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Coalition Formation and Social Choice

  • Book
  • © 1997

Overview

Authors:
  1. M. A. Deemen

    1. University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands

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Part of the book series: Theory and Decision Library C (TDLC, volume 19)

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Table of contents (7 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages i-x
    Download chapter PDF

  2. Introduction

    • M. A. van Deemen
    Pages 1-15

  3. Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory

    • M. A. van Deemen
    Pages 17-45

  4. Examples of Social Choice Rules

    • M. A. van Deemen
    Pages 47-87

  5. General Solutions for Social Choice Problems

    • M. A. van Deemen
    Pages 89-117

  6. Coalition Formation in Simple Games

    • M. A. van Deemen
    Pages 119-148

  7. Coalition Preferences

    • M. A. van Deemen
    Pages 149-186

  8. Coalition Formation in Social Choice Games

    • M. A. van Deemen
    Pages 187-218

  9. Back Matter

    Pages 219-244
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Keywords

About this book

Coalition Formation and Social Choice provides a unified and comprehensive study of coalition formation and collective decision-making in committees. It discusses the main existing theories including the size principle, conflict of interest theory, dominant player theory, policy distance theory and power excess theory. In addition, the book offers new theories of coalition formation in which the endogenous formation of preferences for coalitions is basic. Both simple game theory and social choice theory are extensively applied in the treatment of the theories. This combined application not only leads to new theories but also offers a new and fresh perspective on coalition formation and collective decision-making in committees.
The book covers the fundamental concepts and results of social choice theory including Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. Furthermore, it gives a coherent treatment of the theory of simple games. Besides more traditional topics in simple game theory like power indices, it also introduces new aspects of simple games such as the Chow parameter, the Chow vector and the notion of similar games.

Authors and Affiliations

  • University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands

    M. A. Deemen

Bibliographic Information

  • Book Title: Coalition Formation and Social Choice

  • Authors: M. A. Deemen

  • Series Title: Theory and Decision Library C

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-2578-0

  • Publisher: Springer New York, NY

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

  • Copyright Information: Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1997

  • Hardcover ISBN: 978-0-7923-4750-7Published: 31 October 1997

  • Softcover ISBN: 978-1-4419-4781-9Published: 03 December 2010

  • eBook ISBN: 978-1-4757-2578-0Published: 09 March 2013

  • Series ISSN: 0924-6126

  • Series E-ISSN: 2194-3044

  • Edition Number: 1

  • Number of Pages: X, 244

  • Topics: Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods, Econometrics

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