Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Can Positive Duties be Derived from Kant’s Categorical Imperative?

  • Published:
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Kant’s moral philosophy usually considers two types of duties: negative duties that prohibit certain actions and positive duties commanding action. With that, Kant insists on deriving all morality from reason alone. Such is the Categorical Imperative that Kant lays at the basis of ethics. Yet while negative duties can be derived from the Categorical Imperative and thus from reason, the paper argues that this is not the case with positive duties. After answering a number of attempts to derive positive duties from the Categorical Imperative, most notably those of Barbara Herman, it sketches an alternative approach to understanding the relationship between the universal moral law and specific moral contents.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Such are, for example, religious ethics, e.g., Bible’s ten commandments, as well as Qur’an’s behavior-prescribing duties. Kant also belongs to this tradition. Starting with the Groundwork and more so in the Doctrine of Virtue, he argues for the establishment of positive duties. It should be noted, though, that there is a continuous discussion regarding the status of positive duties – see, for example, Lichtenberg, 2010

  2. The use of the terms “narrow” and “wide” in relation to negative and positive duties is consistent with Kant’s use in the Groundwork (see, for example, GMS, AA 04:454) and in the Metaphysics of Morals (see, for example, MS, AA 06:390), even though Kant might see them a more complicated

  3. MS, AA 06:223.04-05. “die Begehung oder Unterlassung als Pflicht”

  4. see, for example, MS, AA 06:419

  5. GMS, AA 04:424

  6. See, for example, KrV A800/B828, AA 03:520; KpV, AA 05:20; GMS, AA 04:408

  7. KpV, AA 05:027.12-14. “Nun bleibt von einem Gesetze, wenn man alle Materie, d. i. jeden Gegenstand des Willens, (als Bestimmungsgrund) davon absondert, nichts übrig, als die bloße Form einer allgemeinen Gesetzgebung.”

  8. GMS, AA 04:421, 07–08. “[…] handle nur nach derjenigen Maxime, durch die du zugleich wollen kannst, daß sie ein allgemeines Gesetz werde “

  9. See GMS, AA 04:422

  10. It can be claimed that positive duties can require merely a certain type of action rather than having a specific maxim. However, the moral worth of any action, as Kant notes in the Groundwork, lies in its maxim (see GMA, AA 04:399): an action without an underlying maxim cannot be an outcome of conscious reasoning, and hence cannot be seen as undertaken freely by a moral agent.

  11. See MS, AA 06:380 and MS, AA 06:389

  12. GMS, AA 04:423

  13. MS, AA 06:386–387, 06:419, 06:387–388, 06:401–402, etc.

  14. MS, AA 06:385

  15. see, for example, KrV, AA 06:385

  16. GMS, AA 04:392.04. “obersten Pricips der Moralität”

  17. KrV, AA 06:385; GMS, AA 04:407–408, and elsewhere

  18. KrV, AA 02:027-028

  19. For a similar discussion and response to some critique of Kant’s treatment of universality, necessity, and a priority, see Parkinson, 1960. For a different and much contested view of the relationship between a prioricity, universality, and necessity see Kripke, 1980

  20. Kant explicitly refers to judging maxims by the criterion of universalization as a test (Probe) in the second Critique: KpV, AA 05:69.01

  21. GMS, AA 04:420.26-28, 04:421.01-03. “Denke ich mir […] einen kategorischen Imperativ, so weiß ich sofort, was er enthalte. Denn da der Imperativ außer dem Gesetze nur die Nothwendigkeit der Maxime enthält, diesem Gesetze gemäß zu sein, das Gesetz aber keine Bedingung enthält, auf die es eingeschränkt war, so bleibt nichts als die Allgemeinheit eines Gesetzes überhaupt übrig, welchem die Maxime der Handlung gemäß sein soll”

  22. For a definition of a maxim, see GMS, AA 04:421n. It is also important to emphasize that a maxim is a principle rather than a “specific, single, spatio-temporally localizable mental state of a person” (Fricke, 2008, p215), i.e., a maxim can be implemented in a number of situations. Kantian examples of deception, help, etc. can serve a demonstration for this. Therefore, the critique that it is always possible to localize any maxim, to formulate it in a way that it would be specific to unique situational circumstances and this way make it pass the Formula of Universal Law test, is unfounded.

  23. GMS, AA 04:429.10-12. “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” / “Handle so, daß du die Menschheit sowohl in deiner Person, als in der Person eines jeden andern jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, niemals bloß als Mittel brauchst.”

