Abstract
This article reviews the simple economics of matching by characteristics. The goal is to understand sorting patterns in the marriage market and other matching markets by focusing on the nature of the gain from match and the mechanism of the market force of competition.
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Hao, L. (2018). Assortative Matching. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2481
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2481
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