Abstract.
We analyse a non-zero sum two-person game introduced by Teraoka and Yamada to model the strategic aspects of production development in manufacturing. In particular we investigate how sensitive their solution concept (Nash equilibrium) is to small variations in their assumptions. It is proved that a Nash equilibrium is unique if it exists and that a Nash equilibrium exists when the capital costs of the players are zero or when the players are equal in every respect. However, when the capital costs differ, in general a Nash equilibrium exists only when the players' capital costs are high compared to their profit rates.
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Manuscript received: April 1999/Final version received: March 2000
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Baston, V., Garnaev, A. On a game in manufacturing. Mathematical Methods of OR 52, 237–249 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860000075
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860000075