Abstract.
In a general model of common-value second-price auctions with differential information, we show equivalence between the following characteristics of a bidder: (i) having a dominant strategy; (ii) possessing superior information; (iii) being immune from winner's curse. When a dominant strategy exists, it is given by the conditional expectation of the common value with respect to bidder's information field; if the dominant strategy is used, other bidders cannot make a profit.
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Final version November 2001
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Einy, E., Haimanko, O., Orzach, R. et al. Dominant strategies, superior information, and winner's curse in second-price auctions. Game Theory 30, 405–419 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820100087
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820100087