Abstract
Ma (in Econ. Theory 8, 377–381, 1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (Econometrica 58, 1475–1480, 1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented – and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 – is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as “symmetric.”
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Knuth D.E. Marriages Stables. Montréal: Les Presses de l’Université Montréal (1978)
Ma J. (1996) On randomized matching mechanisms. Econ. Theory 8, 377–381
Roth A.E., Vande Vate J.H. (1990) Random paths to stability in two-sided matching. Econometrica 58, 1475–1480
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
We thank two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. B. Klaus’s and F. Klijn’s research was supported by Ramón y Cajal contracts of the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología. The work of the authors was also partially supported through the Spanish Plan Nacional I+D+I (BEC2002-02130 and SEJ2005-01690) and the Generalitat de Catalunya (SGR2005-00626 and the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA).
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Klaus, B., Klijn, F. Corrigendum to “On randomized matching mechanisms” [Economic Theory 8(1996)377–381]. Economic Theory 32, 411–416 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0117-3
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0117-3