. (1993). Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (1919/1920). Gesamtausgabe Band 58. Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Vittorio Klostermann.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heidegger, M. (1999). Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie. Gesamtausgabe Band 56/57. Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Vittorio Klostermann.

    Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, E. (1950). Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge. Husserliana I. Den Haag, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.

    Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, E. (1952). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Drittes Buch: Die Phänomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften. Husserliana V. Den Haag, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.

    Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, E. (1954). Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie. Husserliana VI. Den Haag, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.

    Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, E. (1959). Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Zweiter Teil. Theorie der phänomenologischen Reduktion. Husserliana VIII. Den Haag, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.

    Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, E. (1962). Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925. Husserliana IX. Den Haag, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.

    Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, E. (1966). Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893–1917). Husserliana X. Den Haag, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.

    Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, E. (1973). Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Dritter Teil: 1929–1935. Husserliana XV. Den Haag, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.

    Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, E. (1981). Shorter works. In P. McCormick & F. A. Elliston (Eds.). Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

  • Husserl, E. (1984a). Logische Untersuchungen II. Husserliana XIX/1–2. Den Haag, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.

    Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, E. (1984b). Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie. Husserliana XXIV. Den Haag, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.

    Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, E. (1987). Aufsätze und Vorträge (1911–1921). Husserliana XXV. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.

    Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, E. (1989). Aufsätze und Vorträge (1922–1937). Husserliana XXVII. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Marbach, E. (1993). Mental representation and consciousness: Towards a phenomenological theory of representation and reference. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Marbach, E. (1994). Troubles with heterophenomenology. In R. Casati, B. Smith, & G. White (Eds.), Philosophy and the cognitive sciences (pp. 247–264). Vienna, Austria: Hölder-Pickler-Tempsky.

    Google Scholar 

  • Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945). Phénoménologie de la perception. Paris, France: Éditions Gallimard; Phenomenology of perception. London, UK: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962.

    Google Scholar 

  • Merleau-Ponty, M. (1960). Signes. Paris, France: Éditions Gallimard; Signs. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964.

    Google Scholar 

  • Merleau-Ponty, M. (1964). Le visible et l’invisible. Paris, France: Tel Gallimard; The Visible and the Invisible. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1968.

    Google Scholar 

  • Metzinger, T. (2003). Being no one. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Noë, A. (2005). Action in perception. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Parnas, J. (2003). Self and schizophrenia: A phenomenological perspective. In T. Kircher & A. David (Eds.), The self in neuroscience and psychiatry (pp. 217–241). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Petitot, J., Varela, F. J., Pachoud, B., & Roy, J.-M. (Eds.) (1999). Naturalizing phenomenology: Issues in contemporary phenomenology and cognitive science. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

  • Sartre, J.-P. (1943/1976). L’être et le néant. Paris, France: Tel Gallimard; Being and nothingness. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sass, L., & Parnas, J. (2007). Explaining schizophrenia: The relevance of phenomenology. In M. Chung, W. Fulford, & G. Graham (Eds.), The philosophical understanding of schizophrenia. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, in press.

  • Scheler, M. (1973). Wesen und Formen der Sympathie. Bern, Switzerland / München, Germany: Francke Verlag; The nature of sympathy. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sheets-Johnstone, M. (1999). The Primacy of movement. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: John Benjamins.

    Google Scholar 

  • Strawson, G. (1994). Mental reality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tye, M. (1995). Ten problems of consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Varela, F. J. (1996). Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3(4), 330–349.

    Google Scholar 

  • Varela, F. J., & Shear, J. (1999). First-person methodologies: What, why, how? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6(2–3), 1–14.

    Google Scholar 

  • Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Velmans, M. (2000). Understanding consciousness. London, UK: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Waldenfels, B. (2000). Das leibliche Selbst. Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des Leibes. Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Suhrkamp.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zahavi, D. (1999). Self-awareness and alterity: A phenomenological investigation. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zahavi, D. (Ed.) (2000). Exploring the self. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: John Benjamins.

  • Zahavi, D. (2002). First-person thoughts and embodied self-awareness. Some reflections on the relation between recent analytical philosophy and phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1, 7–26.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zahavi, D. (2003). Husserl’s phenomenology. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zahavi, D. (Ed.) (2004a). Hidden resources. Classical perspectives on subjectivity. Special double issue of Journal of Consciousness Studies 11(10–11).

  • Zahavi, D. (2004b). Back to Brentano? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 11(10–11), 66–87.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zahavi, D. (2004c). Phenomenology and the project of naturalization. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 3/4, 331–347.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zahavi, D. (2004d). Husserl’s noema and the internalism–externalism debate. Inquiry, 4(1), 42–66.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zahavi, D. (2005). Subjectivity and selfhood: Investigating the first-person perspective. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zahavi, D. (2007). The phenomenological tradition. In D. Moran (Ed.), Routledge companion to twentieth-century philosophy. London, UK: Routledge, in press.

  • Zahavi, D., & Stjernfelt, F. (Eds.) (2002). One hundred years of phenomenology. Husserl’s logical investigations revisited. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer.

Download references

Acknowledgment

Thanks to Uriah Kriegel and Galen Strawson for comments to an earlier version of the article.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Danish National Research Foundation: Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen, Njalsgade 140–142, Building 25, 5th floor, 2300, Copenhagen, Denmark

    Dan Zahavi

Authors
  1. Dan Zahavi
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Dan Zahavi.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Zahavi, D. Killing the straw man: Dennett and phenomenology. Phenom Cogn Sci 6, 21–43 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-006-9038-7

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-006-9038-7

Key words

Search

Navigation