  24. GMS, AA 04:439.01-03. “[…] act in accordance with the maxims of a member giving universal laws for a merely possible kingdom of ends” / “[…] handle nach Maximen eines allgemein gesetzgebenden Gliedes zu einem bloß möglichen Reiche der Zwecke” See also GMS, AA 04:438

  25. GMS, AA 04:431.16-18. “[…] the idea of the will of every rational being as a will giving universal law” / “[…] die Idee des Willens jedes vernünftigen Wesens als eines allgemein gesetzgebenden Willens.” See also GMS, AA 04:432

  26. See GMS, AA 04:438 for the statement of the equivalence between FUL and the Formula of Humanity; the derivation of the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends from FUL in GMS, AA 04:438; and for the direct connection between FUL and the Formula of Autonomy see GMS, AA 04:431

  27. GMS, AA 04:436.09. “[…] nur so viele Formeln eben desselben Gesetzes”

  28. GMS, AA 04:436.11. “subjective […] praktisch”

  29. GMS, AA 04:436.29-32. Man thut aber besser, wenn man in der sittlichen Beurtheilung immer nach der strengen Methode verfährt und die allgemeine Formel des kategorischen Imperativs zum Grunde legt […]

  30. MS, AA 06:395.15-16. “[…] handle nach einer Maxime der Zwecke, die zu haben für jedermann ein allgemeines Gesetz sein kann.”

  31. Guyer argues that the other formulations of the CI are not so much substitutes but necessary conditions for the real possibility of the Categorical Imperative. This is similar to the way the requirement of non-contradiction satisfies the logical possibility of an object but by no means its real possibility: the latter requires the object to be conceived in accordance with the categories and intuitions (Guyer, 1995, p361). While at the first glance Guyer’s argument undermines the primacy of the first formulation of the CI, I do not think it does. These are the other formulations that enable FUL to be carried out, yet without FUL they would have no moral import. On the other hand, FUL could become practical with other enabling factors, should there be any. However, further discussion on this subject exceeds the scope of this paper.

  32. I am indebted to the anonymous reviewer #1 for pointing out this issue as relevant to the discussion.

  33. Wood, for example, argues that the different formulas of the Categorical Imperative constitute stages of progressive development, the FUL being just the first step (Wood, 2008, pp66-84 and elsewhere). Yet this interpretation, however interesting, does not seem to cohere with either the letter or the spirit of Kant’s ethics.

  34. Similar position can be found at Baumann who sees it as a “Content of the Moral Principle / Gehalt des Moralprinzips”: The moral principle can consist only in the Categorical Imperative / Das Moralprinzip kann nu rim kategorischen Imperativ bestehen.” (Baumann, 2001, p3)

  35. GMS, AA 04:398

  36. On including the duty of beneficence in imperfect duties despite a degree of textual ambiguity see Seymour, 2008

  37. When, of course, it does not conform to the agent’s own inclinations. Yet in this case we cannot talk about offering help but rather about the benefits to the other that are a by-product of satisfying one’s inclinations.

  38. GMS, AA 04:423.28-29. “[…]es möglich ist, daß nach jener Maxime ein allgemeines Naturgesetz wohl bestehen könnte”

  39. GMS, AA 04:423.30-31. “[…]ist es doch unmöglich, zu wollen, daß ein solches Princip als Naturgesetz allenthalben gelte”; see also Korsgaard, 1996, pp14-16

  40. GMS, AA 04:423.32–35. “[…]manche eräugnen können, wo er anderer Liebe und Theilnehmung Bedarf, und wo er durch ein solches aus seinem eigenen Willen entsprungenes Naturgesetz sich selbst alle Hoffnung des Beistandes, den er sich wünscht, rauben würde”

  41. See, for example, Glasgow, 2001 and Herman, 1993

  42. Herman, 1993

  43. Herman, 1993, 51; see also Schmidt, 2005

  44. Herman, 1993, 54

  45. Ibid., 55

  46. Another alternative to the prudential argument is what can be called the argument from happiness (see, for example, Glasgow, 2001). The argument relies on Kant’s remark to Theorem IV in the second Critique, where he derives the duty to promote the happiness of others through the universalization of one’s desire to promote her own happiness – a desire that, per Kant, can be attributed to us as finite beings. While this approach differs from Herman’s in terms of its specific focus – happiness instead of the limitations of human nature – it seems to give rise to similar problems, and the argument against it can be the same as the argument against Herman.

