Abstract
Rorty has been criticized for his pragmatic rationality by different thinkers like Stout, Steven carter. Here in this article our main focus is Novoa's criticism of Rorty's solution to the challenges of evidentialism (Novoa in Rorty’s Demands on Religious Belief: Looking for a Pragmatic Rationality. Retrieved October 20, 2019, from Researchgate. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321729830_Rorty's_Demands_on_Religious_Belief_Looking_for_a_Pragmatic_Rationality, 2017). Novoa feels that religion needs not be conversation stopper as long as it does not compromise on capabilities (Novoa, 2017). This is what he calls pragmatic rationality. He takes pragmatic rationality based on capabilities. So in this article we argue against Novoa saying that capabilities are not clearly defined and hence the criteria set forth by Novoa have to be revised. The criteria set forth by him are too general, for instance world relationships, etc. The reasons for revising the criteria are too general, no unanimity in what are capabilities and even the specified capabilities are not precise.
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Deka, C., Prabhu, V. Can Capability Approach Pave the Way for Religion? A Study in the Context of Rorty’s Private/Public Sphere’s Debate. J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res. 38, 361–369 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-021-00263-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-021-00263-5