Abstract
Constructivist approaches in epistemology and ethics offer a promising account of normativity. But constructivism faces a powerful Schmagency Objection, raised by David Enoch. While Enoch’s objection has been widely discussed in the context of practical norms, no one has yet explored how the Schmagency Objection might undermine epistemic constructivism. In this paper, I rectify that gap. First, I develop the objection against a prominent form of epistemic constructivism, Belief Constitutivism. Belief Constitutivism is susceptible to a Schmagency Objection, I argue, because it locates the source of normativity in the belief rather than the agent. In the final section, I propose a version of epistemic constructivism that locates epistemic normativity as constitutive of agency. I argue that this version has the resources to respond to the Schmagency Objection.
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Notes
- 1.
In this paper, following Enoch , I am calling constitutivist-constructivist views constructivist. Whether non-constitutivist-constructivist views (alá Sharon Street) face a similar question is outside the focus of this paper. See Street (2010).
- 2.
Enoch writes, “I conclude… that normativity will not come from what is constitutive of action. (Nor, I think, will epistemic normativity come from what is constitutive of beliefs, for reasons similar to the ones I put forward in what follows)” (2006, 171).
- 3.
I am glossing over some of the details of Enoch’s Schmagency Objection. There are two complexities that are worth noting. First, Enoch worries about indeterminacy over which normative practice we are discussing. Second, Enoch phrases the question in terms of whether the agent/schmagent should care. But the constructivist is interested in whether the norms are authoritative, not whether the agent cares. While these nuances are interesting, they are not important for this paper.
- 4.
Velleman writes that until we specify the constitutive standards to which we are appealing, we haven’t asked a determinate question. He writes, “What the Kantian argues is that the criterion in relation to which guidance is possible must lie in the very nature of that which is to be guided. A question must establish criteria for what can count as a correct answer; if it fails to establish criteria for an answer, then it is not a fully constituted question. If ‘Why be an agent?’ isn’t about a choice or a shmoice or any third thing for which there is a criterion of correctness, then you aren’t owed an answer, because you haven’t yet asked a question” (2009, 144).
- 5.
This point becomes especially clear in Enoch’s follow-up paper Enoch (2011).
- 6.
Enoch overstates the grip of this question, though. In general, we do not need a reason to engage in a practice. We might decide whether to play chess or schmess by flipping a coin. The rules of the road dictate that I should drive on the right side, so I have reason to drive on the right side. But suppose I find myself driving, and I ask myself “why am I driving?” and I can think of no reason why I am. I still ought to conform to the rules of the road, even if I cannot answer the request for justification for why I am driving. Similarly, I could take up the hobby of croquet on a whim. I may not have a reason for doing so (other than my whim), but I still have reason to follow the rules of the game. So, dialectically, if I find myself in a practice, and I cannot justify why I am in the practice, so long as I stay in the activity, I still have reason to follow the rules of the practice.
- 7.
To be clear, the presupposition failure occurs by the constructivist’s lights. So while the constructivist can reject the objection as question-begging, the result is impasse, not triumph.
- 8.
Unless schmagency is really just a particular conception of agency, as Ferrero (2009) argues.
- 9.
Why belief rather than believing? Shah and Velleman came to a consensus in their 2005 paper, “Doxastic Deliberation.” Velleman (2000) put forward the view that believing has a constitutive aim, namely truth, and this aim structures our believing. Shah (2003) responded with the counterexample of wishful thinking. Wishful thoughts should be classified as faulty beliefs, but the Velleman (2000) model would classify them as not beliefs at all, since they are not governed by the constitutive aim of believing. Shah and Velleman (2005) propose that we should instead locate the normativity in belief. It’s important to note that this move wasn’t forced by the considerations of Shah (2003), but was rather motivated by considering a number of factors.
- 10.
- 11.
The Belief Constitutivist might respond, but beliefs are not under our direct voluntary control. As a result, we can never get the reflective distance required for this to be possible for us. See my “Evidentialism in Action” (n.d.) for a detailed response to this concern.
- 12.
Thomson distinguishes between the notion of internal-correct and external-correct. Internal-correct refers to an enterprise that can be done well or poorly. External-correct refers to the satisfaction of a standard of correctness. Thomson objects that SOC cannot pick out an enterprise because there is no such thing as internal-correct, only external-correct. There is nothing that counts as well or poorly following the SOC. Instead, SOC is just a standard used to evaluate beliefs.
- 13.
See Hazlett (2013) for an overview of the psychological literature on optimism bias.
- 14.
See Hazlett (2013) for an argument that, in fact, we shouldn’t be good believers.
- 15.
This case is structurally similar to Enoch’s Reluctant Patriot. See Enoch (2011, 216).
- 16.
A similar point is made by Côté-Bouchard (2016).
- 17.
In Korsgaard (2008), she develops this notion in chap. 7, “Acting for a Reason.” In her understanding of action, Korsgaard is drawing on Kant and Aristotle.
- 18.
Crucially, Korsgaard does not think that the beliefs function as reasons that cause the action. The beliefs function as reasons-for-performing-this-act-for-this-end, and the agent’s reasoning is embodied in the action.
- 19.
I am grateful to Cory Davia, Nick Leonard, Nadja El Kassar, Andrea Robitzsch, Meica Magnani, Luis Rosa, Jakob Ohlhurst, Lisa Benossi, Thomas Grundmann, Sandy Goldberg, Baron Reed, Kyla Ebels-Duggan, and Jennifer Lackey for feedback on various stages of this paper.
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Flowerree, A.K. (2018). Epistemic Schmagency?. In: Kyriacou, C., McKenna, R. (eds) Metaepistemology. Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93369-6_13
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