  47. GMS, AA 04:400, 02. “[…]Princip des Wollens”

  48. KpV, AA 05:34

  49. KpV, AA 05:33-34

  50. *Capek, 1985

  51. Herman, 1993, 54, note 13

  52. GMS, AA 04:423, 33. “[…]anderer Liebe und Theilnehmung”

  53. Mill, 1891

  54. Herman, 1993; Glasgow, 2001; to an extent - Illies, 2007

  55. MS, AA 06:427

  56. MS, AA 06:434–436

  57. MS, AA 06:422–423

  58. The discussion on cases of killing other than murder and possible differences between Kant’s texts and the principles of Kantian ethics goes beyond the scope of this paper.

  59. It can be argued that not only the worldview but also other factors, e.g., agent’s estimations of how other individuals are likely to act, play a crucial role in the case of positive duties. This discussion, however, exceeds the scope of the current paper.

  60. MS, AA 06:221, 23–28. “kategorische (unbedingte) Imperativen […] nach denen gewisse Handlungen […] moralisch nothwendig, d. i. verbindlich, sind, woraus dann für jene der Begriff einer Pflicht entspringt” See also 06:222 and 223

  61. MS, AA 06:380, 18. “unbedingte Sollen”

  62. MS, AA 06:380, 23–25. “einen Zweck […] für den Menschen als Pflicht, vorgestellt wird.” See also MS, AA 06:239

  63. MS, AA 06:382, 24–25. “wird […] der Pflichtbegriff auf Zwecke leiten”

  64. See argument in MS, AA 06:381

  65. MS, AA 06:385, 07–09. “ist es ein kategorischer Imperativ der reinen praktischen Vernunft, mithin ein solcher, der einen Pflichtbegriff mit dem eines Zwecks überhaupt verbindet.”

  66. as provided in MS, AA 06:385

  67. MS, AA 06:385, 14–17. “Denn gäbe es keine [gleichen Zwecken], so würden, weil doch keine Handlung zwecklos sein kann, alle Zwecke für die praktische Vernunft immer nur als Mittel zu andern Zwecken gelten, und ein kategorischer Imperativ wäre unmöglich”

  68. It can be argued that this consideration casts doubt on the whole of practical reason. However, discussing such argument is out of the scope of this paper.

  69. MS, AA 06:385, 32. “Eigene Vollkommenheit - fremde Glückseligkeit”

  70. MS, AA 06:392, 16–19. “Gesetz […]für die Maxime der Handlungen […] Baue deine Gemüths und Leibeskräfte zur Tauglichkeit für alle Zwecke an, die dir aufstoßen können”

  71. aka virtue – see MS, AA 06:380 and also MS, AA 06:394

  72. MS, AA 06:387–388

  73. Using Wittgenstein’s term; see Tractatus (Wittgenstein, 1922/2003), §2.012

  74. See Wittgenstein’s language games–Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein, 2009), §7ff

  75. It can be claimed that multiple maxims can be ascribed to the same action. Yet this would not preclude the application of the Categorical Imperative to each of them, neither will it diminish its force. This discussion, however, exceeds the current scope.

  76. Geiger, 2008, 138

  77. Guyer’s translation for MS, AA 06:399.02–03. “Ästhetische Vorbegriffe der Empfänglichkeit des Gemüths für Pflichtbegriffe überhaupt” in Guyer, 2010

  78. MS, AA 06:399.18. “Das moralische Gefühl”; Ibid., 400.22. “Gewissen”; Ibid., 402.28. “Achtung”

  79. See MS, AA 06:399–403

  80. MS, AA 06:402.23. “Menschenliebe”

  81. Ibid., 401–402

  82. Haddock Seigfried, 2001, p98

  83. Hill, 2010, p245

  84. The cultural factors will, of course, play here an important role as well, by giving the basic neurophysiological tendencies certain form, or way of expression.

  85. See similar thoughts in Hill, 2010

  86. see Kant on freedom in KrV, AA 362–363 (A531-534/B559-562); GMS, AA 04:458; MS, AA 06:226 and specifically the discussion on the freedom of the will (Die Freiheit der Willkür). For the review of the development of the concept of freedom as choice see Woody, 1998

  87. GMS, AA 04:493.06–07

  88. see discussion in MS, AA 06:226 for textual support

  89. See, for example, MS, AA 06:376

  90. KrV, AA 03:075.14–15. “Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind.”

  91. Foot, 1992, p282. While my views are different from the ones Philippa Foot has argued for in the quoted article, her formulations seem very appropriate to sum up the paper.

