Abstract
According to the standard reading of Kant’s ethics, application of the Formula of Humanity (FH) yields universal rules that are binding on all agents regardless of their beliefs. I argue that the standard reading needs reconsidering. In particular, I argue that the FH can and should be read as yielding duties that are sensitive to agents’ beliefs. Thus, different actions might be permissible for different agents.
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Notes
All citations to Kant’s texts use the standard Academy pagination which runs in the margins of most English translations. All translations are taken from the Cambridge blue series.
The expressive meaning account has been set forth as a reading of Kant in, e.g., (Wood 1998); (Wood 1999, chapter 4); and (Wood 2008, chapter 5). For an account that argues for something like the expressive meaning account on independent philosophical grounds see, e.g., (Anderson 1993). For two challenges to this account and a reply to these challenges see (Piper 1996), (Sturgeon 1996) and (Anderson 1996), respectively.
However, Kant does not use the term ‘humanity’ univocally throughout his corpus. For example, at 4:430, in his discussion of the duty of self-cultivation, Kant seems to include our capacities for greater perfection and our fortunate natural aptitudes (the natural aptitudes that any particular human has, which will vary from human to human) in humanity. However, in the analogous discussion in the Metaphysics of Morals, humanity is simply the power to set ends. In the Metaphysics of Morals, development of talents and cultivation of the self are not instances of promoting humanity but rather that which is required in order to make one worthy of humanity (6:392). Rawls argues that ‘humanity’ in FH does not include any reference to the general capacity to set ends (Rawls 2003, 188). Guyer points out that this omission has significant consequences for Rawls’ interpretation of Kant, requiring Rawls to introduce the notion of “basic” or “true” human needs in order to generate positive duties and making it difficult for Rawls to explain the relation between morality and happiness that Kant thinks follows from his principle more generally (Guyer 2006, 395n8). This issue will not be pursued here.
This corresponds to the so-called contradiction in conception test for the so-called Formula of a Law of Nature (FLN).
See, e.g., Kant’s remarks about being indifferent to others at 6:395.
Cf., e.g., (Wood 1999, 141): “What FH fundamentally demands of our actions is...that they express proper respect or reverence for the worth of humanity. Expressive reasons for doing things may have been largely overlooked in morality, but they are not unfamiliar in everyday life. People shake hands, congratulate or condole with others, and say “please,” “thank you,” and “you’re welcome,” in order to manifest respect, gratitude, benevolence, or esteem for them.”.
Some might object at this juncture that the FH is about the facts rather than about the beliefs of an ideal agent.
There is something right about this objection: an ideal agent’s beliefs presumably will be true and, as such, in appealing to an ideal agent, we are appealing to the facts. But, this objection also makes an important mistake: the FH is about the permissibility of a given action, and there are no actions without agents, nor is there a way to assess whether an action is permissible according to the FH without appealing to an agent. Indeed, this is on full display in the following passage from Rawls, who argues that FH gives objective conclusions about duties:
“I believe that Kant’s conception of objectivity falls under the following general characterization of objectivity: namely, moral convictions are objective if reasonable and rational persons who are sufficiently intelligent and conscientious in exercising their powers of practical reason would eventually endorse those convictions, when all concerned know the relevant facts and have sufficiently surveyed the relevant considerations.” (Rawls 2003, 245).
That is, according to Rawls, we apply the FH by asking about “reasonable and rational persons who...know the relevant facts”--i.e., ideal agents who have only true beliefs.
So, we do appeal to “the facts.” But, we do so, on the standard reading, via an appeal to ideal agents. And precisely this is what opens up space for my alternate account, for if we appeal to actual, rather than ideal, agents, then we wind up applying the FH through potentially false beliefs.
Merely succeeding in this endeavor would not suffice, either.
It seems to be something like this that Svidrigailov has in mind when he complains of Raskolnikov that “he’s too eager for life. These young men are contemptible on that point.”.
This is the kind of strategy that the rational intuitionist might pursue.
Here I am disagreeing with Hill, who argues that Kant’s claim that conscience cannot err is false on the grounds that agents do make mistakes in matching up their acts (as they perceive them) with their moral principles (Hill 2002, 348). If my reading of Kant’s claim is correct, then Hill’s argument against the passage at 6:401 does not connect.
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Kahn, S. Reinterpreting FH in light of Kant’s claims about conscience. ZEMO (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s42048-024-00178-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s42048-024-00178-1