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Looking for Reasons to be Good: Mengzi as a Moral Advisor

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Abstract

This essay accounts for Mengzi’s 孟子 failure in persuading King Xuan of Qi (Qi Xuan Wang 齊宣王) to act morally. We argue that the distinction between internal and external reasons in contemporary philosophy helps to highlight the nature of the failure. The problem of nontransmission of the compassionate impulse within a person despite moral persuasion, which Mencians need to address in order to enhance the success of moral conversion, is now explained as a result of misdirecting the advisee to the lofty ideal of sagehood. We conclude by proposing a proleptic understanding of external reasons within a pragmatic model of giving moral advice.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Arts and Science, Kyushu University, 744 Motooka, Nishi-ku, Fukuoka-shi, 819-0395, Japan

    Daniel Young

  2. HKU SPACE Community College, 13F KEC, 28 Wang Hoi Road, Kowloon Bay, Hong Kong

    Thomas Ming

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  1. Daniel Young
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  2. Thomas Ming
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Correspondence to Daniel Young.

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Young, D., Ming, T. Looking for Reasons to be Good: Mengzi as a Moral Advisor. Dao 22, 555–575 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11712-023-09906-7

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