References

Kant’s works–German original

  • Kant, Immanuel: Gesammelte Schriften Hrsg.: Bd. 1–22 Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Bd. 23 Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, ab Bd. 24 Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Berlin 1900ff

Kant’s works–English translation

  • Kant I (1998) Critique of pure reason. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

  • Kant I (1996) Practical philosophy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Secondary literature

  • Capek K (1985) War with the newts. Northwestern University Press, Evanston

  • Baumann P (2001) In: Gerhardt V, Horstmann R-P, Schumacher R, Kant G (eds) Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung : Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol 3. De Gruyter, Berlin, pp 3–12

  • Foot P (1992) Morality as a system of hypothetical imperatives. In: Chadwick RF (ed) Immanuel Kant, critical assessments, vol 3. Routledge, London, pp 274–283

    Google Scholar 

  • Fricke C (2008) Maximen. In: Rohden V, Kant G (eds) Recht und Frieden in der zPhilosophie Kants : Akten des X. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol 3. De Gruyter, Berlin, pp 125–135

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Geiger I (2008) How do we derive moral laws? In: Rohden V, Kant G (eds) Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants : Akten des X. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol 3. De Gruyter, Berlin, pp 137–147

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Glasgow J (2001) Kant’s non-prudential duty of beneficence. In: Gerhardt V, Horstmann R-P, Schumacher R, Kant G (eds) Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung : Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol 3. De Gruyter, Berlin, pp 211–219

    Google Scholar 

  • Guyer P (1995) The possibility of the categorical imperative. Philos Rev 104(3):353–385

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Guyer P (2010) Moral feelings in the metaphysics of morals. In: Denis L (ed) Kant’s metaphysics of morals: a critical guide. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 130–151

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Haddock Seigfried C (2001) Kantian autonomy fails to fulfill the conditions of practical rationality. In: Gerhardt V, Horstmann R-P, Schumacher R, Kant G (eds) Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung: Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol 3. De Gruyter, Berlin, pp 96–103

  • Herman B (1993) The practice of moral judgment. Harvard Univsrsity Press, Cambridge

  • Hill T (2010) Kant’s Tugendlehre as normative ethics. In: Denis L (ed) Kant’s metaphysics of morals: a critical guide. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 234–255

  • Iacoboni M (2005) Understanding others: imitation, language, empathy mechanisms of imitation and imitation in animals, vol. 1 of perspectives on imitation: from mirror neurons to memes B2 - mechanisms of imitation and imitation in animals, vol. 1 of perspectives on imitation: from mirror neurons to memes. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 77–100

  • Illies CFR (2007) Orientierung durch Universalisierung: Der Kategorische Imperativ als Test für die Moralität von Maximen. Kant-Studien 98(3):306–328. doi:10.1515/kant.2007.018

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Korsgaard CM (1996) Creating the kingdom of ends. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kripke SA (1980) Naming and necessity. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Lichtenberg J (2010) Negative duties, positive duties, and the “New Harms”. Ethics 120(3):557–578

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mill JS (1891) Utilitarianism, 11th edn. Longmans, Green, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Nietzsche FW (1917) Thus spake Zarathustra (T. Common, Trans.). Random House, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Parkinson GHR (1960) Necessary propositions and “A Priori” knowledge in Kant. Mind 69(275):391–397

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rand A (1992) Atlas shrugged. Dutton, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Schmidt CM (2005) The anthropological dimension of Kant’s ‘metaphysics of morals’: Kant-Studien. Philos Z Kant Ges 96(1):66–84

    Google Scholar 

  • Schulte-Rüther M, Markowitsch HJ, Fink GR, Piefke M (2007) Mirror neuron and theory of mind mechanisms involved in face-to-face interactions: a functional magnetic resonance imaging approach to empathy. J Cogn Neurosci 19(8):1354–1372

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Seymour M (2008) Widening the field for the practice of virtue: Kant’s wide imperfect duties. In: Rohden V, Kant G (eds) Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants : Akten des X. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, vol 3. De Gruyter, Berlin, pp 403–413

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Wittgenstein L (1922/2003) Tractatus logico-philosophicus. New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc

  • Wittgenstein L (2009) Philosophical investigations (G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker & J. Schulte, Trans. Rev. 4th ed.). Chichester, West Sussex, U.K.; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell

  • Wood AW (2008) Kantian ethics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Woody JM (1998) Freedom’s embrace. Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Georgia, Athens, GA, USA

    Michael Yudanin

Authors
  1. Michael Yudanin
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Michael Yudanin.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Yudanin, M. Can Positive Duties be Derived from Kant’s Categorical Imperative?. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 18, 595–614 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-014-9546-4

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-014-9546-4

Keywords

Search

Navigation