Abstract
The coalition theories presented in the previous chapter do not explicate the preferences of the players with respect to winning coalitions. The subjects of this chapter are two theories in which the formation of individual preferences with respect to winning coalitions is explicated. Each of these theories leads to a preference profile concerning a set of winning coalitions. Both theories show how these coalition preferences can be used to obtain a social preference with respect to the set of winning coalitions and how to arrive at a solution, that is, a selection of one or more coalitions.
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© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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van Deemen, M.A. (1997). Coalition Preferences. In: Coalition Formation and Social Choice. Theory and Decision Library, vol 19. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-2578-0_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-2578-0_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-4781-9
Online ISBN: 978-1-4757-2578-0
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